Essays on Investor Beliefs and Asset Pricing by Sui, Pengfei
Essays on Investor Beliefs and Asset Pricing
Thesis by
Pengfei Sui
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
Pasadena, California
2018
Defended April 27th, 2018
ii
© 2018
Pengfei Sui
ORCID: 0000-0002-0364-4915
All rights reserved
iii
I dedicate this dissertation to my family.
iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I am indebted to a great many people who accompanied me along this journey.
First, I am deeply grateful to my committee members, Lawrence Jin, Jakša Cvitanic´,
Matthew Shum, and Colin Camerer, for their enormous support and endless encour-
agement. Their knowledge and wisdom, their attitude towards research, and their
personality have always been inspiring me.
I owe special thanks to my aunt Suhua Dong, and my cousin Jianjie Li, for their
patience and support. I am also indebted to my friends, Haoyao Liu, Cong Wang,
Wenguang Wang, Dayin Zhang, Seo Young (Silvia) Kim, Xiaomin Li, Yimeng Li,
and Jun Zhang, for their company.
I thank the division faculty and staff, especially Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, Michael
Ewens, Ben Gillen, Thomas Palfrey, Bob Sherman, Philip Hoffman, Marina Agra-
nov, and Antonio Rangel, for their invaluable suggestions. I am grateful to Laurel
Auchampaugh and Sabrina De Jaegher for their incredible assistance and support.
I am also thankful to Jun Chen, Lucas Nunez, Alejandro Robinson Cortes, Mali
Zhang, and Marcelo Fernandez, who helped make this five years memorable.
Finally, a special gratitude goes to my parents, Shihai Sui and Sumei Dong. Their
unconditional love and support are priceless.
vABSTRACT
This dissertation is composed of three chapters addressing the connections between
investor beliefs and asset pricing. Specifically, I focus on one prevailing pattern
of investor beliefs in the finance literature, return extrapolation. The idea is that
investor expectations about future market returns are a positive function of the recent
past returns. In this dissertation, I use this concept to understand a number of facts
in the asset pricing literature.
Return extrapolation attracts growing attention in the literature, not only because it
well explains real-world investors’ expectations in the survey, but also because it sig-
nificantly drives investor demand towards stocks. Therefore, we should anticipate a
connection between return extrapolation measurement and the stock market dynam-
ics. However, contrary to the intuition, previous empirical studies fail to document a
significant connection. In Chapter 1, “Time-varying Impact of Investor Sentiment”,
I recover this connection. Specifically, I formally define investors who extrapolate
past returns as extrapolators and incorporate their wealth level into analysis. My
main finding is that return extrapolation interacts strongly with extrapolators’ wealth
level in predicting future market returns. Therefore, conditional on extrapolators’
wealth level, return extrapolation significantly explains stock market returns.
The return extrapolation concept also raises challenges to the asset pricing mod-
els under the rational expectation frameworks. Specifically, rational expectation
theories lead to a positive correlation between expectations and future realized re-
turns, whereas return extrapolation indicates a negative correlation. Given this
discrepancy, there is a clear demand for a behavioral asset pricing model that can
simultaneously explain survey evidence on investor expectations and the classical
asset pricing puzzles. In Chapter 2, “Asset Pricing with Return Extrapolation”,
coauthored with Lawrence Jin, we present a new model of asset prices based on
return extrapolation. The model is a Lucas-type general equilibrium framework, in
which the agent has Epstein-Zin preferences and extrapolative beliefs. Unlike earlier
return extrapolation models, our model allows for a quantitative comparison with
the data on asset prices. When the agent’s beliefs are calibrated to match survey
expectations of investors, the model generates excess volatility and predictability
of stock returns, a high equity premium, a low and stable risk-free rate, and a low
correlation between stock returns and consumption growth.
vi
In Chapter 3, “ ‘Dark Matter’ of Finance in the Survey ”, I investigate another at-
tribute of investor beliefs—tail risk perceptions. Although tail risks play significant
roles in explaining asset pricing puzzles, researchers have very limited knowledge
about them because tail events are difficult to observe. I use Shiller tail risk survey
to empirically investigate tail risk perceptions. In this survey, investors are asked
to report their estimated probability for a crash event in the U.S. stock market.
However, when using survey data to understand investors’ perception of tail risks,
there are two fundamental challenges. First, is tail risks survey reliable? Second,
to avoid cherry-picking, is there a unified framework to explain different attributes
of investor beliefs? My analysis provides positive answers to both questions. First,
I show that Shiller tail risk survey is reliable. More importantly, I show that return
extrapolation can serve as a unified belief formation framework to explain not only
variations in investor expectations but also in tail risk perceptions.
vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
Table of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
List of Illustrations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x
Chapter I: Time-varying Impact of Investor Sentiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Motivating Facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.3 The Behavioral Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.4 Model Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.5 The Role of Extrapolation: A Rational Benchmark Model . . . . . . 36
1.6 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Chapter II: Asset Pricing with Return Extrapolation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.2 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.3 Model Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.4 Comparative Statics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
2.5 Comparison with Rational Expectations Models . . . . . . . . . . . 75
2.6 Fundamental Extrapolation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
2.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
Chapter III: “Dark Matter” of Finance in the Survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.2 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
3.3 Consistency between Two Types of Surveys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
3.4 Connections between Return Extrapolation and Perceived Left-tail
Probabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
3.5 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
Appendix A: Appendix to Chapter One . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
A.1 Micro-foundations for Fundamental Investors . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
A.2 Rational Benchmark Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
A.3 Behavioral Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
A.4 Figures and Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
A.5 Alternative Regressions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
Appendix B: Appendix to Chapter Two . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
B.1 Derivation of the Differential Equations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
B.2 Numerical Procedure for Solving the Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . 153
B.3 Additional Discussion about Return Expectations and Cash Flow
Expectations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
viii
B.4 Figures and Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
Appendix C: Appendix to Chapter Three . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
C.1 Figures and Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
ix
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
Number Page
A.1 Gallup Investor Expectations and S&P 500 Index . . . . . . . . . . . 121
A.2 Gallup Investor Expectations and Household Mutual Fund Flows . . 122
A.3 Predictive Power of Investor Sentiment: Intuition . . . . . . . . . . . 123
A.4 Calibrated Model Solutions: Rational Benchmark. . . . . . . . . . . 124
A.5 Calibrated Model Solutions: Behavioral Model. . . . . . . . . . . . 125
A.6 Gallup Survey and Simulated Investor Sentiment. . . . . . . . . . . 126
A.7 Interaction between Wealth and Investor Sentiment vs Degree of
Extrapolation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
A.8 Perceived Sharpe Ratio and True Sharpe Ratio. . . . . . . . . . . . 128
B.1 Important Equilibrium Quantities Each as a Function of Sentiment. . 157
B.2 Objectively Measured Steady-State Distribution of Sentiment. . . . . 158
B.3 Objective and Subjective Expectations about Price Growth. . . . . . 159
B.4 Agent’s Expectations about StockMarket Returns, Price Growth, and
Dividend Growth. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
B.5 Comparative Statics: Utility Parameters. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
B.6a Comparative Statics: Belief Parameters (I). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
B.6b Comparative Statics: Belief Parameters (II). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
C.1 Tail Risk Measurements Based on Shiller Tail Risks Survey. . . . . 182
C.2 Connecting Investor Expectations with Perceived Left-tail Risks. . . . 183
C.3 Implied Left-tail Risks based on Investor Expectations. . . . . . . . . 184
xLIST OF TABLES
Number Page
A.1 Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
A.2 Forecast Revision of Investor Sentiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
A.3 Predictive Regressions on Future Returns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
A.4 Conditional Predictive Regressions on Future Returns . . . . . . . . 132
A.5 Conditional Predictive Regressions on Future Returns (with Controls) 133
A.6 Parameter Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
A.7 Simulated Extrapolative Expectations: Behavioral Models . . . . . . 135
A.8 Memory Structure of Investor Expectations: Behavioral Models . . . 136
A.9 Forecast Revision of Investor Sentiment: Simulated Results Based
on Behavioral Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
A.10 Model-simulated Conditional Predictive Regressions on Future Re-
turns: Behavioral Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
A.11 Conditional Predictive Power of Investor Sentiment. . . . . . . . . . 139
A.12 Conditional Predictive Power of Investor Sentiment: Simulations
based on the Behavioral Models. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
A.13 Leverage Ratio and Future Consumption Growth: Behavioral Models 141
A.14 Simulated Extrapolative Expectations: Rational Benchmark Models . 142
A.15 Model-simulated Conditional Predictive Regressions on Future Re-
turns: Rational Benchmark Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
A.16 Leverage Ratio and Future Consumption Growth: Rational Models . 144
A.17 Conditional Predictive Regressions on Future Returns . . . . . . . . 146
A.18 Conditional Predictive Regressions on Future Returns (With Controls)147
A.19 Model-simulated Conditional Predictive Regressions on Future Re-
turns: Behavioral Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
A.20 Conditional Predictive Power of Investor Sentiment. . . . . . . . . . 149
A.21 Conditional Predictive Power of Investor Sentiment: Simulations
based on the Behavioral Models. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
B.1 Investor Expectations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
B.2 Determinants of Investor Expectations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
B.3 Parameter Values. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
B.4 Basic Moments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
B.5 Return Predictability Regressions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
B.6 Correlation between Consumption Growth and Stock Returns. . . . . 171
xi
B.7 Campbell-Shiller Decomposition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
B.8 Autocorrelations of Log Excess Returns and Log Price-dividend Ratios.173
B.9 Return Predictability Regressions in the TrueRegime-SwitchingModel.174
B.10 Investor Expectations in Bansal and Yaron (2004). . . . . . . . . . . 175
B.11 Investor Expectations in Bansal et al. (2012). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
B.12 Investor Expectations in the Fundamental Extrapolation Model. . . . 179
B.13 Basic Moments in the Fundamental Extrapolation Model. . . . . . . 181
C.1 Summary Statistics and Correlations between Investor Expectation
Surveys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
C.2 Correlations between the Left-tail Probabilities from Investor Expec-
tation Surveys. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
C.3 Contemporaneous Connections between Shiller Left-tail Probability
and Investor Expectations: Individual Investors . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
C.4 Contemporaneous Connections between Shiller Left-tail Probability
and Investor Expectations: Institutional Investors . . . . . . . . . . . 188
C.5 Left-tail Probabilities based on Return Extrapolation and Rational
Expectations (with VIX). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
C.6 Left-tail Probabilities based on return extrapolation and rational ex-
pectations (without VIX). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
C.7 Determinant of Perceived Left-tail Probabilities: Individual Investors 191
C.8 Determinant of Perceived Left-tail Probabilities: Institutional Investors192
1C h a p t e r 1
TIME-VARYING IMPACT OF INVESTOR SENTIMENT
1.1 Introduction
Whether investor sentiment influences the market has been a long-standing question
in the finance literature. From the Great Crash in 1929 to the Internet bubble, from
the Nifty Fifty bubble to the 2008 financial crisis, each of these episodes is asso-
ciated with dramatic changes in asset prices. Traditional finance theories—models
in which investors have fully correct beliefs about the asset dynamics and therefore
always force the asset prices to the rational present value of expected future cash
flows—leave no room for investor sentiment and have considerable difficulty fitting
these patterns. However, investor sentiment, which reflects excessive optimism and
pessimism in investor beliefs, seems to play a central role in these phenomena. The
large gap between the traditional models and the salient market episodes with dra-
matic asset price movements has made researchers realize that belief-based investor
sentiment plays an important role in asset pricing dynamics.
Relying on survey evidence, recent studies have highlighted the concept of extrapolation—
making forecasts about future returns based on past realized returns—in understand-
ing the dynamics of investor beliefs. Extrapolation implies that investors tend to
believe that asset prices continue to increase after a sequence of high returns and
fall after a sequence of low returns (Greenwood and Shleifer (2014)), and has been
used to account for the excessive optimism and pessimism in the market (? and
Barberis).1 As a result, in this paper, I use extrapolation to characterize belief-
based investor sentiment. But despite its prevalence in surveys and its importance
in investors’ portfolio choice, there is no strong empirical evidence that belief-based
investor sentiment influences the aggregate stock market. In other words, extrap-
olation alone leaves the impact of investor sentiment unsolved: for instance, in
Greenwood and Shleifer (2014), investor beliefs reported in the survey have only
insignificant predictive power over future aggregate stock market returns.
In this paper, I provide a parsimonious approach to reveal the impact of belief-
1There might be other forms of extrapolation. I use extrapolation to refer to return extrapolation
because according to previous studies, because it better addresses the survey expectation series.
There are other studies on extrapolation behavior of investors, for example, Vissing-Jorgensen
(2004), Amromin and Sharpe (2013), Koijen et al. (2015), and Kuchler and Zafar (2016).
2based investor sentiment. By incorporating the time-varying market impact of
extrapolation, which is a notion largely overlooked by the literature, this paper
documents and highlights the impact of belief-based investor sentiment on the
aggregate market. Specifically, in addition to the basic extrapolation framework,
I incorporate the wealth dynamics of investors who extrapolate to proxy for the
market impact of extrapolation. In this setting, extrapolation and its market impact
together drive the asset price dynamics: when the market impact of extrapolation
is high, extrapolation induces irrational demand for the risky asset and, therefore,
it leads to mispricing; when the market impact is low, extrapolation simply reflects
the recent market dynamics. The interaction between extrapolation and its market
impact sheds new light on asset mispricings. More importantly, although investor
beliefs alone do not significantly predict future aggregate market returns, they have
salient predictive power after conditioning on their market impact—a result that
supports both my model implications and my empirical exercise. This conditional
predictive power of investor sentiment not only provides direct evidence of the
impact of investor beliefs on the aggregate stock market, it also helps to reveal the
underlying mechanism of the predictability of returns.
To formalize these arguments, I first develop a continuous-time dynamic equilib-
rium model that features two types of investors: extrapolators and fundamental
investors. On the basis of past price changes, extrapolators form investor sentiment,
or, equivalently, their perceived expectation about future risky asset returns, and
they make an investment choice between a risky and risk-free asset. After consecu-
tive positive price changes in the past, extrapolators become optimistic about future
returns, and after a streak of negative price changes, they become pessimistic about
future returns. However, the perceived expectations are different from the true ones
and, therefore, high or low investor sentiment, in general, cannot continue for long
since extrapolators will easily become disappointed by shocks in the future. Conse-
quently, investor sentiment reverts to its mean. Moreover, the major departure from
previous extrapolation models is to incorporate the wealth level of extrapolators: all
other things being equal, extrapolators have a larger impact on the equilibrium asset
prices when their wealth level is higher.
As in earlier models, extrapolators are met in the market by fundamental investors
who serve as the counteracting forces and arbitrage against mispricing. When the
risky asset is overvalued, fundamental investors short the risky asset and, therefore,
correct prices downwards. If the risky asset is undervalued, fundamental investors
3lean against the wind and push prices upwards. However, their ability to correct
mispricing depends on the wealth level of extrapolators: fundamental investors can
easily correct mispricing when sentiment-driven wealth is low, while the correction
takes longer when the wealth level of extrapolators is high.
This model setting generates the key result: when their wealth level is high, ex-
trapolators drive the asset prices. In this case, high investor sentiment makes the
current asset price overvalued, and the future asset price will decline because high
investor sentiment will cool down over time. Therefore, investor sentiment nega-
tively predicts future market returns. Conversely, when the wealth level is low, high
investor sentiment predicts high future returns because the market is under a price
correction. This predictive power of investor sentiment provides direct theoretical
support for my conclusion that investor beliefs impact the aggregate stock market.
Moreover, this predictive power supports belief-based explanations of the pre-
dictability of returns—that prices temporarily deviate from the level warranted
by fundamentals because of the existence of extrapolators, but they revert back as a
mispricing correction gradually takes place in the future. Cassella and Gulen (2015)
provide empirical support for this explanation. They define the degree of extrap-
olation (DOX) as the relative weight extrapolators place on recent-versus-distant
past returns when they form subjective expectations for future asset returns. When
DOX is high and, therefore, when investor beliefs are transitory, mispricings are
corrected more quickly and price-scaled variables (such as price-to-dividend ratio)
have stronger predictive power. One possible determinant of the variations in DOX
is the time-varying consensus level of extrapolation among market participants.
In my model, the time-varying wealth level of extrapolators effectively drives the
consensus level of extrapolation in the market.
My model matches other salient patterns in the asset pricing literature. For instance,
the mean-reversion of investor sentiment naturally generates a negative equity pre-
mium when investor sentiment is high, a pattern that is consistent with findings
documented by Baron and Xiong (2017). The fact that my model generates a nega-
tive correlation between investors’ expectations and the subsequent realized returns
is consistent with the findings of Greenwood and Shleifer (2014). Moreover, the
resulting countercyclical Sharpe ratio is consistent with empirical evidence doc-
umented by Lettau and Ludvigson (2010). All these asset pricing patterns seem
puzzling under a rational expectations framework.
To empirically test the impact of investor sentiment on the market, I use both
4the CRSP value-weighted index and Gallup survey data. During the period of
December 1996 to September 2011, Gallup asked individual investors to report
their expectations of aggregate stock market returns in the next twelve months.
Using these responses I measure investors’ perceived expectations directly. As a
robustness check, I also follow Barberis et al. (2015) and construct an investor
sentiment index, Psentiment, that is purely based on extrapolation.2 Moreover,
Gallup survey evidence helps to identify extrapolator groups, which allows me to
select a reasonable proxy for the wealth level of extrapolators.
To find reasonable measurements for extrapolators, I focus on the “Households and
Non-Profitable Organizations” (HNPO hereafter) sector reported in the “Financial
Accounts of the United States”. Investors in this sector generally are individual
investors who are less sophisticated than institutional investors. Moreover, Yang
and Zhang (2017) document, first, that investor sentiment in the survey effectively
drives the portfolio position of investors in stocks in the HNPO sector and, second,
that such sentiment-driven investment negatively predicts returns in the following
quarters.3 Their analysis effectively indicates that investor beliefs in the HNPO
sector are associated with extrapolation. My model therefore uses the total financial
assets of the HNPO sector as the proxy for the wealth level of extrapolators.
My empirical tests support the main predictions of my model. Specifically, I
construct an interaction term between the Gallup survey expectations and wealth
dividend ratios in the HNPO sector, and I use it to predict future market returns. I
find a statistically significant and negative coefficient for the interaction term, which
indicates that investor sentiment connects closely to market mispricing when the
wealth level of extrapolators is high. This result holds over different predictive
horizons, ranging from one to six quarters.
Furthermore, following Aiken et al. (1991), I empirically present the predictive
pattern of investor sentiment conditional on different wealth levels of extrapola-
tors.When the wealth level of extrapolator is two standard deviation above its mean,
one standard deviation increase in investor sentiment measured by the Gallup sur-
vey is followed by a significant decrease of 16.2% in future twelve-months returns.
This is consistent with my model implication: when extrapolators drive the market,
2In my empirical analysis, I use both survey evidence and Psentiment to test my model predic-
tions. If investor beliefs in the survey are mainly driven by extrapolation, then two pieces of parallel
evidence should yield similar results for most of my tests. This point is strongly confirmed in my
exercise.
3Yang and Zhang (2017) use surveys by Gallup, Inc. and the American Association of Individual
Investors.
5investor sentiment reverts to its mean and leads to a negative predictive sign. This
pattern remains valid when Psentiment replaces Gallup. Conversely, when extrapo-
lators’ wealth level is two standard deviation below its mean, one standard deviation
increase in investor sentiment predicts a striking future market return of 35.9%: as
my model implies, when sentiment-driven wealth is low, investor sentiment reflects
the market valuation correction and, therefore, it positively predicts future market
returns.
Implications for the Literature. This paper belongs to the burgeoning return
extrapolation literature. Manyworks in this field try to understand the role that return
extrapolation plays in the aggregate stock market. (Cutler et al. (1990b), De Long
et al. (1990), Barberis et al. (2015) and Jin and Sui (2017)). Barberis et al. (2015)
use return extrapolation to construct an asset pricing model that can explain central
asset pricing facts such as the excess volatility puzzle, the predictability of returns,
and the investor belief survey evidence in the data. Jin and Sui (2017) construct a
quantitative benchmark of belief-based asset pricing models that can simultaneously
explain the equity premium puzzle, the excess volatility puzzle, the predictability
of returns, the low correlations between consumption and returns, and investor
belief evidence in the surveys. However, all existing studies of return extrapolation
ignore the role that the wealth level of extrapolators plays in asset dynamics. By
incorporating the wealth dynamics of extrapolators and the counteracting forces
from fundamental investors, I document a novel predictive pattern for future stock
market returns.
This paper also relates to the idea of limits to arbitrage, which is one of the founda-
tions for the behavioral finance literature. In its pioneer work, Shleifer and Vishny
(1997) argue that asset mispricing may exist for a long time because arbitrage ac-
tivities are limited. This is especially true when investment is delegated to portfolio
managers with short investment horizons and when the arbitrage activities face noise
trader risk and other risks. Abreu and Brunnermeier (2002) provide an additional
argument for limited arbitrage.4 My paper utilizes the concept of limits to arbi-
trage in a less direct way. Instead of focusing on the agency issue and risks for the
arbitragers, I mainly focus on the belief dynamics and the relative market impact
of noise traders. When their wealth level is high, arbitragers effectively face more
difficulties correcting the mispricing. In addition, by focusing on extrapolators, I
can not only provide a specific belief pattern for noise traders but also document a
4For a discussion on limits to arbitrage, see Barberis and Thaler (2003).
6salient impact of investor beliefs on the aggregate stock market.
This paper is also relevant to the return predictability literature. Previous stud-
ies have suggested that aggregate stock returns are predictable using price-scaled
variables, such as the dividend-to-price ratio and the earning-to-price ratio (Fama
and French (1988), Campbell and Shiller (1988), and Cochrane (2011)). Some
researchers attribute the predictability of stock market returns to variations in in-
vestors’ required returns. However, behavioral theoretical models attribute the
predictability to mispricings induced by investors’ biased beliefs (Barberis et al.
(2015), Hirshleifer et al. (2015), and Jin and Sui (2017)). Bacchetta et al. (2009)
document that the predictability of excess returns is often associated with the pre-
dictability of expectational errors, and this conclusion holds true for a broad set
of asset classes, including the stock, foreign exchange and bond assets. Moreover,
Cassella and Gulen (2015) empirically investigate the extent to which biased beliefs
can help explain the observed predictability in the data. In this paper, I connect
investor sentiment with return predictability through the time-varying impact of
extrapolators and find empirical support for this result.
This paper also contributes to the literature that examines the impact of investor
sentiment. Baker and Wurgler (2006) construct the investor sentiment index by
directly using the first principal component of important market indicators, such as
volume and equity share issuance, and demonstrate that investor sentiment has a
large impact on the cross-section of stock returns. Baker and Stein (2004) propose
an investor sentiment index based on market liquidity, and they show that it has
predictive power for future market returns. Stambaugh et al. (2012), who also use
the sentiment index provided by Baker and Wurgler (2006), find that overpricing is
more prevalent than underpricing when market-wide sentiment is high. However,
most of these studies construct investor sentiment using a “top down” approach,
which employs reduced-form variations in investor sentiment over time. By contrast,
this paper uses a “bottom up” approach, and it focuses on the belief formation of
investors. My focus on the microfoundations of the variation in investor sentiment
allows me to shed new light on the dynamic patterns of the investor sentiment index.
Like the “top down” literature, my analysis shows that investor sentiment has a large
impact on the aggregate stock market.
Finally, this paper sheds light on important patterns in economic activities. First,
many studies document a strong cyclicality of debt accumulation. Reinhart and
Rogoff (2009) demonstrate that household debt accumulation speeds up during
7market booms and often leads to severe financial crashes. He and Krishnamurthy
(2008) also propose a model that generates a procyclical leverage ratio that is based
on financial intermediations. This model also helps generate a procyclical leverage
ratio. However, in contrast to previous studies, in my model the procyclicality arises
from extrapolation. During market booms, extrapolators become overly optimistic
because they extrapolate the past returns and, consequently, they buy more risky
assets. Conversely, during recessions, extrapolators become overly pessimistic and,
therefore, they have a low leverage level. Second, extrapolation also helps explain
the nagative association between household leverage and future consumption growth
documented in Mian and Sufi (2009). Extrapolation induces investors to make
unreasonable investment decisions that lead to a future decrease in wealth, which
pushes down consumption growth rate.
Outline: This paper is organized as follows. In Section 1.2, I document some
dynamics of belief-based investor sentiment and identify the group of investors
who are more susceptible to extrapolation. In Section 1.3, I construct a behavioral
model that incorporates both extrapolation and thewealth dynamics of extrapolators.
Then I derive several model predictions about the time-varying impact of investor
sentiment. In Section 1.4, I examine these model predictions via both simulation
and data analysis. In Section 1.5, I examine the role of extrapolation by considering
a rational model as the benchmark. Section 1.6 summarizes results and proposes
directions for future research.
1.2 Motivating Facts
The difficulty of investigating the impact of belief-based investor sentiment lies both
in how to correctly measure investor beliefs and how to measure its overall market
impact. To provide insights into the dynamics of belief-based investor sentiment,
I resort to investor expectation surveys which directly asks investors about their
beliefs. In my later analysis, I will use two terms—belief-based investor sentiment
and survey measurement of investor sentiment—interchangeably whenever there
is no confusion. Further, relying on survey measurements of investor sentiment, I
identify one specific group of investors who tend to extrapolate so that I can measure
the market impact of extrapolators properly.
Investor Sentiment Dynamics
In recent decades, researchers have made progress in understanding investor ex-
pectations by analyzing survey evidence. In most of the existing investor surveys,
8respondents are asked about their expectations on future market returns, ranging
from six to twelve months. Compared to other measurements of investor expecta-
tions, survey measurements are more direct in extracting investor belief information.
In this paper, I mainly use the Gallup survey which measures individual investors’
expectations of the U.S. stock market over the next twelve months. 5 It is conducted
monthly between 1996 and 2011, but there are some gaps in later years especially
between November 2009 and February 2011 when the survey was discontinued. To
extract investor expectations, in each month, Gallup survey asks participants one
qualitative question: whether they are “very optimistic”, “optimistic”, “neutral”,
“pessimistic”, “very pessimistic” about stock returns over the next twelve months.
With the percentage of each response in the collected survey answers, Gallup reports
a qualitative investor expectation series to measure investor expectations in the
market:
Gallup = %Bullish −%Bearish, (1.1)
where “Bullish” is defined as either “very optimistic” or “optimistic” and “Bearish”
is defined as either “pessimistic” or “very pessimistic”. This qualitative time series
helps us understand the dynamics of investor sentiment in the market. Moreover,
Gallup survey also asks more precise quantitative questions about investors’ per-
ceived expected returns, although only for a shorter sample. Specifically, between
September 1998 and May 2003, Gallup asks participants to give an estimate of the
percentage return they expect for the stock market over the next year. Therefore,
as long as participants in the Gallup survey answer quantitative and qualitative
questions in a consistent way, I can effectively get quantitative estimations investor
expectation series by rescaling qualitative Gallup investor series with projection
method.6 This projection method also helps me transform qualitative series in other
investor expectation surveys to a meaningful quantitative basis.
However, there were two main concerns about the survey data. One concern is that
survey evidence is imprecisely measured and thus is noisy. The other is that survey
respondents may be confused by the sophisticated questions and therefore could not
5I use Gallup survey measurement to measure investor sentiment since Gallup mainly surveys
individual investors who are more likely to extrapolate. Moreover, Gallup survey has a quantitative
measurement of investor expectations to facilitate my analysis.
6Carlson and Parkin (1975) propose a method to generate average expectations from categorical
survey data. As pointed in Greenwood and Shleifer (2014), this method has almost no impact on the
investor expectation time series.
9provide pertinent answers. Fortunately, there are recent developments that show the
validity of the investor survey information. Greenwood and Shleifer (2014), among
other findings, show that (1) information contained in different surveys reflects sim-
ilar patterns and (2) the reported investor expectations in the surveys are largely
consistent with investors’ behaviors (See Figure A.2).7 Their findings indicate that
survey measures of investor expectations are not meaningless noise but represent
widely shared beliefs about future returns in the stockmarket. With these validations
from previous literature, I report the following observations to motivate my model.
Observation 1. Survey measurement of investor sentiment is positively associated
with the past returns in the aggregate stock market.
Observation 1 is the main message in Greenwood and Shleifer (2014), and is a
restatement of extrapolation: investors in the surveys over-extrapolate recent returns
when forming their expectations in their minds. Formally, I use extrapolators to re-
fer to these investors. Therefore, past good returns tend to make extrapolators overly
optimistic while past bad returns make them overly pessimistic. For the underlying
psychological mechanisms of extrapolation, there are several candidate theories,
including representativeness. Kahneman and Tversky (1972) define representative-
ness as “the degree to which an event (i) is similar in essential characteristics to
its parent population, and (ii) reflects the salient features of the process by which
it is generated”.8 With representativeness, extrapolators might mistakenly treat a
sequence of good (bad) recent returns as a salient feature of the whole distribution
of returns, which leads to an over-extrapolation. Although the fact that extrap-
olators overweight information in the recent returns is commonly documented in
recent empirical studies (Amromin and Sharpe (2013), Bacchetta et al. (2009) and
Greenwood and Shleifer (2014)), the source of over-extrapolation still remains an
important open question.
The belief-based investor sentiment in the surveys is consistent with most of the
anecdotal fluctuations of investor sentiment—that investor sentiment rise rapidly
7For result one, the authors compare survey sources from the American Association of Indi-
vidual Investors (AA), Gallup, Graham and Harvey, Investors’ Intelligence newsletter expectations,
Michigan Survey and Shiller, and document strong correlations between each survey. For result two,
the authors examine the reported investor expectations and the investor mutual fund flows, and find
two time-series are highly synchronized.
8For other references, also see Tversky and Kahneman (1971) and Tversky and Kahneman
(1975).
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during booms and decrease during crash episodes—in the market. In Figure A.1,
I plot the Gallup survey measurement of investor sentiment, ranging from 1996:12
to 2011:09, with the backdrop of shaded NBER recessions. During the “Internet
Bubble” episodes in mid-2000, Gallup survey measurement of investor sentiment
rises to its peak but drops dramatically after the burst. Similarly, Gallup survey
measurement rebounds to the peak before the 2007 financial crisis and declines
significantly after the market index fell in 2008.
[Place Table A.1 about here]
To further reveal the close connections between investor sentiment in the survey and
extrapolation, I construct a new investor sentiment variable called “Psentiment”.
Previous studies on the belief patterns in the survey indicate that when forming
beliefs on expectations of returns, extrapolators put a decayingweight on the realized
returns in the past. For example, Barberis et al. (2015) use the non-linear formula
in equation (1.2) to estimate the weighting scheme of extrapolators, with the survey
measurements of investor sentiment as the dependent variables and ψ represents for
the weighting scheme. Rt−(s+1)∆t,t−s∆t measures the past realized returns within one
interval ∆t. Using data of quarterly frequency (∆t = 1/4), they get the estimated ψ
of 0.44, implying that the realized returns one year ago are only half as important
as the most recent return.
Expectationt = a + bΣ∞s=0ωsRt−(s+1)∆t,t−s∆t, (1.2)
ωs =
e−ψs∆t
Σnk=0e
−ψk∆t ,
The constructed investor sentiment variable, Psentiment, is purely based on extrap-
olation and I use it for robustness check—if investor beliefs in the surveys are mainly
driven by extrapolation, then Psentiment and Gallup surveymeasurement of investor
sentiment should yield similar results.
Observation 2. Survey measurement of investor sentiment tend to revert to its
mean: high investor sentiment revises downwards in the future while low investor
sentiment revises upwards in the future.
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To empirically test the pattern in Observation 2, I run the following regression:
SRt+1[Sentt+N − Sentt+1] = c + dSentt + ut, (1.3)
where on the left hand side SRt+1[Sentt+N−Sentt+1]measures the investor sentiment
revision (SR for short) over future N − 1 horizons, Sentt represents the investor
sentiment at time t, and ut on the right hand side is the corresponding residual at
time t. The results for equation 1.3 is reported in Table A.2.
[Place Table A.2 about here]
The negative coefficient d supports the mean-reversion pattern in Observation 2.
Using the Gallup survey, one standard deviation increase implies an investor sen-
timent revision of 14.2% within one quarter and a revision of 62.4% within four
quarters. Similarly, with the constructed investor sentiment proxy Psentiment, one
standard deviation decrease implies an investor sentiment revision of 6.4% with
one quarter and a revision of 32.9% within four quarters. The coefficients remain
statistically significant in general.
The reversal property in expectations in Observation 2 is largely due to the fact that
investors tend to overreact to the information, and therefore it reflects the excessive
optimism and pessimism on expectations of returns in the surveys. When investor
sentiment is high, investors perceive higher returns going forward. However, the
objective return distributions observed by econometricians remain unchanged—
investors get constantly disappointed by future realized returns. As a result, investor
sentiment revises downwards in the future. When investor sentiment is low, investors
get constantly surprised by future realized returns, and investor sentiment bounce
upwards.
Reversal is a general pattern in economic studies. For instance, Greenwood and
Hanson (2013) document a systematic reversal in bond spreads. Bordalo et al.
(2018) document predictable reversals in the credit market because credit spreads
overreact to news. Reversals in investor expectations are also common and are
not limited to expectations of stock returns. For instance, Gennaioli et al. (2016)
document a salient reversal pattern for CEOs’ expectations about their company’s
earnings growth, and interpret the reversal as a result of over-extrapolating past
earnings growth rate. López-Salido et al. (2017) also link reversals to overreaction,
and suggest that a period of excessive investor optimism is followed by a reversal
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in the credit market, a term they refer to as “unwinding of investor sentiment”. The
reversal patterns capture important properties of investor belief dynamics.
Wealth Level of Extrapolators
The documented patterns in Observations 1 and 2 provide evidence on the dynamics
of investor beliefs. However, investor beliefs alone could not provide an answer to
the question of how belief-based investor sentiment influences the market: as shown
in Table A.3, Gallup survey measurement of investor sentiment does not have sig-
nificant predictive power for future stock market returns. This result seems puzzling
at the first glance since previous studies have shown that the extrapolation pattern in
surveys reflect market-wide investor expectations—intuitively, the predictive pattern
should be strong. One important element that seems missing is the wealth level of
extrapolators: after all, extrapolators with extreme sentiment levels but with trivial
wealth will have a limited impact on asset dynamics. Therefore, I also examine the
wealth level of extrapolators.
To measure the wealth level of extrapolators, it is important to understand which
group of investors are more susceptible to extrapolation. In the finance literature,
a common way to categorize investors is to divide them into individual investors
and institutional investors. Moreover, in the literature, individual investors are often
believed to be less sophisticated and more vulnerable to psychological biases, a term
formally defined as “dumb money” effect. And empirical evidence is prevailing.
For instance, Odean (1999), Barber and Odean (2000) and Barber and Odean
(2001) present extensive evidence that individual investors suffer from biased-self
attribution, and tend to have wealth-destroying excessive trading. Frazzini and
Lamont (2008) use mutual fund flows as a measure of individual investor sentiment
for different stocks and find that high sentiment predicts low future returns.9
A reasonable proxy for individual investors exists in the Federal Reserve’s Z.1 Sta-
tistical Release (“Financials Accounts of the United States”), which reports balance
sheet information for different sectors of the economy at a quarterly frequency, in-
cluding the Households and Nonprofit Organizations Sector (HNPO sector). The
HNPO sector contains aggregated information about individual investors.
More importantly, as shown in the recent studies, individual investors in the HNPO
sector tend to extrapolate. For example, a rigorous examination is reported in Yang
9For other studies supporting the “dumbmoney” effect, see Barber et al. (2008), Sapp and Tiwari
(2004).
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and Zhang (2017). Specifically, they document that (1) when investor expectations
in the surveys are high, investors in theHNPO sector tend to increase their investment
in the stock market; and (2) their investment choices negatively predict future stock
market returns. These results together show that investors in the HNPO sector can
serve as a reasonable proxies for extrapolators. Moreover, in my empirical analysis,
I use the total financial wealth to proxy for the wealth level of extrapolators.10
Interaction Effect between Investor Sentiment and Wealth Level
Investor sentiment should impact market strongly especially when the wealth level
of extrapolators is high. In other words, there should be a strong interaction effect
between investor sentiment and the wealth level of extrapolators in explaining asset
valuations. To formally test this hypothesis and to motivate my model setting, I run
the following regression11:
Ret+N = a + bSentt + cWt/Dt + dSentt ×Wt/Dt +  t . (1.4)
In my regression, Ret+N represents the excess returns of the aggregate stock market
during the future N months. In addition, I use investor sentiment in the Gallup
survey and Psentiment, respectively, to proxy for Sentt , investor sentiment, and use
the total financial assets of HNPO sector at time t as the empirical proxy for the
wealth levelWt . SinceWt is non-stationary, I get the series of real dividend Dt from
Shiller’s website and get the normalized wealth level of Wt/Dt . My sample is at a
quarterly frequency and spans from 1996:12 - 2011: 9.12 For robustness check, I
report predictive regressions over one to six quarters.
[Place Table A.4 about here]
The results reported in Table A.4 not only confirm the strong interaction effect
between investor sentiment and the wealth level in determining the asset prices,
but also point to the usefulness in explaining asset mispricings—the strong nega-
tive coefficient for the interaction term indicates investor sentiment leads to asset
overvaluations and undervaluations when the wealth level is high. When investor
10As long as the HNPO sector captures the general properties of extrapolators, it will help
understand the impact of investor sentiment on the market.
11Alternatively, the market impact of extrapolators can be measured by the relative wealth of
extrapolators compared to the price level of the risky asset. The regressions based on this intuition
is reported in appendix A.5. The results remains robust.
12The Federal Reserve’s Z.1 Statistical Release is published at a quarterly frequency. The sample
period mainly goes with Gallup surveys.
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sentiment is high, the market is highly overvalued due to the high irrational demand
from extrapolators and therefore future returns are low; if investor sentiment is low,
the future returns are high since the market is undervalued. In addition, compared
to the univariate regression using investor sentiment variable, the conditional pre-
dictability model has a significantly higher adjusted-R2. For instance, at the annual
horizon, the goodness of fit for the predictive regression using investor sentiment
alone is around 0.010, which is small compared to 0.039 in the conditional predictive
regression. The increased adjusted-R2 supports the importance of the interaction
effect in explaining the market mispricing. Therefore, I get the following observa-
tion:
Observation 3. Investor sentiment strongly connects with market mispricing
through the market impact of extrapolators.
Observation 3 provides strong evidence for the relation between the market mispric-
ing, investor sentiment and the wealth level of extrapolators. Therefore, for a model
that focuses on the impact of investor sentiment and market mispricing, the wealth
level of extrapolators should also be incorporated.
1.3 The Behavioral Model
In this section, I build a behavioral model that focuses on the investor sentiment of
extrapolators. Specifically, following the patterns of investor sentiment documented
in section 1.2, I introduce extrapolation into my model. With extrapolation, the
behavioral model essentially captures the overvaluations and undervaluations in
the market and shed light on the time-varying impact of investor sentiment on the
equilibrium asset price.
The Economy
I consider a continuous-time economy with two types of assets: one risk-free asset
with elastic supply curve and a constant rate r , and one risky asset with a fixed per-
capita supply of one. Due to extrapolation, extrapolators perceive a biased growth
rate of the risky asset, which is different from the true growth rate observed by the
outside econometricians.
The risky asset is a claim to the underlying dividend process Dt which, under the true
probability measure, follows a geometric Brownian motion and can be generically
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written as
dDt/Dt = gDdt + σDdωt . (1.5)
Therefore, the underlying dividend process is governed by the growth rate of gD and
volatilityσD, which both are positive exogenous parameters. The dividend process is
driven by ωt , a one-dimensional Weiner process under the true probability measure
observed by outside econometricians. The equilibrium price Pt for the dividend
claim evolves as
dPt/Pt = gP,tdt + σP,tdωt . (1.6)
Due to extrapolation, the true growth rate gP,t is different from the perceived growth
rate by extrapolators. The growth rate gP,t and volatility term σP,t are both endoge-
nously determined in the equilibrium.
Investors
There are two types of investors in the behavioral model: extrapolators and funda-
mental investors. Extrapolators are the focus of this paper: their belief formation
are subject to psychological heuristics and therefore are misspecified. Fundamental
investors, on the other end, serves as the counteracting forces in the market and trade
aggressively whenever asset prices deviate from fundamental values. Similarly, I
assume that fundamental investors make up a fraction of 1 − µ and extrapolators
make up a fraction of µ.
Extrapolative Beliefs
The salient properties about investor sentiment in the surveys—that investors form
their expectations based on past realized returns and that their sentiment reverts
quickly to its mean—motivate my theoretical settings for investor sentiment. Dif-
ferent from asset pricing models with rational expectations, extrapolators in the
behavioral model make systematic errors about future market returns. In order to
capture the misspecified beliefs for investors, I propose a mental model.13 Specif-
ically, I assume extrapolators perceive the following process for the market price,
with the perceived growth rate gˆP,t as an affine function of a latent state variable
St that essentially captures the excessive optimism and pessimism in extrapolators’
minds:
13A similar model is used in Jin and Sui (2017).
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dPt/Pt = gˆP,tdt + σP,tdωet ,
gˆP,t ≡ [(1 − θ)g¯P,t + θSt]. (1.7)
Here g¯P,t represents the equilibrium growth rate of risky asset in a benchmark
economy where each investors have correct beliefs. Parameter θ measures to which
extent extrapolators deviate from their beliefs in the rational benchmark. When
θ = 0, I get the rational benchmark case with a drift term gˆP,t .14 Notation-wise,
any quantities with a hat sign or superscript e represent variables perceived by
extrapolators.
Next, I introducemicrofoundations for this key latent state variable St . Specifically, I
assume that from the extrapolators’ perspective, the expected growth rate on the risky
asset is an affine function of a mental variable µ˜P,t , and the extrapolators mistakenly
believe that this mental variable is governed by a regime-switching process between
high and low states µH and µL, with switching densities χ and λ:
*,
µ˜P,t+dt = µH µ˜P,t+dt = µL
µ˜P,t = µH 1 − χdt χdt
µ˜P,t = µL λdt 1 − λdt
+-. (1.8)
Motivated by the fact that investors in the survey over-extrapolate past returns
when forming their expectations, I assume that extrapolators in my model update
their estimate of the mental variable µ˜P,t by looking at the past realized returns.
Therefore, µH and µL reflect extrapolators’ subjective perceptions on the risky asset
growth rate, and λ and χ represent the speed extrapolators update their perceptions
on the risky asset growth rate based on past realized returns. Given this mental
model, the latent state variable St is the Bayesian inference of the mental variable
µ˜S,t . Formally, I can write the latent state variable as St ≡ Ee[µ˜P,t |Ft], whereFt is
the perceived probability measure based on the filtration of the price process Pt . My
later examination on extrapolators’ belief structure helps me justify the magnitude
of these belief parameters.
Therefore, in my model, investor sentiment corresponds to the perceived growth
rate of extrapolators, gˆP,t . Throughout my model, I assume that each extrapolator
is subject to the identical underlying mental model and the same degree of extrap-
olation. In other words, latent state variable θ reflects the consensus extrapolation
14For a detailed solution for gˆP,t , see appendix.
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level among extrapolators.
By applying the optimal filtering theorem (Liptser and Shiryaev (2013)), I obtain
the dynamics for the latent state variable St :
dSt = µSdt + σSdωet , (1.9)
where
µS =λµH + χµL − ( χ + λ)St, (1.10)
σS =σ
−1
P,tθ(µH − St )(St − µL), (1.11)
dωet =
dPt
Pt
− [(1 − θ)g¯P,t + θSt]dt. (1.12)
This mental model captures two salient features of investor sentiment in the surveys.
First, under the mental model, the latent state variable St is driven by the perceived
Brownian shock dωet , which strongly depends on the past realized returns. Increases
in past realized returns dPtPt push up the perceived Brownian shock, which further
increases the latent state variable St and the perceived growth rate of the risky asset
gˆP,t . Therefore, the mental model naturally leads to an extrapolation pattern: high
returns in the past push up investor sentiment and low past returnsmake extrapolators
pessimistic.
Second, the mental model embodies the fact that investor sentiment tends to revert
to its mean. When the latent state variable is high, extrapolators mistakenly perceive
a high level of growth rate for the risky asset. However, the objective probability
measure remain unchanged. Unless extremely good shocks arrive, they will be
constantly disappointed by the perceived Brownian shocks dωet in the future. As a
result, the latent variable will quickly revert downwards. Similarly, if the latent state
variable is low and extrapolators perceive a low level of growth rate, extrapolators
will meet with relatively large perceived Brownian shocks, pushing up the latent
state variable back to its mean.
The underlying mechanism for the reversal of investor sentiment in my model is
different from previous “Natural Expectations” models in Fuster et al. (2011). In
Fuster et al. (2011), the long-term reversal are exogenously assumed and errors
in expectations arise because agents fit a simpler AR(1) model to the data. As
a comparison, in my model, the mean-reversal process is endogenous—investors
overweight recent information and this overreaction leads to reversals. Such en-
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dogenous reversal pattern in investor beliefs helps understand asset mispricings and
predictability of returns generated in this model.15
Moreover, due to the mental model, the perceived probability measure by extrapola-
tors is different from the objective probability measure observed by outside econo-
metricians.16 In other words, extrapolators have misspecified but self-consistent
beliefs, and they fail to realize that their perception is biased. The true and per-
ceived probability measure can be connected using the following equation:
dωet = (gP,t − gˆP,t )/σP,tdt + dωt . (1.13)
Under the probability measure of extrapolators, the perceived dividend process
follows
dDt/Dt = gˆD,tdt + σDdωet . (1.14)
where gˆD,t is the perceived dividend growth rate by extrapolators.
In my model, gP,t , gˆP,t and gˆD,t are endogenous variables determined in the equi-
librium. As a comparison, the volatility variables σP,t and σD remain unchanged.
This is because extrapolators can always calculate the volatilities by calculating the
quadratic variations of the stochastic process. All the quantities together constitute
two mutually coherent probability measurements.
Finally, it is worth pointing out that, there is a two-way feedback loop in my model:
asset prices influence investor expectations due to extrapolation, and changes in
investor expectation will in turn drive asset prices. From a theoretical perspective, a
model with extrapolation on past returns is usually difficult to solve, since the return
process is an endogenous quantity determined in the equilibrium. In this paper, I
overcome this difficulty by solving a system of partial differential equations.
Wealth Process of Extrapolators
To better connect with later analyses on the time-varying impact of investor senti-
ment, I introduce logarithmic utilities for extrapolators to capture the dependence of
demand on their wealth level. Moreover, each extrapolator, indexed by superscript
15The pattern that investors tend to overweight recent information has been incorporated in other
models as well. For instance, Bordalo et al. (2018) focus on investors’ belief formation of credit
spreads, and proposed a mechanism in which investors overreact to recent news.
16The fact that investors have biased beliefs is widely empirically documented in the literature. For
example, using option data, Barone-Adesi et al. (2016) document excessive optimism and pessimism
for investors in the U.S. stock market.
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j, is infinitesimal and therefore acts as price-taker in the market. Specifically, ex-
trapolator j maximizes an additively separable logarithmic utility function under an
infinite time horizon and with a time-preference parameter ρ
max
{C jt+s }s≥0
Eet [
∫ ∞
t
e−ρs lnC js ds] (1.15)
subject to
dW jt = −C jt dt + rW jt dt + α jtW jt [gˆP,tdt +
Dt
Pt
dt − rdt + σP,tdωet ], (1.16)
whereW jt represents the wealth level of extrapolators, C
j
t the optimal consumption
choice and α jt the optimal risk exposure for extrapolator j. Eet represents the
expectation operator under the perceived probability measure, which is biased due
to extrapolation.
With the logarithmic utility, extrapolators have wealth-dependent absolute risk aver-
sion: as their wealth declines to zero, extrapolators become infinitely risk-averse.
Consequently, as their wealth shrinks, they will liquid the risky asset to prevent
their wealth from becoming zero.17 In addition, the infinitely risk-aversion level at
zero wealth level also prevents extrapolators from bankruptcy. Therefore, they can
borrow money at risk-free rate irrespective of their wealth level.
Following the standard Merton’s approach (Merton (1971)), we get the optimal
consumption and portfolio rule for extrapolators:
PROPOSITION 1 Extrapolators with the objective function in equation (1.15)
and wealth process in equation (1.16) will optimally consume and invest at time t
according to the following strategies:
C jt = ρW
j
t (1.17)
and
α
j
t =
gˆP,t (xt, St ) + l−1(xt, St ) − r
σ2P,t (xt, St )
, (1.18)
17The existence of fundamental investors guarantees they can liquidity their risky asset position
at any time.
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where the price to dividend ratio l ≡ PtDt and the risky asset volatility σP,t both
depend on the wealth to dividend ratio xt ≡ WtDt and the latent state variable St . In
other words, the economy depends on state variables xt and St .
Proof : See Appendix A.3.
Proposition (1) documents several salient features of logarithmic utilities. First,
the optimal consumption strategy for extrapolators is proportional to their wealth
level, with adjustment of the time-preference parameters ρ. Second, the optimal
risky portfolio choice is myopic, in a sense that extrapolators do not hedge against
changes in the future investment set. Therefore, their optimal risky exposure purely
depends on the perceived risk premium and the instantaneous volatility rate. Third,
the total dollar demand is also proportional to their wealth. Therefore, their wealth
level, by and large, determines theirmarket impact on the equilibrium asset prices—a
key property that drives my model implications.
In the equilibrium, the risky exposure of extrapolators depends on their perceptions
of equity premium, gˆP,t + l−1 − r . After observing a sequence of high (low) re-
turns, extrapolators become overly optimistic (pessimistic) and increase their risky
asset exposure. In cases when their market impact is high, asset tends to become
overvalued (undervalued).
More importantly, the optimal strategy in equation (1.18) and the wealth dynamics in
equation (1.16) together provide novel insights on how investor sentiment influences
thewealth dynamics of extrapolators. When investor sentiment is high, extrapolators
perceive high equity premium and therefore lever up to buy risky asset. However,
since investor sentiment reverts to its mean, extrapolators demand less risky asset
in the future, which leads to decreases in the asset prices and their wealth level,
therefore generating negative returns. In the mean-reversion process, the wealth
dynamics of extrapolators also play a role: investor sentiment leads investors to
take excessive exposure to the risky asset and therefore suffer from wealth decrease.
Decline in the wealth level of extrapolators makes the mispricing easier to correct.
Fundamental Investors
Next, I describe the demand function for fundamental investors. I assume that
fundamental investors care only about the difference between the current risky asset
prices and their fundamental values, hence they construct their risky asset exposure
based on the deviation of the asset prices from its fundamental values. Following
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this assumption, the per capita demand of the risky asset for fundamental investors
follows
Qt = (PF,t − Pt )/k, (1.19)
where PF,t = Dtr−gD is the fundamental value and k is a constant. This linear demand
structure is standard in the literature (for example Xiong (2001)), and I provide a
micro-foundation for it in the appendix A.1. Intuitively, when PF,t is higher (lower)
than its current price, fundamental investors expect profits when asset prices reverts
back to the fundamental value Pt . Therefore, they have a strong demand to short
(buy) the risky asset.
Fundamental investors are prevailing in the financial market. There are many in-
vestors who truly follow strategies that focus on the long-term profit and apply fun-
damental analysis in their investment. For instance, Abarbanell and Bushee (1997)
document that investors incorporate financial statement information and make fun-
damental analysis when making their investment decision. In addition, there are
manymutual fundswho set their investment objective as to achieve long-term growth
of capital and income, such as the “Fundamental Investor” fund managed by Capi-
tal Group. Moreover, such fundamental analysis really brings abnormal returns to
their portfolio. For instance, Piotroski (2000) document fundamental analysis can
increase annual returns by at least 7.5%.
Several observations about the total dollar demand in equation (1.19) are worth
noting. First, for fundamental investors, the total dollar demand is independent of
their wealth level, rather, it only depends on the difference between the current risky
asset prices and their fundamental values. When asset prices are highly overvalued,
fundamental investors anticipate a higher return from holding the risky asset and,
as a result, their total dollar demand increases. Conversely, when asset prices are
undervalued, fundamental investors lean against the wind and trade actively to push
prices upward. Moreover, the extent to which fundamental investors can correct the
mispricing also depends on the overall market impact of the extrapolators: if the
wealth level of extrapolators is low, fundamental investors can correct mispricing
more easily. This demand structure of fundamental investors proves to be useful in
generating novel implications on the predictive pattern of investor sentiment.
Second, in my model, fundamental investors act as aggressive arbitragers and they
jump into arbitrage activities whenever mispricing occurs—different from fully
rational investors, fundamental investors in my model are the counteracting forces
in the market. In other words, irrespective of their beliefs, fundamental investors
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have a specific demand function due to unspecified factors such as financial frictions
or preference shocks.
Equilibrium
Definition of Equilibrium:
An equilibrium in the behavioral model satisfies the following conditions:
i) extrapolators maximize their objective function in equation (1.15) subject to their
wealth process in equation (1.16) under their subjective probability measure induced
by extrapolation;
ii) fundamental investors invest in the risky asset according to their demand function
in equation (1.18);
iii) risky asset market clears
µαtWt + (1 − µ)Qt = Pt . (1.20)
To solve for the equilibrium, I face with a fixed-point problem: the optimal demand
of extrapolators depends on the instantaneous equity premium and volatilities of the
risky asset, which further depends on the total demand in the equilibrium. For the
behavioral model, I focus on the symmetric equilibrium where each extrapolator
endows with the same level of wealth and follows identical strategies and solve for a
fixed-point problem. The equilibrium depends both on the wealth to dividend ratio
xt and the latent state variable St . Therefore, I rely on solving a partial differential
equation to obtain the solution for the fixed-point problem. As verified later, the
price to dividend ratio is monotonically increasing in both xt and St .
After getting the optimal strategy for extrapolators, now I consider a fixed-point
problem and solve the Markovian system to get an solution of the price-dividend
ratio l (St, xt ). To be specific, I focus on an equilibrium, where each extrapolator j
follows the same strategies based on the return extrapolation. By using aggregation
and the market clearing condition, I can reach the equilibrium as follows:
PROPOSITION 2 In the symmetric equilibrium, the price-dividend ratio l is a
function of current states St and xt , and satisfies the following partial differential
equation:
c0l − c1
x
=
gˆP,t + l−1 − r
σ2P,t
, (1.21)
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where σP is also a function of St and xt and satisfies
σP,t =
( lxl x − 1)σD −
√
( lxl x − 1)2σ2D − 4( lxl (c0l − c1) − 1) lSl θ(µH − S)(S − µL)
2( lxl (c0l − c1) − 1)
,
(1.22)
and l (St, xt ) satisfies the following boundary conditions
lim
xt→0
l =
c1
c0
, (1.23)
lim
xt→0
= lim
x→0
gˆP,t +
c1
c0
− r
σ2D
, (1.24)
and
lim
xt→∞
l = (r − gˆP,t )−1, (1.25)
where c0 = k+1−µkµ and c1 =
1−µ
kµ(r−gD ) are both constants.
In addition, under the perceived probability measure, the dynamics of xt follow
dxt = gˆx,t (St, xt )dt + σx,t (St, xt )dωet , (1.26)
where
gˆx,t (St, xt ) =xt (r − ρ + αt[gˆP,t + l−1 − r] − gˆD,t + σ2D − αtσDσP,t ) (1.27)
σx,t (St, xt ) =xt (αtσP,t − σD).
Proof: See Appendix A.3.
For the boundary conditions, when the wealth to dividend ratio goes to zero, the
fundamental investors dominate the market and I get a constant price-dividend ratio
in equation (1.23). Moreover, in this case, the partial derivative of l with respect to
S, lS (S, 0), equals to zero because extrapolators’ total demand is zero irrespective of
the level of the latent state variable St . On the other hand, when xt goes to infinity, in
order to clear the market, extrapolators hold a risky asset position close to zero. By
the portfolio expression in equation (1.18), we get the expression (1.25). Expression
(1.24) follows naturally from equation (1.23).
In solving the ordinary equation in proposition (2), I resort to a projection method
with Chebyshev polynomials. Compared to the range of the wealth to dividend ratio
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of [0,∞], the required domain for Chebyshev polynomial is [−1, 1]. Therefore, I
apply the following monotonic transformation for the wealth to dividend ratio
zt =
xt − ξ
xt + ξ
, (1.28)
where ξ is a positive constant. Along with the transformed wealth to dividend ratio,
I also transform the latent state variable S into a new variable y that lies between
[−1, 1]:
yt =aSt + b, (1.29)
a =
2
µH − µL , b = −
µH + µL
µH − µL .
When thewealth to dividend ratio goes to infinity, the transformedwealth to dividend
ratio goes to 1. If the wealth to dividend ratio shrinks to zero, the transformed wealth
to dividend ratio goes to −1. Similarly, yt goes to 1 when St goes to its upper bound
µH , and goes to -1 when St goes to its lower bound µL.
Calibrated Model Solution
In this section, I report the main numerical solutions. To get a reasonable model
solution, I choose both asset and utility parameters that are consistent with the
empirical literature. For example, I set gD to be 1.5% and σD to be 10%, which
are commonly used in the asset pricing literature. In addition, I set r = 4% for the
risk-free rate. For utility parameters, I choose the time-preference factor ρ = 2%.
For other parameters that have no empirical counterparts, such as µ and k, I take
a neutral stand and impose a value of 12 . For belief parameters, I set µH = 0.03,
µL = −0.06, χ = λ = 10%, θ = 0.5%. A complete set of parameter values are
reported in Table A.6. I report the numerical solutions in Figure A.5.
Price-Dividend Ratio
The upper-left panel reports the price to dividend ratio l (St, xt ). In general, l (St, xt )
is a monotone function both in the transformed wealth to dividend ratio zt and the
latent state variable yt . First, for most of zt levels, a higher latent variable level St
induces higher total dollar demand and therefore pushes up the price to dividend
ratio. When zt = 0, the price to dividend ratio l (St, xt ) are constant values of 20:
25
if extrapolators have no wealth, they will have no market impact on the equilibrium
quantities. Second, with a fixed level of latent variable yt , the dollar demand for
the risky asset increases as zt increases. With given parameters, the solution for
l (St, xt ) ranges from 20 to 35, which is largely within the reasonable range.
[Place Figure A.5 about here]
Optimal Portfolio Choice
I report the optimal portfolio choice for extrapolators in the lower-right panel. As
yt increases along the axis, extrapolators perceive higher growth rate and therefore
increase their position in the risky asset. As zt increases from −1 to 1, in general, the
optimal portfolio decreases in order to meet the market clearing condition. Together,
I get the optimal strategies of extrapolators. It is worth noting that, when both zt and
yt are low and extrapolators have low market impact and become pessimistic about
future return growth, they can short the risky asset; in other situations, extrapolators
hold the risky asset.
Volatility
The upper-right panel portrays the return volatility σP. In most of the cases, σP is
larger than σD. When the wealth to dividend ratio xt is high and the latent state
variable St is slightly above its mean, the volatility σP reaches its maximum of
17.78%.
Along the latent variable axis, the volatility has a strong hump-shaped pattern due
to the belief structure. Specifically, when the latent variable yt goes to its upper or
lower boundary, there is less uncertainty about which regime the underlying state
belongs to. On the contrary, when yt is in the middle region between the high and
low bound, the uncertainty increases.
Moreover, increases in zt in general increases the market impact of extrapolators. As
a result, their beliefs have a stronger amplification effect on the exogenous shocks,
which explains the increasing volatility along the zt axis. However, when yt reaches
its maximum or minimum, the volatility is mainly determined by changes in zt ratio.
When yt is at its maximum, the optimal portfolio is positive but less than one. In
this case, a price drop caused by a negative dividend shock leads extrapolators to
rebalance their portfolio by purchasing more of the risky asset, which reduces the
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volatility.18 Conversely, when yt is at its minimum, the optimal portfolio is, by
and large, negative. In this case, extrapolators short the risky asset. When positive
dividend shocks arrive, extrapolators’ leverage ratio further decreases and induces
them to buy more risky assets, which increases the volatility.
Two Model Predictions
Investor Sentiment and Market Mispricing
In this model, I simultaneously characterize investor sentiment and the wealth level
within one unified model, which provides novel insights between investor sentiment
and market mispricing. From a static perspective, the market clearing condition in
equation (1.20) helps to identify when the market overvaluations and undervalua-
tions would occur. When the wealth level of extrapolators is high, investor sentiment
has large impacts on the market: with high investor sentiment, the asset price is
largely overvalued; while if investor sentiment is low, the asset price is undervalued.
Investor Sentiment and Return Predictability
The dynamic feature of the behavioral model also sheds light on the connection
between investor sentiment and the future asset price dynamics. With higher wealth
level, a larger fraction of total asset demand will come from extrapolators. Con-
ditional on high wealth level, high investor sentiment will push asset prices above
their fundamental value. However, higher sentiment will revert to its mean quickly,
since optimistic investors will more easily get disappointed by the future realized
returns. Consequently, both investor sentiment and asset prices will decline in the
future, generating negative returns. Conversely, conditional on high wealth level,
low investor sentiment predicts a high returns going forward. This together implies
a strong negative pattern for investor sentiment when wealth level is high.
Moreover, my model implies a novel predictive pattern of investor sentiment on
future returns when the wealth level of extrapolators is low. In this situation, asset
prices are mainly driven by fundamental investors and the sentiment of extrapola-
tors reflects the direction of market correction. If extrapolators have high sentiment,
extrapolation indicates that the recent returns in the past were high and the mar-
ket is undergoing an upward correction. Therefore, high sentiment implies good
future returns along this upward path. Conversely, if extrapolators have low sen-
18Since extrapolation simultaneously make extrapolators less willing to hold the risky asset, the
portfolio-rebalancing effect is weaker than that in the rational benchmark model.
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timent, extrapolation indicates a downward correction, and fundamental investors
will continue shorting risky asset until asset price reaches its fundamental value.
Low sentiment predicts negative returns along this path. Together, conditional on
the low wealth level of extrapolators, investor sentiment positively predicts future
market returns.
Figure A.3 provides intuitive explanations for the positive predictive pattern of
investor sentimentwhen thewealth level of extrapolators is low. If investor sentiment
is low, extrapolation indicate that the asset price is undergoing a upward correction.
Therefore, the only possible price dynamics is the one that goes up but is below
the fundamental value—the wealth level of extrapolators is too low to push asset
prices upwards from the fundamental value. Conversely, if investor sentiment is
low, then the only possible situation is that the asset price is corrected downwards
from overvaluations—the low market impact of extrapolators is not able to push
asset prices downwards from the fundamental value.
[Place Figure A.3 about here]
1.4 Model Implications
In this section, I provide analyses for the behavioral model based on simulations.
Specifically, I start by checking the belief pattern of extrapolators to see whether it
captures the investor sentiment dynamics in the survey. Then I test whether there
is a strong connection between investor sentiment and market mispricing, and test
the key model implications on the return predictability based on investor sentiment.
I also use my model to shed some light on the extant asset pricing patterns in the
empirical literature.
Extrapolators’ Beliefs
One important prerequisite to investigate the impact of investor sentiment is to
understand the dynamics of investor sentiment. In this subsection, I provide justifi-
cations for the belief structure in my behavioral model based on model simulations.
Specifically, I first compare investor sentiment based on model simulations with that
in the Gallup survey. Second, I regress the model-implied investor sentiment on
either past twelve month returns or the current log price to dividend ratio, and check
whether my model embodies extrapolative expectations. Third, I formally test how
much weight extrapolators put on the past realized returns and compare my results
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to the literature. Last, I test whether the model-implied investor sentiment reverts
to its mean.
To simulate my model, I back out a sequence of shocks based on the monthly real
dividend data of the S&P 500 index starting from June 1996 to December 2011.
This range is consistent with the Gallup series in Greenwood and Shleifer (2014)
and therefore can facilitate my comparison between the simulated sentiment series
and the survey data. Moreover, I also use these implied shocks for my analyses of the
behavioral model, so that I can compare two models within the same background.
Specifically, in order to get the series of shocks, I take the log on the dividend
process and then use Ito’s lemma to get
d ln Dt = (gD − 12σ
2
D)dt + σDdωt . (1.30)
Then, I can discretize the equation and back out the shocks using the following
formula:
 t = (ln Dt+1 − ln Dt − (gD − 12σ
2
D)∆t )/(σD
√
∆t ). (1.31)
Since the real dividend data is at a monthly frequency, I set ∆t equals to 1/12. In
addition, I set gD as 1.5% and σD as 10%, which are both commonly accepted
magnitudes in the asset pricing literature. I take a neutral stand and set the initial
sentiment level to be S0 = 0. I also set the initial wealth to dividend ratio x0
to be 1. Since I have numerically solved the equilibrium, I can easily get the
simulated sequence for investor sentiment St , price process Pt , the wealth-dividend
ratio process xt as well as l (St, xt ), gP,t (St, xt ) and σP(St, xt ).
Model-implied Investor Sentiment
Since bothmymodel simulation andGallup survey are driven by the same underlying
shocks to the economy, I can directly compare these two sequences. I plot both series
in Figure A.6. From this figure, it is clear that the simulated investor sentiment based
on the behavioral model is highly synchronized with the Gallup survey series, and
captures the large part of anecdotal fluctuations of investor sentiment in the market.
For example, consistent with the Gallup survey, the investor sentiment based on the
behavioral model also rises to its peak right before the 2007 financial crisis and
drops significantly during the afterward recessions.
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[Place Figure A.6 about here]
Extrapolative Belief Structures
Next, I zoom in the extrapolation pattern in my behavioral model. Greenwood and
Shleifer (2014) documents that investor expectations about future returns heavily
depend on the current price level and past realized returns. Specifically, I regress
the perceived expectations of future returns on either the current log price-dividend
ratio or the past twelve-month accumulative raw returns, based on the simulated
series. I report the regression coefficients, their t-statistics and their R-squared in
Table A.7. For robustness check, I report results based on two different types of
expectation measures: the expectations of future return growth rate dPt/(Ptdt) and
the expectations of future return growth rate with dividend yield dPt/(Ptdt) + l−1.
Table A.7 indicates the investor belief pattern in mymodel matches the extrapolation
pattern documented in Greenwood and Shleifer (2014). Among others, both in my
model and in the survey, subjective expectations on future returns are positively
related to the current log price-dividend ratio and the past twelve-month returns.
Moreover, the regression coefficients and t-statistics are also close to the regression
results based on the Gallup survey. For instance, compared to the regression coeffi-
cient of 9.12% and t-statistics of 8.81 from regressions based on Gallup survey, my
simulation-based regression yields coefficient of 2.3% and t-statistics of 2.09.
[Place Table A.7 about here]
Extrapolators’ Memory Span
Another important dimension of investor belief structure is its memory span, which
measures how much weight extrapolators put on the recent returns. In my model,
extrapolators’ memory span is controlled by the magnitude of belief parameters χ
and λ, which determines how fast extrapolators update their beliefs. To formally test
extrapolators’ memory span, I run the nonlinear regression following Greenwood
and Shleifer (2014):
Expectationt = a + bΣ∞s=0ωsRt−(s+1)∆t,t−s∆t, (1.32)
ωs =
e−ψs∆t
Σnk=0e
−ψk∆t .
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In Table A.8, I report the regression coefficient a, the intercept b, the adjusted-R2,
and more importantly, the estimated memory span parameter ψ. My simulation is
at monthly frequency and therefore I set ∆ = 1/12. I impose n = 600, which means
extrapolators use returns within the past 50 years to form their beliefs. Table A.8
show that the estimated ψ is 0.51. This means a monthly returns three years ago is
weighted only 25% as much as the most recent returns. As a comparison, Barberis
et al. (2015) obtain an estimator of 0.44 for ψ. This consistency in turn helps justify
the belief parameter choice for χ and λ.
It is worth pointing out that there is no consensus on investors’ memory spans in
the behavioral finance literature. Some studies, including Greenwood and Shleifer
(2014) and Kuchler and Zafar (2016), document that investors have short memories
and only use recent information in the past few years to form their beliefs. By
contrast, other studies such as Malmendier and Nagel (2011), Malmendier and
Nagel (2013) and Vanasco et al. (2015) argue that investors form their beliefs based
on their life experience—events in the distant past might still have a significant
impact in the belief formation process. Explaining this discrepancy is beyond the
scope of this paper, but correctly interpreting investors’ memory span would help
understand the investor beliefs and the asset price dynamics.
[Place Table A.8 about here]
Model-implied Mean-reversion Property of Investor Sentiment
To complete my justification on my belief structure, I check whether investor sen-
timent in my model reverts to its mean. Consistent with Observation 2, I run the
regression in equation (1.3), but replace survey measures with the model-implied
investor sentiment.
[Place Table A.9 about here]
In Table A.9 , I report the regression coefficients, t-statistics and the adjusted-R2.
All t-statistics are adjusted with Newey-West correction. In addition, for robustness
check, I also report results of forecasting horizons from 1 to 6 quarters. Table A.9
shows that the coefficient of sentiment variable is uniformly negative and statistically
significant, which indicates that investor sentiment in my model reverts to its mean.
With the extrapolation pattern in my behavioral model, now I investigate the time-
varying impact of investor sentiment.
31
Impact of Investor Sentiment
The Interaction Effect in the Model
In this section, I test whether the interaction effect in Observation 3 exists in my
model. The market clearing condition (1.20) has already provides some clues:
sentiment-driven risk exposure αt and market power Wt together determines the
equilibrium asset price. However, to provide a direct comparison, I rely on the
model-simulated time series to test the interaction effect in my model.
Following the analysis on Observation 3, I run the regression:
Ret+N = a + bSentt + cWt/Dt + dSentt ×Wt/Dt +  t, (1.33)
where Ret+N represents the future excess returns over the next N months, Sentt
represents model-simulated investor sentiment, andWt/Dt proxies for the wealth to
dividend ratio. These two variables are also the underlying state variables in my
model.
[Place Table A.10 about here]
Table A.10 reports the regression results based on themodel-simulated data. The co-
efficient for our interaction term is statistically significant. Therefore, the interaction
effect is confirmed in my theoretical model.
Time-varying Impact of Investor Sentiment
Based on my behavioral model, investor sentiment has time-varying impacts on
the market. To formally test this model prediction, I empirically test the predictive
power of investor sentiment conditional on different market impacts of extrapolators.
In section 1.4, I already connect the market impact of extrapolators with mispricing.
However, the predictive direction of investor sentiment still remains ambiguous.
To provide a more detailed analysis, I present the predictive coefficient of investor
sentiment bt = [b + d ×Wt/Dt] for future 12-month returns in Table A.11. Specif-
ically, I follow Aiken et al. (1991) and present the predictive pattern of investor
sentiment conditional on different wealth levels. In the remaining analysis, I define
the high wealth level as two standard deviations above the mean of the wealth to
dividend ratio, and the low wealth level as two standard deviations below the mean
of the wealth to dividend ratio.
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[Place Table A.11 about here]
The results coincide with my theoretical model predictions. When the wealth level
of extrapolators is high, one unit increase in Gallup-measured investor sentiment is
followed by a significant 16.2% decrease in the future 12-month returns. Replace
Gallup survey with Psentiment, the conditional predictive pattern is even stronger:
one unit in Psentiment, in general, leads to a tremendous return decline of 26.7% in
the next 12month. If extrapolators have high market power, then they are driving the
market and investor sentiment negatively predicts future returns because it reverts
to its mean in the future. Such negative predictive pattern is hardly consistent with
rational asset pricing models.
Moreover, when the wealth level of extrapolators is low, investor sentiment has a
strong positive predictive power. With Gallup survey and Psentiment, the coeffi-
cients of the conditional coefficients bt are 0.359 and 0.479 respectively. At first
glance, positive coefficient might be inconsistent with the irrational story of investor
sentiment. However, my model indicates they are consistent. The key observation
from my model is that, when extrapolators’ wealth level is low, the main market
power comes from fundamental investors. In this situation, high sentiment indicates
the market is going through an upward market correction, leading to positive market
returns in the future. Similarly, low sentiment implies that fundamental investors
are correcting overvalued asset prices downwards, causing negative market returns.
The regression results based on model simulations in Table A.12 also confirms the
conditional predictive pattern of investor sentiment in the model— they are very
close to the predictive pattern in the empirical data.
It is worth pointing out that, conditional on the wealth level of extrapolators, investor
sentiment has significant predictive power over future market returns. By contrast,
without considering the market impact of extrapolation, investor sentiment does not
have significant predictive power over future market returns, as shown in Table A.3.
Comparison between Interaction Effect and Degree of Extrapolation
Both my theoretical and empirical results support that the predictive power of
investor sentiment on future returns is time-varying. A similar pattern is recently
recorded in Cassella and Gulen (2015). In their paper, they define the degree of
extrapolation (DOX) as the relative weight extrapolators place on recent-versus-
distant past returns when forming their sentiment on future stock market returns.
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Their key empirical findings are that DOX is time-varying and that predictability
of log price-dividend ratio strongly depends on the DOX. Higher (lower) log price
to dividend ratio indicates assets are undervalued (overvalued). When DOX is
higher and extrapolators rely more on recent returns, few recent returns will change
both their sentiment and irrational demand dramatically, which induces a faster
correction of mispricing. These two sets of conditional predictive patterns seem
to be fundamentally similar and connected to each other, since both answers one
critical question in the asset pricing theory: when will a mispriced asset experience
a correction?
[Place Figure A.7 about here]
Specifically, their explanation to this question relies on the aggregate belief transition
pattern of extrapolators (DOX), which could either depend on the time-varying
participation rate of extrapolators or the time-varying return extrapolation pattern
at the individual investor level. With higher DOX, investors easily change their
sentiment based on recent returns, which leads to a faster mispricing correction
speed and stronger predictive pattern of log price to dividend ratio.
As a comparison, the interaction effect based on my results proves the importance
of the time-varying impact of of investor sentiment. When their wealth level is
high, investor sentiment leads to higher degree of asset mispricing, which leads to
a strong mispricing correction in the future and a significant predictive power of
investor sentiment. Two explanations should have overlapped common underlying
mechanism.
Given this similarity, a natural hypothesis is that the DOX in their paper might be
very correlated with the interaction effect in my model. To check it, I plot both
DOX and the interaction effect in Figure A.7. As we can see from the figure,
two measurements are indeed highly synchronous. For instance, between 1996
and 2000 and before the Internet bubble bursts, the DOX measurements rise from
0.35 to 0.9. Within the same sample period, the market impact in my model also
increases. Therefore, my model provides a formal justification for the time-varying
DOX: variations in DOX is largely due to the time-varying impact of extrapolators
in the market.
Despite the similarities, there are some new predictions using the interaction term in
my model. For example, as I have shown, the time-varying impact of extrapolators
implies a novel predictive power of investor sentiment on future returns.
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Household Leverage and Future Consumption Growth
My model also sheds lights on the recent findings in the household literature. Mian
and Sufi (2009) document that household leverage ratio before the Great Depression
is a strong and negative predictor of future consumption growth rate. Moreover,
they document that the increase in household leverage is largely due to the biased
expectations, and belief mistakes lead to a decrease in future income and declines
in consumption growth rate.
My model provides a formal justification for this mechanism. In my model, extrap-
olators form biased beliefs based on past returns, consequently, they become overly
optimistic and take excessive leverage. However, their high expectations will not
continue for long and consequently, the wealth level of extrapolators in the future
will decline. Since the optimal consumption rule is linearly depending on the wealth
level, their future consumption rate will also decline as the result.
My model simulation results confirm this. In Table A.13, I report the predictive
regression of future consumption growth using current leverage ratio as the predictor.
The predictive pattern is significantly negative, and remains stable when forecasting
horizons span from 1 to 6 quarters.
Additional Model Implications
Bubbles
Extrapolative beliefs help generate excessive optimism and pessimism in the market,
consistent with the anecdotal descriptions of market boom and bust. Specifically,
episodes of good returns lead extrapolators to become overly optimistic about the
future expected returns, consistent with the high sentiment during booms measured
in the survey. Conversely, a sequence of low returns will significantly disappoint
extrapolators, leading to a drop in investor sentiment during recessions.
Moreover, what distinguishes this model from others in explaining the bubble phe-
nomena is the role of the wealth dynamics during the bubble and crash episodes.
In my model, investor sentiment has large impacts on the dynamics of the wealth
process, especially during bubbles when the wealth level of extrapolators is high.
High sentiment during bubbles induces investors to lever up, which pushes up the
total dollar demand and leads to overvaluations. However, investor sentiment could
not last long since extrapolators get disappointed by future shocks, and future dollar
demand for the risky asset goes down. The decrease in risky asset price not only
makes investors pessimistic but also reduces the overall market impact of extrapo-
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lators, which makes fundamental investors easier to correct mispricing and leads to
the market crash.
[Place Figure A.8 about here]
Countercyclical Sharpe ratios and Negative Risk Premium
My model with extrapolation naturally generates a procyclical perceived Sharpe
ratio, since investor beliefs are mainly driven by recent realized returns in the past:
during market booms, investors become optimistic about future returns and the
perceived Sharpe ratio increases. Conversely, in the recessions, investors become
overly pessimistic and perceive low Sharpe ratio due to low past returns. This
procyclicality resonates with the finding in Amromin and Sharpe (2013) where
they document a procyclical Sharpe ratios using data from Michigan Surveys of
Consumer Attitudes.
Compared to rational expectation models, the behavioral model in my paper has two
distinct probability measures. While Sharpe ratio is procyclical under the perceived
probability measure, my model generates a countercyclical Sharpe ratio under the
objective probability measure. This countercyclicality closely relates to the fact
that investor sentiment reverts: with high level of investor sentiment, extrapolators
become overly optimistic and perceive high Sharpe ratio, but the Sharpe ratio under
objective probability measure is low in the future. This countercyclical Sharpe ratio
is consistent with the empirical pattern documented in Lettau and Ludvigson (2010).
Debt Accumulation and Procyclical Leverage
Many studies document the strong cyclicality of debt accumulation. For instance,
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) document that household debt accumulation speeds up
duringmarket booms and often leads to severe financial crashes. The extrapolation in
mymodel capture this dynamic pattern for debt. Duringmarket booms, extrapolators
become overly optimistic by extrapolating the past returns and consequently they take
lever up to buy the risky asset. Conversely, during recessions, extrapolators become
overly pessimistic and therefore have low leverage level. In addition, consistent with
many other models such as He and Krishnamurthy (2008), this model also captures
the procyclical leverage. However, different from previous studies, the procyclicality
in my model arises from extrapolation.
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1.5 The Role of Extrapolation: A Rational Benchmark Model
To correctly evaluate the role of extrapolation, in this section, I impose extrapolators
to have fully correct beliefs by setting θ = 0, and compare the model implications
with previous behavioralmodel settings. Such comparison implies that extrapolation
is important for understanding investor beliefs and asset price dynamics.
The Economy
In this rational benchmarkmodel, I followprevious setting and consider a continuous-
time economy with two types of assets: one risk-free asset and one risky asset. The
underlying dividend process Dt for the risky asset still follows a geometric Brownian
motion:
dDt/Dt = gDdt + σDdωt . (1.34)
The dividend process is driven by ωt , a one-dimensional Weiner process under the
true probability measure observed by outside econometricians. The equilibrium
price Pt now follows
dPt/Pt = g¯P,tdt + σ¯P,tdωt . (1.35)
The growth rate gP,t and volatility term σP,t are both endogenously determined in
the equilibrium.
Investors
There are two types of investors in the rational benchmark model: extrapolators and
fundamental investors. Different from the case of behavioral model, extrapolators
have correct beliefs about the asset dynamics and optimize their portfolio choice
under the objective probability measure accordingly. Fundamental investors, on the
other end, still serves as the counteracting forces in themarket and trade aggressively
whenever asset prices deviate from fundamental values. Similarly, I assume that
fundamental investors make up a fraction of 1 − µ and extrapolators make up a
fraction of µ.
Extrapolators
As in the behavioral model, I introduce logarithmic utilities for extrapolators and
assume that each of them, indexed by j, is infinitesimal and therefore acts as price-
taker in the market. They solve the following optimization problem:
max
{C jt+s }s≥0
Et[
∫ ∞
t
e−ρs lnC js ds], (1.36)
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and subject to budget constraint
dW jt = −C jt dt + rW jt dt + α jtW jt [g¯P,tdt +
Dt
Pt
dt − rdt + σ¯P,tdωt].
Most of the properties of the optimal strategies in the behavioral model—that the
optimal risky position depends on instantaneous equity premium and volatility, that
the investment decision is myopic and ignores the hedging demand—carry over to
the rational benchmark case. However, one key difference is that now extrapolators
make investment decisions under the true probability measure.
Following the standard Merton’s approach, we get the optimal consumption and
portfolio rule for extrapolators:
PROPOSITION 3 In the rational benchmark economy, the extrapolators with the
objective function in equation (1.36) and budget constraint in equation (1.37) will
optimally consume and invest at time t according to the following strategies:
C jt = ρW
j
t (1.37)
and
α
j
t =
g¯P,t (xt ) + l¯−1(xt ) − r
σ¯2P,t (xt )
, (1.38)
where the price to dividend ratio l¯ ≡ PtDt depends on the wealth to dividend ratio
xt ≡ WtDt . In other words, the equilibrium depends on state variable xt .
Proof : See Appendix A.2.
Equilibrium
Definition of Equilibrium In this rational benchmark model, the equilibrium satisfies
the following conditions:
(i) Rational investors follow the optimal consumption and portfolio choice described
in proposition (3).
(ii) Fundamental investors follow their trading strategy defined in equation (1.19).
(iii) The following market clearing condition holds:
µαWt + (1 − µ)Qt = Pt . (1.39)
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For the rational benchmark model, I still focus on the symmetric equilibrium where
each extrapolator is endowed with the same level of wealth and follows identical
strategies. The equilibrium depends both on the wealth to dividend ratio xt and the
latent state variable St . Therefore, I rely on solving a partial differential equation
to obtain the solution for the fixed-point problem. As verified later, the price to
dividend ratio is monotonically increasing in both xt and St .
PROPOSITION 4 In the symmetric equilibrium, the price-dividend ratio l¯ is a
function of the current states xt , and satisfies the following partial differential
equation:
c0 l¯ − c1
xt
=
g¯P,t + l¯−1 − r
σ¯2P,t
, (1.40)
where σP,t is also a function of xt and satisfies
σ¯P,t = σD
1 − l¯x
l¯
xt
1 − l¯x
l¯
xtαt
(1.41)
and l (xt ) satisfies the following boundary conditions:
lim
xt→0
l¯ =
c1
c0
, (1.42)
lim
xt→0
= lim
x→0
gD +
c1
c0
− r
σ2D
, (1.43)
and
lim
xt→∞
l¯ = (r − g¯P,t )−1, (1.44)
where c0 = k+1−µkµ and c1 =
1−µ
kµ(r−gD ) are both constants.
In addition, the dynamics of xt follows
dxt = gx,t (xt )dt + σx,tdωt, (1.45)
where
gx,t = xt (r − ρ − gD + σ2D) + (c0l − c1)(g¯P,t + l−1 − r − σDσ¯P,t ) (1.46)
σx,t = (c0l − c1)σ¯P,t − xtσD . (1.47)
Proof: See Appendix A.2.
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The volatility pattern in equation (1.41) essentially reflects the wealth effect and
the portfolio rebalancing effect, as documented in previous studies (Xiong (2001)
and Jin (2015)). When αt is greater than one, extrapolators borrow money at the
risk-free rate r and lever up their positions in the risky asset. Once positive dividend
shocks arrive, the increase in the risky asset leads to an increase in their wealth
level and hence their absolute risk aversion; at the same time, the leverage ratio of
extrapolators is further pushed down, which induce them to buy more risky assets.
This wealth effect amplifies the initial dividend shocks, which makes σ¯P,t larger
than σD. Conversely, when αt is less than one, the portfolio rebalancing effect
dominates: once positive dividend shocks arrive, the increase in the risky asset
leads to an increase in their wealth level and hence their absolute risk aversion; at
the same time, the leverage ratio of extrapolators is further pushed up, which induce
them to delever. Together, the portfolio rebalancing effect dampens the initial shocks
and make σ¯P,t less than σD.
In solving the ordinary equation in proposition (4), I still rely on numerical methods.
Similarly, I apply the following monotonic transformation:
zt =
xt − ξ
xt + ξ
, (1.48)
where ξ is a positive constant.
Calibrated Model for the Benchmark Case
In this section, I solve the rational benchmark model using the projection method.
I use the following parameter values: r = 4%, gD = 1.5%, σD = 10%, ρ = 2%,
k = 0.5 and µ = 0.5. The selected asset and utility parameters are reported in the
upper two panels in Table A.6.
[Place Table A.6 about here]
[Place Figure A.4 about here]
Price-Dividend Ratio: Benchmark Case
With the above parameters, I report the model solution in Figure A.4. In the upper
panel, I report the price-dividend ratio l¯ (xt ) as a function of the wealth-to-dividend
ratio. As we can see, l¯ (xt ) is an monotonically increasing function of xt . When xt
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equals zero, the risky asset is hold by the fundamental investors and the risky asset
price is at its fundamental value, which is relatively low. Increase in the wealth level
of extrapolators helps push up the total dollar amount of the risky asset, which in
turn increases the price-to-dividend ratio l¯ (xt ). With the given parameters, the price
to dividend ratio lies between 20 to 40, which is fairly consistent with the empirical
moments in the literature.19
Optimal Portfolio Weight: Benchmark Case
The portfolio weight αt for extrapolators is monotonically decreasing in zt . Recall
that the price to dividend ratio positively depends on the wealth to dividend ratio.
Therefore, as zt increases, the dividend yield naturally goes down, which makes the
investment set less attractive to the extrapolators. Consequently, extrapolators want
to decrease their position in the risky asset, reducing the optimal portfolio αt .
Volatility: Benchmark Case
I also report the volatility σ¯P,t (xt ) in the equilibrium as a function of the wealth to
dividend ratio. As discussed before, the reverse-S shaped curve is closely related to
extrapolators’ portfolio choice αt . When the transformed wealth-to-dividend ratio
zt is slightly below 1, the wealth fraction they invested in the risky asset grows from
zero to slightly above. When αt is positive but small, faced with exogenous shocks,
investors will rebalance their portfolio and dampen the overall volatility. As a result,
equilibrium σ¯P,t is less than the magnitude of fundamental shocks σD and it can be
as low as 9.55%. As zt decreases and the portfolio weight αt gradually becomes
greater than one, a negative dividend shock will cause their leverage ratio to increase
and lead extrapolators to reduce their risky asset position, which helps amplify the
initial shocks and pushes up volatility σ¯P,t . When zt goes down to -1, extrapolators
lose their impact and fundamental investors gradually dominate the market, which
makes the volatility gradually converge to σD.
Extrapolators’ Beliefs
Extrapolators in the rational benchmarkmodel have fully correct beliefs about future
risky asset returns. As a result, their belief pattern is not consistent with the observed
dynamics for investor sentiment. To provide a formal justification, I still focus on
the model simulation results.
19Beeler and Campbell (2012) report the average of log(PD) ratio of around 28.8.
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[Place Table A.14 about here]
First, I follow Greenwood and Shleifer (2014) and run the following regression:
E[Rt+12] = a0 + a1Xt +  t, (1.49)
where E[Rt+12] represents the expectation of future twelve-month returns under the
true probability measure, Xt represent either past accumulative 12-month returns or
the current log price to dividend ratio.
I report the regression results in Table A.14. The belief pattern for extrapolators
in the rational benchmark model is not consistent with the extrapolation pattern in
the survey: when the current log price to dividend ratio is high, extrapolators with
correct beliefs would anticipate that the market is overvalued and then anticipate a
decline in the risky asset price.
The Interaction effect
[Place Table A.15 about here]
Moreover, the rational benchmark model does not capture the strong interaction
effect between investor sentiment and thewealth level of extrapolators in determining
the mispricing. Specifically, I test the Observation 3 by running the same regression
in equation (1.4) using the simulated series from the rational benchmark model.
The regression results are reported in Table A.15. The coefficients for each of the
regressors are all statistically significant but positive because extrapolators always
hold correct beliefs.
Household Leverage and Future Consumption Growth
The absence of extrapolation also drives away the negative association between
the household leverage and the future consumption growth. In the rational model,
households have fully correct beliefs, therefore, they increase their exposure to the
risky asset when future returns are high. This leads to a positive correlation between
the leverage ratio and future consumption growth rate, which is inconsistent with
the pattern documented in Mian and Sufi (2009). As shown in Table A.16, when
regressing future consumption growth rate on current leverage ratio, the coefficient
αt is significantly positive.
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In summary, with fully correct beliefs, rational models miss most of the important
model implications in the behavioral model. Therefore, extrapolation, or equiva-
lently investor beliefs, plays a key role in explaining a set of empirical patterns. The
excessive optimism and pessimism induced by extrapolation not only help under-
stand the anecdotal fluctuations in investor sentiment but also helps explain the asset
mispricings and consequently the predictability of returns in the aggregate stock
market. Moreover, it helps shed light on the household leverage-taking behaviors
and corresponding real consequences to the economy. All these facts point to the
importance of belief-based investor sentiment in understanding both asset pricing
facts and real economic activities.
1.6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I have developed a model that focuses on investor sentiment and ana-
lyzed its time-varying impact on the market. In my model, there are two types of in-
vestors: fundamental investors who trade as aggressive arbitragers and extrapolators
who form investor sentiment by over-extrapolating past realized returns. The model
implies dynamic connections between investor sentiment and market mispricing
through the market impact of extrapolators. When the wealth level of extrapolators
is high and therefore have a large impact on the equilibrium, investor sentiment
directly causes the market mispricing and negatively predicts future market returns
due to the fact that investor sentiment reverts quickly to its mean. Conversely, if the
wealth level of extrapolators is low—the situation in which fundamental investors
dominate the market and extrapolators have trivial impacts on the market—investor
sentiment positively predicts future market returns since it reflects an undergoing
market correction.
There are at least two avenues for future work. First, a fully fledgedmodel that simul-
taneously incorporates extrapolators, fundamental investors and rational investors
are in demand. Although intuition tells me that the existence of rational investors
will only reinforce my current results of the behavioral model due to their “ride on
the bubble” motives, a formal model will help verify my conjecture. Second, my
model implies a strong but general connection between investor sentiment and mis-
pricing by the time-varying impact of extrapolators, and I find empirically support
using the stockmarket as an example. However, the connection implied in mymodel
should be a general pattern that applies to a broader set of asset classes. Empirically
testing such connections in other asset classes will deepen our understanding of the
impact of investor sentiment.
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C h a p t e r 2
ASSET PRICING WITH RETURN EXTRAPOLATION
2.1 Introduction
In financial economics, there is growing interest in “return extrapolation”, the idea
that investors’ beliefs about an asset’s future return are a positive function of the
asset’s recent past returns. Models with return extrapolation have two appealing
features. First, they are consistent with survey evidence on the beliefs of real-
world investors.1 Second, they show promise in matching important asset pricing
facts, such as volatility and predictability in the aggregate market, momentum and
reversals in the cross-section, and bubbles (Barberis et al. (2015); Barberis et al.
(2017); Hong and Stein (1999)).
One limitation of existing models of return extrapolation, however, is that they can
only be compared to the data in a qualitative way. Early models, such as Cutler
et al. (1990a) and DeLong et al. (1990), highlight the conceptual importance of
return extrapolation, but they are not designed to match asset pricing facts quanti-
tatively. Barberis et al. (2015) is a dynamic consumption-based model that tries to
make sense of both survey expectations and aggregate stockmarket prices. However,
the simplifying assumptions in the model make it difficult to evaluate the model’s
fit with the empirical facts. For instance, their model adopts a framework with
constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) preferences and a constant interest rate.
Under these assumptions, many ratio-based quantities that we study in asset pricing
(e.g., the price-dividend ratio) do not have well-defined distributions in the model
and therefore do not have properties that match what we observe in the data.
In this paper, we propose a new model of aggregate stock market prices based on
return extrapolation that overcomes this limitation. The goal of the paper is to
see if the model can match important facts about the aggregate stock market when
the agent’s beliefs are calibrated to match survey expectations of investors, and to
compare the model in a quantitative way to rational expectations models of the stock
1Among others, Vissing-Jorgensen (2004), Bacchetta et al. (2009), Amromin and Sharpe (2013),
Greenwood and Shleifer (2014), Koijen et al. (2015), and Kuchler and Zafar (2016) document that
many individual and institutional investors have extrapolative expectations: they believe that the
stock market will continue rising in value after a sequence of high past returns, and that it will
continue falling in value after a sequence of low past returns.
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market.
We consider a Lucas economy in continuous time with a representative agent.
The Lucas tree is a claim to an aggregate consumption process which follows a
geometric Brownian motion. Besides the Lucas tree, there are two tradeable assets
in the economy: the stock market and an instantaneous riskless asset. The stock
market is a claim to an aggregate dividend process whose growth rate is positively
correlated with consumption growth. The riskless asset is in zero net supply with
its interest rate determined in equilibrium. The representative agent has Epstein-Zin
preferences and extrapolative beliefs. She perceives that the expected growth rate
of stock market prices is governed by a switching process between two regimes. If
recent price growth of the stock market has been high, the agent thinks it is likely
that a high-mean price growth regime is generating prices and therefore forecasts
high price growth in the future. Conversely, if recent price growth has been low,
the agent thinks that it is likely that a low mean-price growth regime is generating
prices and therefore forecasts low price growth in the future.
We calibrate the agent’s beliefs to match the survey expectations of investors studied
in Greenwood and Shleifer (2014). Specifically, we set the belief-based parameters
so that, for a regression of the agent’s expectations about future stock market returns
on past twelve-month returns, the model produces a regression coefficient and a
t-statistic that match the empirical estimates from surveys. Our parameter choice
also allows the agent’s beliefs to match the survey evidence on the relative weight
investors put on recent versus distant past returns when forming beliefs about future
returns. Overall, the model generates a degree of extrapolative expectations for the
agent that matches the empirical magnitude. With the agent’s beliefs disciplined by
survey data, the model quantitatively matches important facts about the aggregate
stock market: it generates significant excess volatility and predictability of stock
market returns, a high equity premium, a low and stable interest rate, as well as a
low correlation between stock market returns and consumption growth.
We now explain the intuition for the model’s implications, starting with excess
volatility. The model generates significant excess volatility from the interaction
between return extrapolation and Epstein-Zin preferences. Suppose that the stock
market has had high past returns. In such a case, return extrapolation leads the
agent to forecast high future returns. Under Epstein-Zin preferences, the separation
between the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and risk aversion gives rise to
a strong intertemporal substitution effect. Therefore, the agent’s forecast of high
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future returns leads her to push up the current price significantly, generating excess
volatility.2
The mechanism described above for generating excess volatility, together with a
strong degree of mean reversion in the agent’s expectations about stock market
returns, produces the long-horizon predictability of stock market returns that we
observe in the data. The agent’s beliefs mean-revert, for two reasons. First, by
assumption, the agent believes that the expected growth rate of stock market prices
tends to switch over time from one regime to the other: the agent believes that her
expectations about stock market returns will mean-revert. Second, the agent’s return
expectations mean-revert faster than what she perceives: when the agent thinks that
the future price growth is high, future price growth tends to be low endogenously,
causing her return expectations to decrease at a pace that exceeds her anticipation.
As a result, following periods with a high price-dividend ratio—this is when the high
past price growth of the stock market pushes up the agent’s expectation about future
returns and hence her demand for the stock market—the agent’s return expectation
tends to revert back to its mean, giving rise to low subsequent returns and hence the
predictability of stock market returns using the price-dividend ratio.
Next, we turn to the model’s implications for the equity premium. Three factors
affect the long-run equity premium perceived by the agent. First, because the agent is
risk averse, excess volatility causes her to demand a higher equity premium. Second,
return extrapolation gives rise to perceived persistence of the aggregate dividend
process, which, under Epstein-Zin preferences, is significantly priced, pushing up
the perceived equity premium. Finally, the separation between the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution and risk aversion helps to keep the equilibrium interest
rate low and hence keep the equity premium high. Furthermore, the true long-
run equity premium is significantly higher than the perceived one. In the model,
the agent’s beliefs mean-revert faster than what she perceives. Given this, she
underestimates short-term stock market fluctuations and hence the risk associated
with the stock market. In other words, if an infinitesimal rational agent, one that has
2A feedback loop emerges from this mechanism. If current returns are high, that makes the
agent think that future returns will also be high, which leads her to push up prices, increasing current
returns further, and so on. In general, there is a danger that this feedback loop could “explode”.
Nonetheless, in the model, we assume the agent believes that the expected growth rate of stock
market prices tends to switch over time from one regime to the other; she therefore believes her
optimism will decline in the future. As a result, the cumulative impact of the feedback loop on
investor expectations and asset prices is finite; the model remains stable. Models like Cutler et al.
(1990a) and Barberis et al. (2015) instead introduce fully rational investors in order to counteract the
behavioral investors and preserve equilibrium.
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the same preferences as the behavioral agent but holds rational beliefs, enters our
economy, she would have demanded a higher equity premium: the model produces
a true average equity premium that is substantially higher than the perceived equity
premium.
Finally, the model generates low interest rate volatility and a low correlation between
stock market returns and consumption growth. In the model, the agent separately
forms beliefs about the dividend growth of the stock market and about aggregate
consumption growth. Here, we assume that the bias in the agent’s beliefs about
consumption growth derives only from the bias in her beliefs about dividend growth.
Given the low observed correlation between consumption growth and dividend
growth, the bias in the agent’s beliefs about consumption growth is small, consistent
with the lack of empirical evidence that investors have extrapolative beliefs about
consumption growth. The agent’s approximately correct beliefs about consumption
growth allow the model to generate low interest rate volatility. They also imply
that the agent’s beliefs about stock market returns—they co-move strongly with
her beliefs about dividend growth—are not significantly affected by fluctuations
in consumption growth, giving rise to the low observed correlation between stock
market returns and consumption growth.
Although our model is based on return extrapolation, it yields direct implications
for cash flow expectations. When the past price growth of the stock market has been
high, this has a positive effect not only on the agent’s beliefs about future returns,
but also on her beliefs about future dividend growth; indeed, her expectations
about dividend growth rise at a pace that exceeds her expectations about future
returns.3 Given this, a Campbell-Shiller decomposition using the agent’s subjective
expectations about stock market returns and dividend growth shows that changes in
subjective expectations about future dividend growth explain most of the volatility
of the price-dividend ratio. This model implication is consistent with the recent
empirical findings of de la O and Myers (2017): they find that during periods when
the price-dividend ratio of the U.S. stock market is high, investors’ expectations
of future dividend growth are much higher than their expectations of future stock
market returns. As a result, changes in investors’ subjective expectations of future
dividend growth explain the majority of stock market movements. Importantly, the
fact that prices in our model are mainly correlated with cash flow expectations is
a consequence of the Campbell-Shiller accounting identity; this statement is about
3We provide a detailed explanation of this finding in Sections 2.2 and 2.3.
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correlation, not about causality. The agent’s return expectations determine her cash
flow expectations and are the cause of price movements. Given this, our model
simultaneously explains the empirical findings of de la O and Myers (2017) on
cash flow expectations and the empirical findings of Greenwood and Shleifer (2014)
on return expectations. At the same time, the model also explains the empirical
findings of Cochrane (2008) and Cochrane (2011) that, under rational expectations,
the variation of the price-dividend ratio comes primarily fromdiscount rate variation.
Ourmodel also points to some challenges: when calibrated to the survey expectations
data, the model predicts a persistence of the price-dividend ratio that is significantly
lower than its empirical value. In other words, to match the empirical persistence
of the price-dividend ratio, investors need to form beliefs about future returns based
on many years of past returns. However, the available survey evidence suggests that
they focus on just the past year or two.
After presenting the model, we compare it to the standard rational expectations
models of the aggregate stock market. As with the habit formation model of Camp-
bell and Cochrane (1999), the long-run risks models of Bansal and Yaron (2004)
and Bansal et al. (2012), and the rare disasters models of Barro (2006), Gabaix
(2012), and Wachter (2013), our model is developed in a Lucas economy with a
representative agent. This model structure allows for a direct comparison between
our model and models with rational expectations. Here, we focus on the long-run
risks models because these are the models most related to ours. We document some
different implications.
First, our model differs from the long-run risks models in the way the agent forms ex-
pectations. In Bansal and Yaron (2004), dividend growth and consumption growth
share a stochastic yet persistent component. High past stock market returns are
typically caused by positive shocks to this common component, which, given its
persistence, implies high dividend growth and hence high raw returns moving for-
ward. That is, the agent in Bansal and Yaron (2004) has extrapolative beliefs about
future raw returns. At the same time, precisely because dividend growth and con-
sumption growth share a persistent component, the comovement between the agent’s
beliefs about stock market returns—these rationally drive returns—and her beliefs
about consumption growth—these determine the interest rate in equilibrium—is
high. That is, when the raw returns are high, the interest rate is also high. As a
result, the agent does not hold extrapolative beliefs about excess returns. In our
model, however, the agent extrapolates past stock market returns, but extrapolates
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past consumption growth much less: the comovement between her beliefs about
stock market returns and her beliefs about consumption growth is low. Therefore,
the agent has extrapolative beliefs about both raw returns and excess returns.
Furthermore, these two models yield different implications for asset prices. Our
model produces an equity premium that does not vary significantly with changes
in the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. On the contrary, long-run risks
models cannot generate a high equity premiumwith a low elasticity of intertemporal
substitution. To see this model difference, we first note that the agent’s beliefs in
our model are much less persistent than the stochastic component of dividend and
consumption growth in Bansal and Yaron (2004), allowing the equilibrium interest
rate and hence the equity premium in our model to be less responsive to changes
in the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. At the same time, the perceived
dividend growth in our model depends more strongly on the agent’s beliefs about
the price growth of the stock market, pushing up the perceived equity premium;
as a comparison, dividend growth in Bansal and Yaron (2004) depends much less
on the stochastic growth component. Finally, the true long-run equity premium in
our model is above the perceived one, allowing the equity premium to be high even
when the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is low.
Our paper adds to a newwave of theories that attempt to understand the role of belief
formation in driving the behavior of asset prices and themacroeconomy (Fuster et al.
(2011); Gennaioli et al. (2012); Choi and Mertens (2013); Alti and Tetlock (2014);
Hirshleifer et al. (2015); Barberis et al. (2015); Jin (2015); Ehling et al. (2015);
Vanasco et al. (2015); Pagel (2016); Collin-Dufresne et al. (2016a,b); Greenwood
et al. (2016); Glaeser and Nathanson (2017); DeFusco et al. (2017); Bordalo et al.
(2018)). Our paper also adds to a growing literature on the source of stock price
movements (Cochrane (2008); Cochrane (2011); Chen et al. (2013); de la O and
Myers (2017)). Furthermore, it is related to theories of model uncertainty and am-
biguity aversion such as Bidder and Dew-Becker (2016). These models typically
assume that agents learn about the dynamic properties of the consumption process or
the dividend process. Therefore, they are closely linked to the fundamental extrapo-
lation models in the behavioral finance literature, but do not match survey evidence
on return expectations. Finally, our paper speaks to the debate between Bansal et al.
(2012) and Beeler and Campbell (2012) which focuses on excess predictability: the
notion that, in the long-run risks literature, future consumption growth and dividend
growth are excessively predicted by current variables such as the price-dividend
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ratio and the interest rate (see also, Collin-Dufresne et al. (2016b)). Our model
does not give rise to excess predictability: return extrapolation in the model only
generates perceived but not true persistence in consumption growth and dividend
growth.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2.2, we lay out the basic elements of
the model and characterize its solution. In Section 2.3, we parameterize the model
and examine its implications in detail. Section 2.4 provides a comparative statics
analysis. Section 2.5 discusses differences between our model and rational expecta-
tions models. Section 2.6 further compares the model to a model with fundamental
extrapolation, the notion that some investors hold extrapolative expectations about
the future dividend growth of the stock market. Section 2.7 concludes and suggests
directions for future research. All technical details are in the Appendix.
2.2 The Model
In this section, we first describe the model setup and characterize its solution,
and then derive equilibrium quantities that are important for understanding the
implications of the model.
Model setup
Asset space.—We consider an infinite-horizon Lucas economy in continuous time
with a representative agent. The Lucas tree is a claim to an aggregate consumption
process. We assume it is a geometric Brownian motion
dCt/Ct = gCdt + σCdωCt , (2.1)
and we denote the price of the Lucas tree at time t as PCt .
Besides the Lucas tree, there are two other tradeable assets in the economy; they are
the main focus of our analysis. The first asset is the stock market which is a claim
to an aggregate dividend process given by
dDt/Dt = gDdt + σDdωDt ; (2.2)
we denote the price of the stock market at time t as PDt .4 Both ωDt and ωCt are
4Since the aggregate consumption process in the model is exogenous, the dividend payment from
the stock market does not further affect consumption. As a result, we can think of the stock market
as an asset in zero net supply with a shadow price determined in equilibrium. This is a common
assumption adopted by many other consumption-based models such as Campbell and Cochrane
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standard Brownian motions. We assume that the instantaneous correlation between
dDt and dCt is ρ: Et[dωDt · dωCt ] = ρdt. The second asset is an instantaneous
riskless asset. This asset is in zero net supply, and its interest rate rt is determined
in equilibrium.
Agent’s preferences.—We follow Epstein and Zin (1989, 1991) and assume that the
agent has a recursive intertemporal utility
Ut =
[
(1 − e−δdt )C1−ψt dt + e−δdt
(
Eet [U˜
1−γ
t+dt]
) (1−ψ)/(1−γ)]1/(1−ψ)
, (2.3)
where δ is the subjective discount rate, γ > 0 is the coefficient of relative risk aver-
sion, andψ > 0 is the reciprocal of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. When
ψ equals γ, (2.3) reduces to power utility. The superscript “e” is an abbreviation for
“extrapolative” expectations: the certainty equivalence in (2.3) is computed under
the representative agent’s subjective beliefs, which, as we specify later, incorporate
the notion of return extrapolation.
The subjective Euler equation, or the first-order condition, is
Eet
e−δ(1−γ)dt/(1−ψ)
(
C˜t+dt
Ct
)−ψ(1−γ)/(1−ψ)
M˜ (ψ−γ)/(1−ψ)t+dt R˜ j,t+dt
 = 1. (2.4)
Here M˜t+dt is the gross return on the optimal portfolio held by the agent from time t
to time t + dt. In a Lucas economy with a representative agent, the optimal portfolio
in equilibrium is the Lucas tree itself, and therefore
M˜t+dt =
P˜Ct+dt + C˜tdt
PCt
=
P˜Ct+dt + C˜t+dtdt
PCt
+ o(dt). (2.5)
On the other hand, R˜ j,t+dt is the gross return on any tradeable asset j in the market
from time t to time t + dt; as mentioned above, the two tradeable assets we focus on
are the stock market and the riskless asset.
Agent’s beliefs.—We now turn to the key part of themodel: the representative agent’s
beliefs about stock market returns. According to surveys, real-world investors form
beliefs about future stock market returns by extrapolating past returns (Vissing-
Jorgensen (2004); Bacchetta et al. (2009); Amromin and Sharpe (2013); Greenwood
and Shleifer (2014); Koijen et al. (2015); Kuchler and Zafar (2016)). One natural
(1999) and Barberis et al. (2001).
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way to capture this notion of return extrapolation is through a regime-switching
model. Specifically, we suppose that the agent believes that the expected growth
rate of stock market prices is governed by (1 − θ)gD + θ µ˜S,t , where µ˜S,t is a latent
variable which switches between a high value µH in a high-mean price growth
regime H and a low value µL (µL < µH) in a low-mean price growth regime L with
the following transition matrix 5
*,
µ˜S,t+dt = µH µ˜S,t+dt = µL
µ˜S,t = µH 1 − χdt χdt
µ˜S,t = µL λdt 1 − λdt
+-. (2.6)
Here χ and λ are the intensities for the transitions of regime from H to L and from
L to H , respectively, and the parameter θ (0 ≤ θ ≤ 1) controls the extent to which
the agent’s beliefs are extrapolative: setting θ to zero makes the agent’s beliefs fully
rational.
Given this perceived regime-switching model—this is not the true model—if recent
stock market price growth has been high, the agent thinks it is likely that the high-
mean price growth regime is generating prices and therefore forecasts high price
growth in the future. Conversely, if recent price growth has been low, the agent
thinks it is likely that the low-mean price growth regime is generating prices and
therefore forecasts low price growth in the future. Formally, at each point in time,
the agent computes the expected value of the latent variable µ˜S,t given the history
of past price growth: St ≡ E[µ˜S,t |F Pt ]. That is, she applies optimal filtering theory
(see, for instance, Liptser and Shiryaev (2013)) and obtains
dSt = (λµH + χµL − (λ + χ)St )dt + (σDP,t )−1θ(µH − St )(St − µL)dωet
≡ µeS (St )dt + σS (St )dωet ,
(2.7)
where dωet ≡ [dPDt /PDt −(1−θ)gDdt−θStdt]/σDP,t is a standardBrownian innovation
term from the agent’s perspective. As a result, she perceives the evolution of the
stock market price PDt to be
dPDt /P
D
t = µ
D,e
P (St )dt + σ
D
P (St )dω
e
t , (2.8)
5The models of Barberis et al. (1998), Veronesi (1999), and Jin (2015) also adopt a regime-
switching learning structure.
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where
µD,eP (St ) = (1 − θ)gD + θSt . (2.9)
The agent’s expectation about price growth µD,eP (St ) is therefore a linear combination
of a rational component gD and a behavioral component St ; hereafter we call St the
sentiment variable.
In summary, the evolution of sentiment in (2.7) captures return extrapolation: high
past price growth dPDt /PDt pushes up the perceived shock dωet , which leads the
agent to raise her expectation of the sentiment variable St , causing her expectation
about future price growth µD,eP (St ) to rise.6
Although the subjective evolution of sentiment (2.7) is derived through optimal
learning, the representative agent, it should be emphasized, does not hold rational
expectations. With rational expectations, the agent will realize in the long run
that the regime-switching model (2.6) is incorrect: she can look at the historical
distribution of dωet and realize that it does not fit a normal distribution with a
mean of 0 and a variance of dt. Instead, the agent in our behavioral model always
believes that the regime-switching model is correct. In reality, it is possible that
investors in the market learn over time that their mental model is incorrect. At the
same time, new investors who hold extrapolative beliefs may continuously enter the
market. The stable belief system in (2.6) is an analytically convenient way to capture
these dynamics. Alternatively, if equations (2.6) and (2.7) represent the true data
generating process, then the agent does hold rational expectations. In that case, the
model becomes a fully rational model with incomplete information.7 We discuss
the predictions of such a model in Section 2.5.
So far we have been focusing on the agent’s beliefs about stock market prices. These
beliefs also have direct implications for the agent’s beliefs about dividend growth.
If we write the perceived dividend process as
dDt/Dt = geD (St )dt + σDdω
e
t , (2.10)
6There are many ways to specify the evolution of St in order to capture return extrapolation. We
derive St from a regime-switching model for two reasons. First, such a learning model captures base
rate neglect, an important consequence of the representativeness heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman
(1974)). To see this, note that the perceived regimes or states, H and L, are not part of the true states
of the economy. As a result, assigning positive probability weights to these regimes reflect the bias
that the investor neglects the zero base rate associated with such regimes. Second, bounding St by a
finite range (µL, µH ) reduces the analytical difficulty of solving the model.
7Information is incomplete in the sense that the agent does not directly observe the latent variable
µ˜S,t .
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we can connect the agent’s expectation about dividend growth geD (St ) to her expec-
tation about stock market price growth µD,eP (St ). To formally make this connection,
we first observe that all the ratio-based quantities in our model (e.g., the price-
dividend ratio of the stock market) are a function of the sentiment variable St ; we
can define f (St ) ≡ PDt /Dt . We then apply Ito’s lemma on both sides of this equation
f (St ) = PDt /Dt and match terms to obtain
geD (St ) = (1 − θ)gD + θSt︸              ︷︷              ︸
expectation of price growth
−( f ′/ f )µeS (St )︸             ︷︷             ︸
expectation of sentiment evolution
+σ2D − σDP (St )σD − 12 ( f ′′/ f )(σS (St ))2︸                                              ︷︷                                              ︸
Ito correction terms
,
(2.11)
where
σDP (St ) =
σD +
√
σ2D + 4θ(µH − St )(St − µL)( f ′/ f )
2
> σD . (2.12)
Equation (2.11) highlights an “expectations transmission mechanism”: it says that
the agent’s expectation about dividend growth equals the sum of her expectation
about stock market price growth, her expectation about how the price-dividend
ratio evolves with respect to changes in sentiment, and the Ito correction terms that
are related to the agent’s risk aversion and the volatility of dividend growth, price
growth, and changes in sentiment. In this way, the agent’s expectation about price
growth affects her expectation about dividend growth.
With the parameter values we specify later, equation (2.11) suggests that the agent’s
expectation about dividend growth is more responsive to changes in sentiment than
her expectation about price growth. Under Epstein-Zin preferences, the separation
between the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and risk aversion gives rise to
a strong intertemporal substitution effect. As a result, when the past price growth
has been high, the agent’s forecast of high future price growth leads her to push
up the current price-dividend ratio, making it a positive function of sentiment.
Furthermore, under the regime-switching model, the agent perceives sentiment to
be mean-reverting: µeS (St ) in (2.7) is a negative function of St . This suggests that the
agent also perceives the price-dividend ratio to be mean-reverting. Together, these
two conditions—the price-dividend ratio is a positive function of sentiment and
is perceived to be mean-reverting—imply that the agent anticipates that the price-
dividend ratio will decline from a high value when she expects high future price
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growth. That is, when the agent expects high future price growth, her expectation
about dividend growth rises at a pace that exceeds her expectation about future price
growth.
To complete the description of the model, we need to further specify the agent’s
beliefs about consumption growth. To do this, first note that, with a local correlation
of ρ between consumption growth and dividend growth, we can rewrite the aggregate
consumption process of (2.1) as
dCt/Ct = gCdt + σC
(
ρdωDt +
√
1 − ρ2dω⊥t
)
, (2.13)
where ω⊥t is a Brownian motion that is locally uncorrelated with ωDt , the Brownian
shock on dividends. We then assume that the agent perceives the consumption
process as
dCt/Ct = geC (St )dt + σC
(
ρdωet +
√
1 − ρ2dω⊥t
)
. (2.14)
That is, we replace the true Brownian shock on dividends dωDt by the agent’s
perceivedBrownian shock dωet and factor the difference between these twoBrownian
shocks into geC (St ), the agent’s subjective expectation about consumption growth.
Conceptually, this amounts to assuming that the bias in the agent’s beliefs about
consumption growth comes only from the bias in her beliefs about dividend growth.8
In doing so, we derive the agent’s expectation about dividend growth as
geC (St ) − gC = ρσCσ−1D (geD (St ) − gD). (2.15)
Empirically, the correlation between consumption growth and dividend growth is
low—ρ is positive but low—and consumption growth is much less volatile than
dividend growth—σC is much smaller than σD. As a result, (2.15) implies that
the bias in the agent’s expectation about consumption growth—the difference be-
tween geC (St ) and gC—is small. This is in keeping with the lack of any evidence
that investors have extrapolative beliefs about consumption growth.9 Moreover, the
8For any alternative assumption, one needs to explain why the investor has incorrect beliefs
about consumption above and beyond her incorrect beliefs about dividends.
9Consistent with the way we model the agent’s expectations about consumption growth, Kuch-
ler and Zafar (2016) find that survey expectations are “asset-specific:” respondents who become
pessimistic about their employment situation after experiencing unemployment are not pessimistic
about other economic outcomes, such as stock prices or interest rates. Similarly, Huang (2016) finds
that investors who become optimistic about an industry’s future returns after having positive prior
investment experience in the industry do not invest heavily in a dissimilar industry.
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agent’s approximately correct beliefs about consumption growth allow the model
to generate low interest rate volatility and a low correlation between consump-
tion growth and stock market returns, both of which are consistent with the data
(Campbell (2003); Hansen and Singleton (1982, 1983)).
Model solution
The subjective Euler equation in (2.4) shows that, when pricing the stock market,
the gross return from holding the Lucas tree is also part of the pricing kernel. This
observation has two implications. First, both the price-dividend ratio f (St ) = PDt /Dt
and the wealth-consumption ratio PCt /Ct are functions of the sentiment variable St ;
we can define l (St ) ≡ PCt /Ct . Second, the two functions f and l are interrelated
through Euler equations, so they need to be solved simultaneously. Specifically,
using the Euler equation to price the stock market—setting R˜ j,t+dt in (2.4) to the
gross return on the stock market—we obtain
0 =

− (1−γ)1−ψ δ − γgeC + geD + [( f ′/ f ) + ψ−γ1−ψ (l′/l)]µeS + 12 [( f ′′/ f ) + ψ−γ1−ψ (l′′/l)]σ2S
+
γ(γ+1)
2 σ
2
C +
1
2
ψ−γ
1−ψ
2ψ−γ−1
1−ψ (l
′/l)2σ2S − γ(ψ−γ)1−ψ ρσCσS (l′/l) − γρσCσD − γρσCσS ( f ′/ f )
+
ψ−γ
1−ψσDσS (l
′/l) + ψ−γ1−ψσ
2
S (l
′/l)( f ′/ f ) + σDσS ( f ′/ f ) + ψ−γ1−ψ l
−1 + f −1

.
(2.16)
Similarly, using the Euler equation to price the Lucas tree—setting R˜ j,t+dt in (2.4)
to the gross return on the Lucas tree—we obtain
0 =

− 1−γ1−ψ δ − (γ − 1)geC + γ(γ−1)2 σ2C + 1−γ1−ψ (l′/l)µeS + 1−γ2(1−ψ) (l′′/l)σ2S
+12
1−γ
1−ψ
ψ−γ
1−ψ (l
′/l)2σ2S +
(1−γ)2
1−ψ ρσCσS (l
′/l) + 1−γ1−ψ l
−1

. (2.17)
Substituting µS and σS from (2.7), geD and σ
D
P from (2.11) and (2.12), and g
e
C
from (2.15) into equations (2.16) and (2.17), we then obtain a system of two ordinary
differential equations that jointly determines the evolutions of f and l.10 The detailed
derivation of (2.16) and (2.17) is in the Appendix.
Regarding the boundary conditions for solving the differential equations, note that,
10When θ = 0, our model reduces to a fully rational benchmark. In this case, equations (2.16)
and (2.17) lead to
f =
[
δ + ψgC − gD − γ(ψ+1)2 σ2C + γρσCσD
]−1
, l =
[
δ + (ψ − 1)gC − γ(ψ−1)2 σ2C
]−1
.
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in (2.16) and (2.17), the second derivative terms are all multiplied by σS, and that
σS goes to zero as S approaches either µH or µL. As a result, µH and µL are both
singular points, and therefore no boundary condition is required.
Equations (2.16) and (2.17) cannot be solved analytically. We apply a projection
methodwith Chebyshev polynomials to solve them numerically. We leave the details
of the numerical procedure to the Appendix.
Important equilibrium quantities
With the model solution at hand, we derive equilibrium quantities that are important
for understanding the model’s implications. Specifically, we derive the dynamics of
the interest rate, the objective and subjective expectations of stock market returns,
and the steady-state distribution of the sentiment variable.
For the interest rate, we use the Euler equation in (2.4) to price the riskless asset—we
set R˜ j,t+dt to the gross return on the riskless asset 1 + rtdt—and obtain
rt =
1−γ
1−ψ δ+γg
e
C− γ(γ+1)2 σ2C−ψ−γ1−ψ ×

(µeS − γρσCσS)(l′/l) + 12σ2S (l′′/l)
+
2ψ−γ−1
2(1−ψ) σ
2
S (l
′/l)2 + l−1

. (2.18)
The interest rate is linked to the agent’s time preferences, her subjective expecta-
tion about consumption growth, precautionary saving, as well as how the wealth-
consumption ratio PCt /Ct responds to changes in sentiment.11
To understand the risk-return tradeoff in the model, we compute, at each point
in time, both the agent’s expectation about future stock market returns and the
(objectively measured) rational expectation about future stock market returns. From
equations (2.8) and (2.9), the log excess return on the stock market from time t to
time t + dt is
rD,et+dtdt ≡ `n(PDt+dt + Dt+dtdt) − `n(PDt ) − rtdt
= [(1 − θ)gD + θSt + f −1 − 12 (σDP )2 − rt]dt + σDP dωet .
(2.19)
Therefore, the agent’s subjective expectation about the log excess return is
Eet [r
D,e
t+dt] = (1 − θ)gD + θSt + f −1 − 12 (σDP )2 − rt, (2.20)
11When θ = 0, r = δ + ψgC − γ(ψ+1)2 σ2C .
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and the subjective Sharpe ratio is [(1 − θ)gD + θSt + f −1 − 12 (σDP )2 − rt]/σDP .
Next, to compute the rational expectation about the stock market return, we com-
pare (2.2) with (2.10) and obtain a relationship between the true and perceived
Brownian shocks
dωet = dω
D
t − (geD (St ) − gD)dt/σD . (2.21)
We then substitute (2.21) into (2.19) and derive
rD,et+dtdt = [(1−θ)gD+θSt+ f −1−σ−1D σDP (geD−gD)−12 (σDP )2−rt]dt+σDP dωDt . (2.22)
As a result, the rational expectation about the log excess return on the stock market
is
Et[rD,et+dt] = (1 − θ)gD + θSt + f −1 − σ−1D σDP (geD − gD) − 12 (σDP )2 − rt, (2.23)
and the objectively measured Sharpe ratio of the stock market return is [(1− θ)gD +
θSt + f −1 − σ−1D σDP (geD − gD) − 12 (σDP )2 − rt]/σDP .
All the ratio-based quantities in thismodel such as the agent’s expectation about stock
market returns and the interest rate are a function of the sentiment variable St . Given
this, to provide a statistical assessment of the model’s fit with the empirical facts, we
also compute the steady-state distribution for the sentiment variable St as objectively
measured by an outside econometrician. To that end, we first obtain the objective
evolution of sentiment by substituting the change-of-measure equation (2.21) into
the subjective evolution of sentiment in (2.7)
dSt = [µeS (St ) + σ
−1
D σS (St )(gD − geD (St ))]dt + σS (St )dωDt . (2.24)
Compared to the subjective evolution of sentiment, the objective evolution exhibits
a larger degree of mean reversion: the additional term σ−1D σS (St )(gD − geD (St ))
in (2.24) is a negative function of sentiment.
Denote the objective steady-state distribution for sentiment as ξ (S). Based on (2.24),
we then derive ξ (S) as the solution to the Kolmogorov forward equation (the Fokker-
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Planck equation)
0 = 12
d2
dS2
(
σ2S (S)ξ (S)
)
− ddS
(
[µeS (St ) + σ
−1
D σS (St )(gD − geD (St ))]ξ (S)
)
= (σ′S)
2ξ + σSσ
′′
S ξ + 2σSσ
′
Sξ
′ + 12σ
2
Sξ
′′
− [(µeS)′ + σ−1D σ′S (gD − geD) − σ−1D σS (geD)′]ξ − [µeS + σ−1D σS (gD − geD)]ξ′,
(2.25)
where σS and geD are from (2.7) and (2.11), respectively, and the expressions for
σ′S, σ
′′
S , (µ
e
S)
′ and (geD)
′ are provided in the Appendix. In addition, the steady-state
distribution must integrate to one.
2.3 Model Implications
In this section, we examine the implications of the model. We begin by setting
the benchmark values for the model parameters. In particular, we calibrate the
agent’s beliefs to match the survey evidence documented in Greenwood and Shleifer
(2014). We then look at two building blocks for the model’s implications: a set of
important equilibrium quantities, each as a function of sentiment; and the steady-
state distribution of sentiment. Finally, we discuss the model’s implications for asset
prices.
Model parameterization
There are three types of parameters: asset parameters, utility parameters, and belief
parameters. For the asset parameters, we set gC = 1.91%, gD = 2.45%, σC = 3.8%,
σD = 11%, ρ = 0.2. These values are consistent with those used in Campbell and
Cochrane (1999), Barberis et al. (2001), Bansal and Yaron (2004), and Beeler and
Campbell (2012).12 For the utility parameters, we set γ, the coefficient of relative
risk aversion, to 10. As pointed out in Bansal et al. (2012) and Bansal and Yaron
(2004), the long-run risks literature—a literature that depends significantly on the
parameter values of Epstein-Zin preferences for its model implications—typically
assigns a value of 10 or below for γ. Bansal and Yaron (2004), for instance, set
γ to either 10 or 7.5.13 For ψ, the reciprocal of the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution, there exists a wide range of estimates in the asset pricing literature.
The majority of previous papers suggests that ψ should be lower than one, but
12The parameter values for gC and gD are set such that both `n(C) and `n(D) grow, on average,
at an annual rate of 1.84%; this rate is also used in Barberis et al. (2001).
13An estimate of 10 for γ is also the maximum magnitude that Mehra and Prescott (1985) find
reasonable.
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several other papers argue the opposite.14 Given this, we set ψ to 0.9, a value that
implies an elasticity of intertemporal substitution slightly above one. We explain
in Section 2.5 that our model’s implications are quantitatively robust even with an
elasticity of intertemporal substitution significantly lower than one. Finally, for δ,
the subjective discount rate, we assign a value of 2%.
We now turn to the belief parameters. We set µH and µL, the mean price growth
in the high and low regimes, to 15% and −15%, respectively. As we will see later
in this section, the probability of the agent’s price growth expectations approaching
the boundaries of µH and µL is approximately zero. As a result, the model’s
implications are not very sensitive to the choice of µH and µL. Next, we focus on θ,
the parameter that controls the extent to which the representative agent is behavioral,
and χ and λ, the perceived transition intensities between the high- and low-mean
price growth regimes. We calibrate these three parameters to match the survey
expectations of investors studied in Greenwood and Shleifer (2014). Specifically,
we set θ = 0.5 and χ = λ = 0.18 so that the agent’s beliefs match survey data along
two dimensions.15 First, for a regression of the agent’s expectations about future
stock market returns on past twelve-month returns, our parameter choice allows the
model to produce a regression coefficient and a t-statistic that match the empirical
estimates from surveys. Second, our parameter choice allows the agent’s beliefs
to match the survey evidence on the relative weight investors put on recent versus
distant past returns when forming beliefs about future returns. Below we examine
these two dimensions in detail.
Empirically, Greenwood and Shleifer (2014) regress survey expectations about fu-
ture stockmarket returns on past twelve-month cumulative raw returns across various
survey expectations measures. They find that the regression coefficient is positive
and statistically significant. To justify our parameter values for θ, χ, and λ, we
want to run the same regression in the context of the model. One caveat, how-
ever, is that we are uncertain about what survey respondents think the definition
of return is. Does it include the dividend yield or not? Is it a raw return or an
excess return? Given this caveat, we examine four measures of return expectations:
Eet [(dPDt + Dtdt)/(PDt dt)], the agent’s expectation about the percentage return on
the stock market, Eet [(dPDt + Dtdt)/(PDt dt)] − rt , the agent’s expectation about the
14See Bansal et al. (2012) for a discussion of this point.
15Recall that θ = 0 means the agent is fully rational, whereas θ = 1 means that the agent is fully
behavioral. Therefore, 0.5 is a natural default value for θ: it implies that the representative agent is
approximately an aggregation of rational and behavioral agents with equal population weights.
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percentage return in excess of the interest rate, Eet [dPDt /(PDt dt)], the agent’s expec-
tation about the price growth of the stock market, and Eet [dPDt /(PDt dt)] − rt , the
agent’s expectation about the price growth in excess of the interest rate. The latter
two measures are also plausible candidates because investors may not actively think
about the dividend yield when answering survey questions.16
[Place Table B.1 about here]
Table B.1 reports the regression coefficient, its t-statistic, the intercept, as well
as the adjusted R-squared, when regressing each of the four measures of return
expectations described above on either the past twelve-month cumulative raw return
or the current log price-dividend ratio, over a sample of 15 years or 50 years. Each
reported value—for instance, the regression coefficient—is averaged over 100 trials,
with each trial being a regression using monthly data simulated from the model.
Here we make two observations. First, the magnitude of the agent’s extrapolative
beliefs about future stock market returns matches the empirical values suggested
by Greenwood and Shleifer (2014). Regressing the agent’s expectation about future
price growth (Eet [dPDt /(PDt dt)]) on the past twelve-month cumulative raw return
for a 15-year simulated sample, the regression coefficient is 4.0% with a Newey-
West adjusted t-statistic of 8.4. Running the same regression for a 50-year simulated
sample, the regression coefficient is 4.0%with a t-statistic of 12.1. As a comparison,
for a 5-year sample of data from the Michigan survey, the regression coefficient is
3.9% with a t-statistic of 1.68; for a 15-year sample of data from the Gallup survey,
the regression coefficient, after some conversion, is 8% with a t-statistic of 8.81.
Second, by comparing the regression coefficients and the t-statistics across the four
measures of return expectations, we find that including the dividend yield in the
calculation of return reduces the regression coefficient by about a half, but does
not significantly affect the t-statistic. Therefore, even though we model return ex-
trapolation as extrapolating past price growth, the agent also holds extrapolative
expectations about the total return. Furthermore, subtracting the interest rate from
the expectation of returns only has a small impact on the regression results because
of low interest rate volatility. In summary, across all four measures of return expec-
tations, the agent extrapolates past stock market returns when forming expectations
about future returns. In Section 2.5, we compare these regression results with those
16Hartzmark and Solomon (2017) provide empirical evidence for the idea that investors do not
take the dividend yield into account when calculating returns. Barberis et al. (2015) also take this
interpretation when calibrating their model parameters to survey expectations.
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from the rational expectations models of Bansal and Yaron (2004) and Bansal et al.
(2012).
Our parameter choice of θ, χ, and λ is also disciplined by matching the agent’s
beliefs with the survey evidence on the relative weight of recent versus distant past
returns in determining investors’ return expectations. Specifically, we estimate the
following non-linear least squares regression
Expectationt = a + b
∑n
j=1
w jRD(t− j∆t)→(t−( j−1)∆t) + εt (2.26)
using model simulations, where Expectationt is the agent’s time-t expectation about
stock market returns, RD(t− j∆t)→(t−( j−1)∆t) is the raw return from time t − j∆t to
t − ( j − 1)∆t, and w j ≡ e−φ( j−1)∆t
/∑n
l=1 e
−φ(l−1)∆t . In Equation (2.26), each past
realized return is assigned a weight. The weight decreases exponentially the further
back we go into the past, and the coefficient φmeasures the speed of this exponential
decline. When φ is high, the agent’s expectation is determined primarily by recent
past returns; when it is low, even distant past returns have a significant impact on
the agent’s current expectation.
[Place Table B.2 about here]
Table B.2 reports the intercept a, the regression coefficient b, the adjusted R-squared,
and most importantly, the parameter φ. As before, we examine four expectations
measures,Eet [(dPDt +Dtdt)/(PDt dt)],Eet [dPDt /(PDt dt)],Eet [(dPDt +Dtdt)/(PDt dt)]−
rt , and Eet [dPDt /(PDt dt)] − rt . Each reported value is averaged over 100 trials, with
each trial being a regression using simulated data with a monthly frequency over
either 15 years or 50 years. We set ∆t, the time interval for each past return in (2.26),
to 1/12 (one month), and we set n, the total number of past returns on the right hand
side of (2.26), to 600.17
Across the four expectations measures, the estimation of φ is stable: it is around
0.42. This value means that a monthly return three years ago is weighted about 25%
as much as the most recent return; that is, the agent looks back a couple of years
when forming beliefs about future returns. For comparison, Barberis et al. (2015)
run the same regression (2.26) using survey data documented in Greenwood and
Shleifer (2014); they estimate φ at a value of 0.44. We choose the values of θ, χ,
and λ such that the model generates about the same estimate of φ as surveys.
17We choose n = 600 because further increasing n has a minimal impact on the estimated values
of the parameter φ and the adjusted R-squared.
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The literature has not reached consensus on the value of φ. On the one hand,
Greenwood and Shleifer (2014) and Kuchler and Zafar (2016) find that investor
expectations depend only on recent returns. On the other hand, Malmendier and
Nagel (2011, 2013) andVanasco et al. (2015) suggest that distant past eventsmay also
play an important role when investors form beliefs. Reconciling this discrepancy is
beyond the scope of the paper. Here, we provide two possible explanations. First,
investors may simultaneously adopt twomechanisms when forming beliefs: one that
focuses on recent past events such as daily stock market fluctuations, the other that
focuses on infrequent but salient events such as a stock market crash. Second, the
horizon over which investors form expectations may affect how far they look back
into the past. For instance, the survey expectations data studied in Greenwood and
Shleifer (2014) are based on questions that ask investors to forecast stock market
returns over the next six to twelve months, which may prompt investors to look
back only a couple of years. On the other hand, the equity holdings data studied
in Malmendier and Nagel (2011) are based on equity investment decisions that may
require investors to forecast equity returns over the next couple of decades; they may
therefore examine equity performance over the past few decades.
[Place Table B.3 about here]
We summarize the default parameter values in Table B.3. In Section 2.4, we further
provide a comparative statics analysis to examine the sensitivity of the model’s
implications to changes in these parameter values.
Building blocks
We start with two building blocks for understanding the model’s implications. First,
we analyze a set of important equilibrium quantities. We then look at the steady-state
distribution of sentiment.
Figure B.1 plots the price-dividend ratio of the stock market f , the volatility of
stock market returns σDP , the rational expectation about the log excess return E[r
D,e]
(the conditional equity premium), and the interest rate r , each as a function of the
sentiment variable S.
[Place Figure B.1 about here]
Figure B.1 shows that the model generates substantial excess volatility: the volatility
of dividend growth is 11%, while the volatility of stock market returns is typically
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above 20%. This result stems from the interaction between return extrapolation and
Epstein-Zin preferences. With the coefficient of relative risk aversion γ significantly
higher than the reciprocal of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution ψ—we set
γ to 10 and ψ to 0.9—the intertemporal substitution effect strongly dominates the
wealth effect. Given this, when the stock market has had high past price growth, the
agent’s forecast of high future price growth—this is a result of the agent extrapolating
past price growth—leads her to push up the current price, causing the current price
growth to rise. When the current price growth is higher, the agent’s forecast of
future price growth also becomes higher, which leads her to push up the current
price, causing the current price growth to further rise, and so on. In other words, a
feedback loop emerges from the interaction between beliefs and preferences, giving
rise to significant excess volatility.
The mechanism described above for generating excess volatility also allows the
model to generate a strong procyclical pattern for the price-dividend ratio of the
stock market. With a strong intertemporal substitution effect in the model, the
agent’s forecast of high future price growth following high past price growth also
leads her to push up the current price-dividend ratio. Figure B.1 shows that the
price-dividend ratio f is indeed a positive function of sentiment S.
Furthermore, the model generates a strong countercyclical pattern for the true equity
premium. Suppose the stock market has had high past price growth. The agent’s
expectation about future price growth then increases, pushing up the stock market
price relative to dividends. Given that sentiment on average tends to revert back
to its mean, the price-dividend ratio also tends to mean-revert, leading to low
future returns. In addition, the agent’s high expectation about future price growth
also makes her optimistic about future consumption growth, although to a much
lesser extent. This in turn causes the agent to push up the equilibrium interest
rate. Together, both a low (rational) expectation of stock market returns and a high
interest rate contribute to a low equity premium during high-sentiment periods. Of
these two forces, the first one dominates: moving St from its mean to the top 25%
percentile level causes a total decrease of 9.7% for the equity premium, out of which
9.5% comes from the decrease in the expected log return of the stock market.
[Place Figure B.2 about here]
The second building block for the model’s implications is the objectively measured
steady-state distribution of sentiment. Figure B.2 plots this steady-state distribution.
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Under the true probability measure, sentiment exhibits a strong degree of mean
reversion, for two reasons. First, the agent believes that sentiment will naturally
mean-revert: with a regime-switching model, the agent believes that the expected
growth rate of stock market prices tends to switch over time from one regime to the
other. Second, the agent’s price growth expectations mean-revert faster than what
she perceives: when the agent thinks that the future price growth is high, future
price growth tends to be low endogenously, causing her price growth expectations to
decrease at a pace that exceeds her anticipation. Overall, the steady-state distribution
has a mean of 2.0% and a standard deviation of 2.7%: the chance of sentiment
approaching the extreme values of µH and µL is close to zero.
Model implications for asset prices
The two building blocks—the quantitative relation between important equilibrium
quantities and sentiment as well as the steady-state distribution of sentiment—allow
us to systematically study the model’s implications for asset prices. We begin with
examining the long-run properties of stock market prices and returns. Table B.4
reports the model’s predictions for six important moments, and compares them
side by side with the empirical values. In general, the model matches the facts: it
generates significant excess volatility, a high equity premium, a Sharpe ratio similar
to the empirical value, an interest rate that has a low level and low volatility, and a
price-dividend ratio whose average level is close to the empirical one.
[Place Table B.4 about here]
As explained above, the model generates significant excess volatility from the inter-
action between return extrapolation and Epstein-Zin preferences. This interaction
is quantitatively important. Without return extrapolation, Epstein-Zin preferences
alone with i.i.d. dividend growth and consumption growth do not lead to any excess
volatility. Without Epstein-Zin preferences—that is, setting both ψ and γ to 10
while keeping all the other parameter values unchanged—return extrapolation alone
leads to average return volatility of 13.8%, which implies much less excess volatility
compared to the data.
The model also generates a significant equity premium: when measured as the ratio-
nal expectation of log excess returns, the true long-run equity premium is 4.9%; when
measured as the rational expectation of excess returns E[(dPDt +Dtdt)/(PDt dt)−rt],
it is 8.6%. In order to understand this model implication, we first note that the
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model produces a substantial long-run perceived equity premium—this is what the
agent thinks she will receive as the average equity premium. When measured
as the subjective expectation of log excess returns, the perceived long-run equity
premium is 1.6%; when measured as the subjective expectation of excess returns
Ee[(dPDt + Dtdt)/(PDt dt) − rt], it is 5.1%. Three factors affect the perceived long-
run equity premium. First and most intuitively, excess volatility causes the agent to
demand a higher equity premium because she is risk averse. Second, return extrapo-
lation gives rise to perceived persistence of both the aggregate dividend process and,
to a lesser extent, the aggregate consumption process.18 Under Epstein-Zin pref-
erences, this perceived persistence is significantly priced, pushing up the perceived
equity premium. Finally, the separation between the elasticity of intertemporal sub-
stitution and risk aversion keeps the equilibrium interest rate low and hence helps
to keep the equity premium high.
[Place Figure B.3 about here]
Furthermore, with incorrect beliefs, the true long-run equity premium in the model
can be significantly different from the perceived long-run equity premium. We find
that the true long-run equity premium is significantly higher than the perceived
one. In the model, the agent’s beliefs mean-revert faster than what she perceives.
Given this, she underestimates short-term stock market fluctuations and hence the
risk associated with the stock market. In other words, if an infinitesimal rational
agent, one that has the same preferences as the behavioral agent but holds rational
beliefs, enters our economy, she would have demanded a higher equity premium:
the model produces a true average equity premium that is substantially higher than
the perceived equity premium. To illustrate this point, Figure B.3 plots the objective
(rational) expectation and the agent’s subjective expectation about price growth:
for St less than 3.2%, the objective expectation about price growth is higher than
the subjective expectation; for St greater than 3.2%, the opposite is true. Because
the sentiment distribution has a mean of 2.0% and a standard deviation of 2.7%,
Figure B.3 suggests that, about 67% of the time, the rational expectation about price
growth is above the subjective expectation. That is, the true price growth is more
likely to be higher than the perceived price growth. As a result, the model produces
a true average equity premium that is substantially higher than the perceived average
equity premium.
18The agent is averse to persistent shocks when γ > ψ; with our choice of parameter values, this
condition is satisfied.
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During high-sentiment periods, the model produces a negative equity premium:
the equity premium averaged over the top quartile of the sentiment distribution is
−13.05%. In general, rational expectations models—for instance, long-run risks
models and habit formation models—do not generate a negative equity premium
at any time.19 In our model, however, subjective expectations and objective ex-
pectations of stock market returns differ significantly during high- or low-sentiment
periods: when the sentiment level is high, the agent expects high stock market
returns moving forward, but precisely because of her incorrect beliefs, future stock
market returns are low on average, generating a negative equity premium. This
model implication is consistent with the recent empirical findings of Greenwood
and Hanson (2013), Baron and Xiong (2017), Cassella and Gulen (2015), and ?:
these papers document that the expected excess return turns negative during high-
sentiment periods.
Next, we examine the model’s implications for the predictability of stock market
returns. Empirically, Campbell and Shiller (1988) and Fama and French (1988)
document that a regression of future log excess returns on the current log price-
dividend ratio gives a negative and significant regression coefficient. Moreover,
the predictive power of the price-dividend ratio is greater when future returns are
calculated over longer horizons.
[Place Table B.5 about here]
Table B.5 reports the regression coefficient β j and the adjusted R-squared for a
regression of the log excess return of the stock market from time t to time t + j on
the current log price-dividend ratio
rD,et→t+ j = α j + β j`n(P
D
t /Dt ) + ε j,t (2.27)
over various time horizons j. We calculate the regression coefficients and the
R-squared using 10,000 years of monthly data simulated from the model, and
compare them side by side with the empirical values. Consistent with the data, β j
is negative and its magnitude increases as the time horizon j increases. A strong
degree of mean reversion in sentiment, together with the feedback loop described
above for generating excess volatility, allows the model to produce the long-horizon
19Strictly speaking, a rational expectations model can generate a negative equity premium if the
stock market negatively correlates with some other risk factors in the agent’s portfolio and therefore
serves as a diversification device.
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predictability of stock market returns. When the stock market has had high past
price growth, the agent’s expectation about future price growth increases, pushing
up the current price-dividend ratio. Since the agent’s expectation—the sentiment
variable—tends to revert back to its mean, subsequent returns are low on average,
giving rise to a negative regression coefficient in (2.27).
The magnitudes of the regression coefficient and the R-squared generated from the
model are broadly consistent with the empirical values. One difference, however, is
that in the model, the R-squared begins to decrease as the time horizon j increases
beyond three years, whereas in the data, the R-squared keeps rising over longer
horizons. To understand this difference, recall that we calibrate the model to the
survey expectations by setting θ to 0.5 and setting λ and χ to 0.18: the agent
looks back a couple of years when forming beliefs about future returns. Given this
parameter choice, the mean reversion of sentiment tends to occur over the first few
years. Over longer horizons, no additional mean reversion in the agent’s beliefs
contributes to the predictability of stock market returns.
We now further investigate the model’s implications for the correlation between
stock market returns and consumption growth. Empirically, Hansen and Singleton
(1982, 1983) document that this correlation is low. Nonetheless, most consumption-
based asset pricing models generate a high, if not perfect, correlation between stock
market returns and consumption growth. By imposing rational expectations, these
models treat the consumption-based pricing kernels as the only source of stock
market movements; stock market movements are driven by changes in consumption.
As a result, the correlation between stock market returns and consumption growth
is high.20
[Place Table B.6 about here]
Table B.6 reports both the model-implied values and the empirical values for the
correlation between consumption growth and stock market returns. Consistent with
the data, the model produces a low correlation: the correlation between annual log
consumption growth and annual log excess returns is 0.19 in themodel, and similarly
it is 0.09 in the data. In comparison, the model of Campbell and Cochrane (1999)
20One exception is Barberis et al. (2001). They use “narrow framing”, the notion that investors
may evaluate financial risks in isolation from consumption risks, to generate a low correlation
between stock market returns and consumption growth. Specifically, they use power utility as the
agent’s preferences over consumption, but use prospect theory developed by Kahneman and Tversky
(1979) as the agent’s preferences over financial wealth.
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generates a correlation of 0.79, a much higher value. In our model, we assume that
the bias in the agent’s beliefs about consumption growth comes only from the bias
in her beliefs about dividend growth. Given the low correlation observed in the data
between consumption growth and dividend growth, the bias in the agent’s beliefs
about consumption growth in small. As a result, the agent’s beliefs about stock
market returns—they co-move strongly with her beliefs about dividend growth—
are not significantly affected by fluctuations in consumption growth, giving rise to
the low observed correlation between stock market returns and consumption growth.
Table B.6 shows that the model also generates a small but negative correlation
between the current consumption growth and the stock market return in the subse-
quent period, an implication that is consistent with the data. Recall that consumption
growth and dividend growth are weakly but positively correlated. If the current con-
sumption growth is high, dividend growth is also high on average, which leads
the agent to push up the current price, increasing the current price growth and the
current level of sentiment. In the subsequent period, sentiment reverts towards its
mean value, giving rise to a low stock market return.
[Place Figure B.4 about here]
Although our model is based on return extrapolation, it yields direct implications
for cash flow expectations. The expectations transmission mechanism described
by equation (2.11) suggests that the agent’s expectation about dividend growth is
more responsive to changes in sentiment than her expectation about price growth.
Moreover, the total return equals the sum of the price growth and the dividend
yield, and the dividend yield decreases as sentiment increases. Therefore, the
agent’s expectation about price growth is more responsive to changes in sentiment
compared to her expectation about stock market returns.
Figure B.4 plots the agent’s expectation about stock market returns, Ee[(dPDt +
Dtdt)/(PDt dt)], the agent’s expectation about price growth, Ee[dPDt /(PDt dt)], and
the agent’s expectation about dividend growth, Ee[dDt/(Dtdt)], each as a function
of the sentiment variable S. Quantitatively, Figure B.4 suggests that a one-standard
deviation (2.7%) increase in sentiment from its mean (2.0%) pushes up the agent’s
expectation about stock market returns from 7.44% to 8.22%—a small increase
of 0.78%—while it pushes up the agent’s expectation about dividend growth from
−0.04% to 6.48%—a much larger increase of 6.52%. Also, recall from Figure B.1
that a one-standard deviation increase in sentiment from its mean pushes up the
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price-dividend ratio of the stock market from 19.16 to 21.75. These results together
imply that the price-dividend ratio is mainly correlated with the agent’s expectation
about dividend growth.
To further understand stockmarketmovements, we follow the procedure inCampbell
and Shiller (1988) to decompose, in the context of the model, the log price-dividend
ratio of the stock market:
`n(PDt /Dt ) ≈
∞∑
j=0
ξ j
(
∆d(t+ j∆t)→(t+( j+1)∆t) − rD(t+ j∆t)→(t+( j+1)∆t)
)
−(`n(ξ)+(1−ξ)ζ )/(1−ξ),
(2.28)
where ζ is the in-sample average of the annual log dividend-price ratio, ξ =
e−ζ/(∆t + e−ζ ), ∆d(t+ j∆t)→(t+( j+1)∆t) is the log dividend growth from time t + j∆t
to t + ( j + 1)∆t, and rD(t+ j∆t)→(t+( j+1)∆t) is the log gross return over the same period.
Equation (2.28) says that the movement of price-dividend ratio comes from either
the movement of future dividend growth—this is called “cash flow news”—or the
movement of future returns—this is called “discount rate news.” The standard ap-
proach that empirically addresses the relative importance of these two components
is to look at future realized dividend growth and returns, and compute
1 ≈
Cov
(∑∞
j=0 ξ
j∆d(t+ j∆t)→(t+( j+1)∆t), `n(PDt /Dt )
)
Var
(
`n(PDt /Dt )
)︸                                                          ︷︷                                                          ︸
CFobjective
+
Cov
(
−∑∞j=0 ξ jrD(t+ j∆t)→(t+( j+1)∆t), `n(PDt /Dt ))
Var
(
`n(PDt /Dt )
)︸                                                          ︷︷                                                          ︸
DRobjective
.
(2.29)
The first term on the right hand side of (2.29), CFobjective, is the contribution
of changes in cash flow news to stock market movements, and the second term,
DRobjective, is the contribution of changes in discount rate news to stock market
movements. By using future realized dividend growth and returns, this approach ef-
fectively imposes rational expectations. Most empirical studies that have conducted
a Campbell-Shiller decomposition take this approach.
However, in a model with incorrect beliefs, we can further study the relation be-
tween the agent’s subjective expectations and stock market movements by taking the
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subjective expectations on both sides of (2.28) and computing
1 ≈
Cov
(
Eet [
∑∞
j=0 ξ
j∆d(t+ j∆t)→(t+( j+1)∆t)], `n(PDt /Dt )
)
Var
(
`n(PDt /Dt )
)︸                                                               ︷︷                                                               ︸
CFsubjective
+
Cov
(
−Eet [
∑∞
j=0 ξ
jrD(t+ j∆t)→(t+( j+1)∆t)], `n(P
D
t /Dt )
)
Var
(
`n(PDt /Dt )
)︸                                                               ︷︷                                                               ︸
DRsubjective
.
(2.30)
The first term on the right hand side of (2.30), CFsubjective, is the contribution of
changes in subjective expectations about cash flow news to stockmarket movements,
and the second term, DRsubjective, is the contribution of changes in subjective
expectations about discount rate news to stock market movements.
[Place Table B.7 about here]
TableB.7 reports the four coefficients,CFobjective, DRobjective,CFsubjective, DRsubjective,
as well as their corresponding adjusted R-squared. These coefficients and R-squared
are calculated using 10,000 years of monthly data simulated from the model. By us-
ing future realized dividend growth and stock market returns and therefore imposing
rational expectations, we obtain DRobjective = 0.98 with a R-squared of 0.209 and
CFobjective = 0.02 with a R-squared of 1.2× 10−4. This result replicates the empiri-
cal finding of the volatility test literature that the variation of the price-dividend ratio
comes primarily from discount rate variation (see Cochrane (2008) and Cochrane
(2011)).
On the other hand, by relaxing the rational expectations assumption and using
the agent’s subjective expectations about dividend growth and returns, we obtain
DRsubjective = −0.08 with a R-squared of 0.982 and CFsubjective = 1.08 with a
R-squared of 0.984. This result unveils a very different picture and highlights the
importance of expectations data: changes in the agent’s subjective expectations about
future cash flow news explain the majority of stock market movements. Empirically,
de la O and Myers (2017) find that DRsubjective = −0.09 and CFsubjective = 1.09.
These values match the theoretical values from our model.
Importantly, the fact that prices in our model are mainly correlated with cash flow
expectations is a consequence of the Campbell-Shiller accounting identity; this
statement is about correlation, not about causality. The agent’s return expectations
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determine her cash flow expectations and are the cause of price movements. Given
this, our model simultaneously explains the empirical findings of de la O and Myers
(2017) on cash flow expectations and the empirical findings of Greenwood and
Shleifer (2014) on return expectations. We provide additional discussion about the
relation between return expectations and cash flow expectations in the Appendix.
[Place Table B.8 about here]
The model also points to some challenges: when calibrated to the survey expec-
tations data, the model predicts a persistence of the price-dividend ratio that is
significantly lower than its empirical value. Table B.8 presents the empirical values
and theoretical values for the autocorrelations of asset prices. Empirically, price-
dividend ratios are highly persistent at short lags. Nonetheless, the model produces
a persistence for the price-dividend ratio that is much lower than the empirical value:
the autocorrelation of `n(PD/D) with a lag of three years is 0.5 in the data, but it
is essentially zero in the model. In the model, the persistence of the price-dividend
ratio is driven by the persistence of the agent’s beliefs. The available survey evi-
dence suggests that investors focus on just the past year or two when forming beliefs
about future returns. Therefore, when calibrated to surveys, the agent’s beliefs tend
to mean-revert in a couple of years. However, to match the empirical persistence
of the price-dividend ratio, the agent’s beliefs need to be much more persistent: the
agent needs to form beliefs about future returns based on many years of past returns.
We leave a careful reconciliation of the survey expectations about stock market
returns and the observed persistence of the price-dividend ratio to future research.
One possibility, however, is to develop a framework that allows for the interaction
between financial frictions and the agent’s beliefs. ? show that various types of
financial frictions are empirically more persistent than investor sentiment. As a
result, investor beliefs can affect asset prices through their interaction with financial
frictions, making their impact more persistent.
We conclude this section by discussing the role of rational arbitrageurs. The model
has a representative agent whose beliefs are biased. One natural question to ask is: if
we introduce rational arbitrageurs, to what extent can they counteract the mispricing
caused by the behavioral agent and therefore attenuate the significance of the model
implications? Developing such a two-agent model is beyond the scope of the paper.
However, three observations suggest that our model implications will remain intact
after taking rational arbitrageurs into account.
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First, in an economy with both rational and behavioral agents who have recursive
preferences, the behavioral agents may eventually dominate the market: there is a
positive probability that they take up most of the wealth in the economy in the long
run. This is a key finding in Borovicka (2016). It suggests that our model’s implica-
tions can be the limiting implications of a model with both rational and behavioral
agents in the initial period. Second, in an economy with heterogeneous beliefs, asset
prices are jointly determined by agents’ beliefs weighted by their risk tolerances. A
positive fundamental shock causes optimists to gain a larger fraction of wealth and
increases their risk tolerance relative to pessimists, which in turn gives optimists a
greater weight in driving asset prices, pushing asset prices further up. As a result,
heterogeneity in investor beliefs can be an additional source of excess volatility;
it can further amplify—rather than attenuate—our model implications.21 Lastly,
as pointed out by Barberis et al. (2015), extrapolative expectations are persistent
in a dynamic model, which means that the behavioral agents who extrapolate past
returns have persistently high demand for the stock market following high stock
market returns. The persistence of this demand prevents near-future stock market
returns from becoming too low, which reduces the incentive of rational agents to
counteract mispricing. In other words, the persistence of extrapolative beliefs limits
the impact of rational arbitrageurs on asset prices.
2.4 Comparative Statics
In this section, we examine the sensitivity of the model’s implications to changes in
parameter values. We focus on parameters that either have dispersed estimates in the
literature or cannot be directly observed from the data. Specifically, for the utility
parameters, we study how changes in γ, the coefficient of relative risk aversion,
and ψ, the reciprocal of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, affect the equity
premium and the volatility of stock market returns. For the belief parameters, we
look at how changes in θ affect the equity premium, the volatility of stock market
returns, the price-dividend ratio, and the average interest rate. We also examine
how changes in θ, χ, and λ affect return predictability and the persistence of the
price-dividend ratio.
Utility parameters
Figure B.5 plots the long-run average of the equity premium and the volatility of
stock market returns, each as a function of γ or ψ. The coefficient of relative
21See Xiong (2013) for more discussion of this amplification mechanism.
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risk aversion is positively related to the equity premium but negatively related to
the volatility of returns. Lower risk aversion naturally leads the agent to require a
lower equity premium for risk compensation; reducing γ from 10 to 5, the model
still explains 75% of the observed equity premium. At the same time, lower risk
aversion strengthens the feedback loop described earlier since it increases the agent’s
demand for risky assets. Therefore, it leads to higher return volatility.
[Place Figure B.5 about here]
Within the examined range, changes in the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
do not significantly affect the average equity premium and the average volatility of
returns. As a result, our model implications are quantitatively robust to changes in
ψ. We provide a detailed explanation of this observation in the next section when
we compare our model with the model of Bansal and Yaron (2004).
Belief parameters
Belief Parameters.—Figure B.6a plots the long-run average of the equity premium,
the volatility of stock market returns, the price-dividend ratio, and the interest rate,
each as a function of θ, the parameter that measures the extent to which the agent
is behavioral. Setting θ to zero gives the agent fully rational beliefs. In this case,
the equity premium is 0.23%; the return volatility equals the fundamental volatility
of 11%; the price-dividend ratio stays constant at 135; and the interest rate stays
at 2.35%. With θ = 0, the model fails to match the long-run properties of the
stock market. Increasing θ from zero allows the feedback loop described above to
emerge, which generates excess volatility, pushes up the perceived equity premium,
and significantly reduces the price-dividend ratio. At the same time, a higher θ—
and the agent’s more extrapolative beliefs about stock market returns—leads the
agent to perceive a higher persistence in dividend growth, which, under Epstein-Zin
preferences, is significantly priced, causing the perceived equity premium to further
rise. Finally, a higher θ leads to a true equity premium that is significantly higher
than the perceived one.
[Place Figure B.6a about here]
Overall, a 1% increase in θ leads to a 0.09% increase in the equity premium and
a 0.29% increase in the volatility of returns. On the other hand, the effect of θ on
the interest rate is small. A higher θ increases the extrapolation bias in the agent’s
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beliefs about stock market returns, but does not significantly affect her beliefs about
consumption growth, which determine the equilibrium interest rate.
Figure B.6b examines how changes in θ, χ, and λ affect the predictability of stock
market returns and the persistence of the price-dividend ratio. Here the predictability
of returns is measured by the slope coefficient in a regression of the next year’s log
excess return on the current log price-dividend ratio; the persistence of the price-
dividend ratio is measured by the one-year autocorrelation of log price-dividend
ratios.
[Place Figure B.6b about here]
Figure B.6b shows that higher values of θ, χ, and λ lead to stronger predictability of
returns and a lower persistence of the price-dividend ratio. Higher values of χ and
λ—that is, higher perceived transition intensities between the high- and low-mean
price growth regimes—suggest that the agent focuses on a shorter history of past
return realizations when forming beliefs about future returns. A higher value of θ
has a similar implication: it suggests that the agent exhibits a stronger extrapolation
bias, which means that the agent deviates more from a rational agent whose beliefs
depend on both recent and distant past returns. In other words, with a higher θ, the
agent relies more heavily on recent past returns when forming beliefs about future
returns. Therefore, higher values of θ, χ, and λ all lead to a stronger degree of mean
reversion in sentiment, which in turn gives rise to stronger predictability of returns
and a lower persistence of the price-dividend ratio.
The comparative statics results in Figure B.6b are consistent with recent empirical
findings. At the aggregate level, Cassella and Gulen (2015) find that, during periods
when investors’ expectations about future returns depend on both recent and distant
past returns, the price-dividend ratio does not strongly predict the next year’s return.
Conversely, during periods when investors’ expectations depend primarily on recent
past returns, the price-dividend ratio strongly predicts the next year’s return. In our
model, higher values of θ, χ, and λ lead to a higher φ, and therefore the agent’s
expectations about future returns depend more heavily on recent past returns. In
the meantime, they also lead to stronger return predictability. Overall, the model
implies that, when the agent forms beliefs based on a short history of past returns,
the predictability of returns is strong. To give an example, increasing θ from 0.05
to 0.5 changes φ from 0.37 to 0.43. At the same time, it changes β1, the slope
coefficient for a regression of the next year’s log excess return on the current log
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price-dividend ratio, from −0.32 to −0.72; the corresponding R-squared increases
from 0.001 to 0.13. In the cross-section, Da et al. (2017) show that stocks associated
with a larger extrapolation bias—beliefs of forecasters on these stocks depend more
strongly on recent past returns—exhibit stronger return reversals. Applying our
model to individual stocks gives the same prediction.
2.5 Comparison with Rational Expectations Models
In this section, we provide a quantitative comparison between our model and several
models with rational expectations. First, we look at a rational expectations model
that is most analogous to our behavioral model, one in which the regime-switching
process characterized in Section 2.2 represents the true data generating process. We
then examine differences between our model and the rational expectations models
of Bansal and Yaron (2004) and Bansal et al. (2012): we focus on the long-run risks
models because these are the models most related to ours.
The true regime-switching model
The rational expectationsmodel most analogous to ourmodel is the one that assumes
the regime-switching process characterized in equations (2.6) and (2.7) is the true
data generating process. In this case, the true evolution of the stock market price is
dPDt /P
D
t = [(1 − θ)gD + θ µ˜S,t]dt + σDP (St )dωPt , (2.31)
where ωPt is a standard Brownian motion. As with the behavioral model, the agent
in this model does not directly observe the latent variable µ˜S,t . Instead, she uses past
stock market prices to form a Bayesian estimate of µ˜S,t : St = E[µ˜S,t |F Pt ]. That is,
the perceived evolution of stock market price in (2.8) is fully rational. We further
assume that the perceived dividend process (2.10) and the perceived consumption
process (2.14) are also rational.
By construction, this rational expectations model produces the same equilibrium
prices as our behavioral model: the solutions to the differential equations of (2.16)
and (2.17) also apply to this model. Nonetheless, the two models have statistical
properties that are significantly different. One difference, for instance, lies in the
models’ implications for the predictability of stock market returns.
[Place Table B.9 about here]
Table B.9 reports the regression coefficient β j and the adjusted R-squared for a
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regression of the log excess return of the stock market from time t to time t + j on
the current log price-dividend ratio `n(PDt /Dt ) over various time horizons j (one
to seven years), now using the true regime-switching model. Table B.9 shows that
the model fails to produce the predictability of stock market returns documented
in Campbell and Shiller (1988) and Fama and French (1988): both the regression
coefficients and the R-squared are close to zero. In contrast, Table B.5 shows that
the behavioral model produces the observed predictability of stock market returns.
With rational expectations, the agent’s beliefs about stock market returns are on
average correct. Therefore, following high past price growth, the agent properly
anticipates high future price growth, which pushes down the dividend yield in
equilibrium, leading to flat returns in subsequent periods. As a result, future returns
do not vary significantly with the current price-dividend ratio, giving rise to the lack
of return predictability in the true regime-switching model.
The long-run risks models
Table B.10 reports the regression coefficients and t-statistics when regressing four
measures of rational expectations of return—raw return or excess return, with or
without dividend yield—either on the past twelve-month return or on the current
log price-dividend ratio. The regressions are based on simulated data from Bansal
and Yaron (2004). Interestingly, their model generates, to some extent, extrapolative
expectations about future raw returns: a regression of the agent’s expectations—this
is also the rational expectation—about the next twelve-month total return on past
twelve-month total return yields a coefficient of 2.5% with a t-statistic of 2.4 for a
15-year simulated sample; the regression coefficient is 3.0% with a t-statistic of 3.8
for a 50-year simulated sample.
[Place Table B.10 about here]
In Bansal and Yaron (2004), dividend growth and consumption growth share a
stochastic yet persistent component. High past stock market returns are typically
caused by positive shocks to this common component, which, given its persistence,
implies high dividend growth and hence high raw returns moving forward. That
is, the agent in Bansal and Yaron (2004) has extrapolative beliefs about future raw
returns. At the same time, precisely because dividend growth and consumption
growth share a persistent component, high dividend growth tends to coincide with
high consumption growth, which implies a high interest rate in equilibrium. That is,
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when raw returns are high, the interest rate is also high. As a result, the agent does
not have extrapolative beliefs about future excess returns: as shown in Table B.10,
regressing the agent’s expectation about future excess returns on past returns, the
regression coefficient and the t-statistic are both close to zero.
These regression results highlight one fundamental difference between our model
and the model of Bansal and Yaron (2004). In our model, the agent extrapolates
past returns on the stock market, but extrapolates past consumption growth much
less. The comovement between the agent’s beliefs about returns and her beliefs
about consumption growth is low. On the contrary, in Bansal and Yaron (2004), the
comovement between the agent’s beliefs about stock market returns—these ratio-
nally drive returns—and her beliefs about consumption growth—these determine
the interest rate in equilibrium—is high. Therefore, the agent in our model has
extrapolative beliefs about both raw returns and excess returns, whereas the agent
in Bansal and Yaron (2004) has extrapolative beliefs only about raw returns.
Furthermore, as shown in Figure B.5, our model produces an equity premium and
return volatility that do not vary significantly with respect to changes in the elasticity
of intertemporal substitution. On the contrary, the long-run risks models cannot
generate a high equity premium with a low elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
For instance, setting the elasticity of intertemporal substitution to 0.5, our model
generates an equity premium of 7.1% (measured as the rational expectation of excess
returns), while the model of Bansal and Yaron (2004) produces an equity premium
between 1% and 2%. Given this contrast, our model does not face the challenge of
defending an elasticity of intertemporal substitution that is greater than one.
To understand this model difference, first note that sentiment, the state variable
in our model, is much less persistent than the stochastic component of dividend
and consumption growth in Bansal and Yaron (2004), allowing the equilibrium
interest rate and hence the equity premium in our model to be less responsive
to changes in the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. At the same time, the
perceived dividend growth in our model depends more strongly on the state variable
of sentiment, pushing up the perceived equity premium; as a comparison, dividend
growth in Bansal and Yaron (2004) depends much less on the stochastic growth
component.22 Finally, the true average equity premium in our model is above the
perceived one, allowing the equity premium to be high even when the elasticity of
22Bansal and Yaron (2004) set their “leverage parameter” φ to 3.5. In comparison, with return
extrapolation, our model effectively sets φ to 14.5, a much higher value.
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intertemporal substitution is low.
Table B.11 repeats the regression analyses of Table B.10 using the model of Bansal
et al. (2012). Compared to the original model of Bansal and Yaron (2004), Bansal
et al. (2012) introduces additional time variation in the long-run risks that further
reduces the model’s ability to generate extrapolative expectations: when regressing
the agent’s expectation of raw returns on past returns, the coefficient now becomes
insignificant.
[Place Table B.11 about here]
We complete our discussion in this section by making two remarks. First, the
persistence introduced by the long-run risks models on consumption growth and
dividend growth leads to excess predictability, the notion that future consumption
growth and dividend growth are excessively predicted by current variables such
as the price-dividend ratio and the interest rate (see Beeler and Campbell (2012)
and Collin-Dufresne et al. (2016b) for a detailed discussion). Our model does not
give rise to excess predictability: return extrapolation in the model only generates
perceived but not true long-run risks, and therefore the true consumption growth
and dividend growth remain unpredictable.
Second, the rational expectations models and our model generate different impli-
cations regarding the role of cash flow expectations in understanding stock market
movements. In models with rational expectations, the stock market price is mainly
correlated with subjective discount rate (return) expectations; it is not significantly
correlated with cash flow expectations. In our model, however, the stock market
price is mainly correlated with the agent’s subjective expectations of future cash
flow growth.
2.6 Fundamental Extrapolation
A literature in behavioral finance focuses on fundamental extrapolation, the notion
that some investors hold extrapolative expectations about fundamentals such as
dividend growth or GDP growth (Barberis et al. (1998); Fuster et al. (2011); Choi
and Mertens (2013); Alti and Tetlock (2014); Hirshleifer et al. (2015)). In this
section, we provide a quantitative comparison between our model and a model
with fundamental extrapolation. To facilitate the comparison, we keep the two
models almost identical. The only difference is that, in the model with fundamental
extrapolation, sentiment is constructed from past dividend growth, whereas in the
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model with return extrapolation, sentiment is constructed from past price growth.
Belowwe first briefly describe the key assumptions in this fundamental extrapolation
model. We then discuss the model’s implications.
Model setup
With fundamental extrapolation, the agent believes that the expected growth rate of
dividends—instead of the expected growth rate of stock market prices in the case of
return extrapolation—is governed by (1−θ)gD+θ µ˜S,t , where µ˜S,t is a latent variable
that follows a regime-switching process described in Section 2.2. The agent does
not directly observe the latent variable µ˜S,t . Instead, she computes its expected
value given the history of past dividend growth: St ≡ E[µ˜S,t |F Dt ]. She then applies
optimal filtering theory and derives
dSt =(λµH + χµL − (λ + χ)St )dt + σ−1D θ(µH − St )(St − µL)dωet
≡µeS (St )dt + σS (St )dωet ,
(2.32)
where dωet ≡ [dDt/Dt − (1−θ)gDdt−θStdt]/σD is a standard Brownian innovation
term from the agent’s perspective. That is, she perceives the evolution of dividend
as
dDt/Dt = geD (St )dt + σDdω
e
t , (2.33)
where
geD (St ) = (1 − θ)gD + θSt . (2.34)
In other words, the agent’s expectation about dividend growth geD (St ) is a linear
combination of a rational component gD and a sentiment component St constructed
from past dividend growth. On the other hand, the perceived evolution of the stock
market price can be derived as
dPDt /P
D
t = µ
D,e
P (St )dt + σ
D
P (St )dω
e
t , (2.35)
where
σDP (S) =σD + ( f
′/ f )σ−1D θ(µH − S)(S − µL),
µD,eP (S) =( f
′/ f )µeS +
1
2 ( f
′′/ f )σ2S + (1 − θ)gD + θS − σ2D + σDσDP (S).
(2.36)
As before, f is defined as the price-dividend ratio of the stock market.
As with the return extrapolation model, equations (2.16) and (2.17) determine f and
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l, the price-dividend ratio and the wealth-consumption ratio, except that µS, σS, geD,
µD,eP , and σ
D
P are now from (2.32), (2.34), and (2.36).
Model implications
We first examine the model’s implications for investor expectations. Table B.12
reports the regression coefficient, its t-statistic, the intercept, as well as the adjusted
R-squared, when regressing the four measures of return expectations on either the
past twelve-month cumulative raw returns or the current log price-dividend ratio.
With fundamental extrapolation, the regression coefficient on past returns and the
t-statistic are both close to zero.
[Place Table B.12 about here]
Suppose past dividend growth has been high. On the one hand, it results in high past
returns. On the other hand, fundamental extrapolation leads the agent to expect high
dividend growth moving forward, but not high returns: following high past dividend
growth, the stock market price increases to the extent that the agent’s expectation of
future returns does not change significantly. A fundamental extrapolationmodelwith
a representative agent therefore faces a challenge in explaining survey expectations
about returns. In contrast, our return extrapolation model is constructed to explain
these survey expectations.23
[Place Table B.13 about here]
Table B.13 analyzes the model’s fit with the long-run properties of the stock market.
Using the same parameters that allow the return extrapolation model to well explain
the important moments of the stock market, the fundamental extrapolation model
generates lower excess volatility and a much lower equity premium. Quantitatively,
fundamental extrapolation generates 74.4% of excess volatility and 37.9% of the
equity premium that return extrapolation produces.
This quantitative comparison highlights the importance of the feedback loop de-
scribed above in matching asset pricing facts. With return extrapolation, the feed-
back loop emerges because extrapolative beliefs are applied to the stock market
23A fundamental extrapolation model with heterogeneous agents—for instance, one with both
an agent who extrapolates past dividend growth and an agent who is fully rational—can potentially
generate extrapolative expectations of returns for the behavioral agent in the model. See the model
of Ehling et al. (2015) as an example.
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return, a variable that is endogenously determined in equilibrium. With fundamen-
tal extrapolation, however, the feedback loop is absent because extrapolative beliefs
are applied to dividend growth, a variable that is exogenous in the model: high
past dividend growth makes the agent optimistic about future dividend growth and
therefore pushes up the current price, but the higher price does not further affect the
agent’s beliefs about future dividend growth.
This feedback loop also points to a methodological contribution of the paper. Equa-
tion (2.32) shows that, in a fundamental extrapolation model, sentiment S, the
state variable that drives asset prices dynamics, can be exogenously specified with-
out solving the equilibrium; this greatly simplifies the model. On the other hand,
with return extrapolation, sentiment S determines—and is endogenously determined
by—asset prices. As a result, such a model requires solving beliefs and asset prices
simultaneously, and therefore imposes a greater modeling challenge. Our numerical
approach to solving a system of differential equations provides a solution to this
challenge.
2.7 Conclusion
We build a new return extrapolation model that can be brought to the data quanti-
tatively. With the agent’s beliefs calibrated to fit the extrapolative expectations data
documented in surveys, the model matches the long-run properties of stock market
prices: it generates a high average equity premium, significant excess volatility,
a low average interest rate, low interest rate volatility, and a price-dividend ratio
whose average level is similar to the empirical one. The model also matches the
dynamic behavior of stockmarket prices: it produces the long-horizon predictability
of stock market returns, and generates the observed low correlation between stock
market returns and consumption growth. We compare our model to the long-run
risks models and find that our model’s quantitative implications are more robust to
changes in the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
Our analysis has left several important issues for future work. First, when calibrated
with the survey expectations data, the model predicts a persistence of the price-
dividend ratio that is significantly lower than its empirical value. To reconcile
the survey expectations about stock market returns with the observed persistence
of the price-dividend ratio, we need a deeper understanding about how investors
form beliefs. Second, the extrapolation framework is closely linked to theories of
model uncertainty. A careful investigation of this connection may produce useful
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insights to both literatures. Finally, our representative-agent model neglects an
important channel that affects asset prices: the time-varying fraction of wealth held
by behavioral agents. Explicitly incorporating rational agents into our framework
may lead to additional implications.
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C h a p t e r 3
“DARK MATTER” OF FINANCE IN THE SURVEY
3.1 Introduction
Tail risk is economists’ version of cosmologists’ dark matter. It is
unseen and not directly observable but it exerts a force that can change
over time and that can profoundly influence markets.
— Steve Ross (2015)1
Tail risks have a profound impact on the asset market and play an important role
in answering central asset pricing questions such as the equity premium puzzle, the
variance premium puzzle and the volatility smile (Barro (2006), Gabaix (2012),
Ross (2015), Wachter (2013)). However, due to the rare occurrences of tail events in
the historical data, tail risks are usually difficult to observe or measure. As a result,
economists have limited knowledge about how investors form their beliefs about tail
risks. In this paper, I use Shiller tail risk survey, a survey that directly asks investors
about their perceptions of tail risks in the stock market, to investigate this question.
In understanding investors’ belief formation on tail events with survey data, I face
two fundamental challenges. On the one hand, recent developments in behavioral
finance have proved the usefulness of investor belief surveys in some situations.
For example, Greenwood and Shleifer (2014) document that investor expectation
surveys of different sources reflect meaningful market-wide investor expectations.2
However, it is unclear whether investor belief surveys also contain effective infor-
mation on other attributes of investor beliefs, such as investors’ perception of tail
risks. Therefore, one might naturally ask, is the reported tail risks in the survey
really reliable? On the other hand, with the recent development in past decades,
researchers have collected different pieces of evidence on investor beliefs, including
excessive optimism and pessimism concerning investor expectations (Greenwood
1John Campbell also mentioned the term “dark matter” of finance in his 2008 Princeton Finance
Lectures.
2These investor expectation surveys include: the American Association of Individual Investors
Sentiment Survey, Gallup Survey, Investor Intelligence Survey, Shiller Survey, Graham and Harvey
Survey, and Michigan Survey. In these surveys, respondents answer questions such as what the
percentage of expected returns over the next twelve months is.
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and Shleifer (2014)), neglected risks before the financial crisis (Baron and Xiong
(2017)), and others. For each piece of evidence, researchers have proposed sepa-
rate belief formation frameworks, such as overconfidence, return extrapolation, and
“this-time-is-different” hypothesis. However, there is no unified belief framework
to explain different pieces of extant investor belief evidence. Therefore, a more
challenging question is, could we interpret the documented investor belief evidence
in one unified framework?
My paper primarily targets these two challenges and provides positive answers to
both questions. First, for the reliability of survey evidence, with the documented con-
sistency between investor expectation surveys in the previous literature (Greenwood
and Shleifer (2014)), I reinforce its validity by showing the connections between in-
vestor expectation surveys and Shiller tail risks survey; indeed, variations in investor
expectation surveys are highly consistent with changes in Shiller tail risks survey.
Not only is there consistency within each survey type, information between different
types of surveys is essentially connected and can serve as cross-validations for each
other. Second, I show that two documented investor belief patterns—time-varying
excessive optimism and pessimism on investor expectations and the time-varying
perceptions of tail risks—can be understood within one belief formation framework.
Specifically, the proposed framework for investors’ belief is based on return extrap-
olation: investors believe that stock returns will continue rising after a sequence
of good returns and continue falling after a sequence of low returns. As a result,
perceived left-tail risks decline as investors become optimistic about future returns
during market booms and vice versa, which leads to a strong countercyclical pattern.
Therefore, I have not only expanded understandings of the tail risks dynamics but
reinforced the validity of return extrapolation as a belief framework to interpret a
wide range of investor belief patterns.
In order to authenticate the consistency between investor expectation surveys and
Shiller tail risks survey, I start with a simple return distribution assumption—the
conditional normal—for both investor expectation surveys and Shiller tail risks sur-
vey. Therefore, based on the expectation information in the investor expectation
surveys, I can effectively back out a sequence of left-tail probabilities and compare
it with the reported tail event probability in Shiller tail risks survey. The correlation
between two variables, it turns out, is as high as 76%, which indicates that approxi-
mately 80% of variations in the reported probabilities in Shiller tail risk surveys can
be effectively attributed to changes in investors’ perceptions in investor expectation
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surveys. In backing out the implied left-tail probabilities from investor expectation
surveys in the main text, I also use VIX index as the perceived time-varying condi-
tional volatility since VIX is widely believed to reflect market anticipation for future
stock market volatilities. However, replacing VIX with a constant volatility does
not significantly dampen the close connections between the two types of surveys.
To further test the connections between the two types of surveys, I investigate con-
temporaneous relations between investor expectation surveys and the reported tail
event probability in Shiller surveys. Specifically, I rely on the following hypothesis:
if two types of surveys contain consistent information, then when investors perceive
a higher expected return, they should simultaneously report lower left-tail probabil-
ities in the tail risks surveys. Regressing the reported left-tail probabilities in Shiller
on the contemporaneous investor expectation surveys, I find significant support for
this hypothesis, which again demonstrates the connections between the two types
of surveys. Moreover, this negative association holds true even after controlling for
VIX index and a set of other commonly used variables, such as the default yield and
the term yield.
In connecting two types of survey evidence, one main empirical concern is to
make reasonable assumptions about the perceived conditional return distributions.
For my main text analysis, I adhere to the simple conditional normal distribution
assumption. It is worth pointing out that, even under normality assumption with
time-varying expectations and volatilities, the unconditional return distribution is
highly skewed and fat-tailed, largely consistent with the empirical patterns in the
data. Nevertheless, I test alternative return distribution assumptions for robustness
check. Specifically, I consider skew-normal distribution and see whether skewness
would significantly affect results. It turns out that the close connections between two
types of surveys is insensitive to the return distribution assumptions, and introducing
skewness only slightly affects the probability level.
With the confirmed consistency between different investor belief surveys, I next
make attempts to understand variations in the perceived investor expectations and
perceived tail risks with one unified belief formation framework. Motivated by
previous studies (Amromin and Sharpe (2013), Greenwood and Shleifer (2014)),
return extrapolation serves well to explain the excessive optimism and pessimism
on investor expectations and their portfolio choice. A natural conjecture is return
extrapolation could also drive the time-varying perceptions of tail risks. I first con-
struct this connection by investigating the determinants of the reported tail risks in
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the Shiller survey. Specifically, return extrapolation indicates that the current price
level—log price to dividend ratio—positively affects investors’ perceived expecta-
tions of returns. If changes in investors’ perceived expectations influence variations
in investors’ perception of tail risks, then reported tail risks should also depend on
the current price to dividend ratio level, with a negative sign. I find significant sup-
port for this conjecture, although the perceived left-tail probabilities also positively
correlate with the time-varying VIX.
To further link return extrapolation to variations in the perceived tail risks, I first rely
on the results of previous literature (Barberis et al. (2015), Greenwood and Shleifer
(2014)) and construct an investor expectation measurement, denoted as Psentiment,
based on return extrapolation. Specifically, Barberis et al. (2015) estimate howmuch
weight investors put on past realized returns when using return extrapolation to form
their expectations of returns, and I directly borrow those coefficients to construct
my return extrapolation expectation measurement. With constructed Psentiment,
the implied perceived left-tail probability with conditional normality assumption
and VIX index explains around 55% of the variations in the reported tail risks in
Shiller surveys. Even without information from VIX, it still explains 47% of the
total variations. The close connections between return extrapolation and perceived
tail risks remain robust even with skew-normal distributions.
As a striking contrast, rational expectations cannot explain the time-varying pattern
for the perceived tail risks for the stock market in the survey. Specifically, during
market booms, rational expectation models would predict lower expected returns
going forward, and therefore a higher tail event risks, which leads to a procyclical
pattern of tail risks. Hence, rational expectation models find difficulty in explaining
both the time-varying investor expectations (Greenwood and Shleifer (2014)) and
the variations in perceived tail risks in the surveys.
Literature Review:
My paper relates to a strand of literature focusing on the validity and usefulness
of investor belief surveys. Greenwood and Shleifer (2014) demonstrate a high
correlation within investor expectation surveys, thereby indicating that investor
expectation surveys are not meaningless noise but rather reflections of widely shared
investor beliefs in the market. Amromin and Sharpe (2013) use data obtained
from a series of Michigan Surveys of Consumer Attitudes and demonstrate that
household investors appear to extrapolate past realized returns when forming their
expectations of future returns. Additionally, their reported expectations affect their
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portfolio choices. Gennaioli et al. (2016) rely on Duke quarterly survey of CFO
and show that the actual investment activities are explained quite well by CFO’s
expectations in the survey. My paper reinforces the validity of survey information
by showing the consistency between different types of surveys and that survey
information are mutually supportive to each other. Moreover, I show that the
reported left-tail probabilities in the survey have strong predictive power for future
market performance.
My paper belongs to the burgeoning return extrapolation literature. Many works
in this field attempt to understand the role of return extrapolation in driving the
behavior of aggregate market performance. (Cutler et al. (1990b), De Long et al.
(1990), Barberis et al. (2015), Jin and Sui (2017)). Barberis et al. (2015) use return
extrapolation to construct an asset pricingmodel that can explain central asset pricing
facts, such as excess volatility puzzle and the predictability of returns, as well as the
investor belief survey evidence in the data. Jin and Sui (2017) construct a quantitative
benchmark of belief-based asset pricing models that can simultaneously explain
the equity premium puzzle, excess volatility puzzle, predictability of returns, low
correlations between consumption and returns, as well as the investor belief evidence
in the surveys. However, all existing studies on return extrapolation primarily focus
on explaining time-varying investor expectations of returns. In this paper, I show
that return extrapolation also helps understand investors’ perceptions of tail risks
and therefore can serve as a unified framework for explaining a set of investor belief
evidence.
This paper resolves a general challenge in the literature, mentioned in Barberis , to
simultaneously explain the overestimation and underestimation of tail events during
different episodes. For example, people underestimate tail risks in the run-up to
the 2008 U.S. financial crisis but, as documented in this paper, overestimate the
tail event probabilities during the financial crisis. Baron and Xiong (2017) also
document that bank equity investors neglect crash risks during credit expansions.
The proposed belief mechanism with return extrapolation in this paper provides a
plausible answer. During the market boom before the 2008 U.S. financial crisis,
investors extrapolate past good returns and become overly optimistic about future
stockmarket returns; increase in perceived investor expectations naturally reduce the
perceived tail risks in the stock market. During the financial crisis, when investors
pessimistically perceive low future stock market returns, the perceived tail risks in
the stock market increase dramatically. ? propose a similar mechanism to explain
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the credit cycles.
This paper also relates to the literature measuring the left-tail risks. Chen et al.
(2017) propose a tractable measurement of model fragility and use it to evaluate the
asset pricing models with rare disasters in the consumption process. Barone-Adesi
et al. (2016) apply behavioral pricing kernel theory to estimate aggregate preference
and beliefs from option prices and historical returns. Their estimates pertaining to
left-tail risks based on options data are consistent with the Shiller Crash Index used
in this paper. Goetzmann et al. (2016) investigate the role of media influence in
shaping investors’ perceptions of tail risks, and find that recent market declines and
adverse market events made salient by the financial press are associated with higher
subjective crash probabilities. My paper proposes a belief framework to explain
multisets set of investor belief evidence.
3.2 Data
For my empirical analysis in this paper, I mainly draw on two types of investor
belief surveys: (1) surveys on investors’ perceived tail risks and (2) surveys on
investor expectations of future returns. Specifically, for investor tail risks survey, I
draw on one question in Shiller survey that targets exclusively on both institutional
and individual investors’ perceived tail risks. For investor expectation surveys, I
rely on five data sources: the Gallup investor survey, the American Association of
Individual Investors survey (AA), Investor Intelligence’s summary of professional
investors’ belief (II), Shiller’s survey on individual investors’ expectations, Graham
and Harvey’s surveys of CFOs. Although carried out by different institutions, each
of five investor expectation surveys all asks participants similar questions about their
expectations on future market returns.
It is worth noting that Shiller survey asks both investor expectation question and tail
risks question. In my analysis, I use his tail risks question and formally refer to it
as Shiller tail risks survey. Meanwhile, I also use his investor expectation questions
and formally refer to it as Shiller investor expectation survey. Additionally, all the
surveys used in my analysis primarily focus on the U.S. stock market.
Moreover, although two types of investor belief surveys collect different attributes of
investor belief information, as long as investor belief surveys are reliable, two belief
attributes in each type of surveys should be connected together within a certain belief
formation framework. Before I touch on details about the connections between the
two types of surveys, I first describe the two types in detail below.
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Shiller Tail Risks Survey
Since 1989, Robert Shiller has been surveying individual and institutional investors
on their views about U.S. stockmarket; semi-annually for ten years and thenmonthly
by the International Center for Finance at the Yale School of Management since
July, 2001. Relying on a market survey firm, Shiller categorizes investors into two
groups: individual investors and institutional investors. During each month, around
300 questionnaires are mailed to investors in each groups. One of the questions in
the survey specifically asks investors about their estimation on the probability that
a catastrophic event will occur over the next six months. The original question is
presented to survey subjects as follows:
“What do you think is the probability of a catastrophic stock market crash in the
U.S., like that of October 28, 1929 or October 19, 1987, in the next six months,
including the case that a crash occurred in the other countries and spreads to the
U.S.? (An answer of 0% means that it cannot happen, an answer of 100% means it
is sure to happen.)”
Responses to this question help me to extract investors’ perceived left-tail risks.
Specifically, the International Center for Finance at Yale School of Management
and Shiller construct Stock Market Crash Index for both individual and institutional
investor subsamples, measured by the percentage of investors in each groups who
report a left-tail probability within next six months of less than 10%. Therefore,
high levels in the original Crash index indicate lower perceived left-tail probabilities
from investors and vice versa. Through out the paper, I use the inverse of the original
index, just to keep the relation that higher index refers to higher perceived tail risks.
I plot the Crash index in Figure C.1.
The crash index for the subsample of individual investors starts from 1999 while
the sample of institutional investors starts from 1990.3 Despite difference in sample
spans and investor groups, two indices are highly synchronized, which indicates that
Shiller tail risk survey measurements contain consensus information on investors’
perceptions of tail risks. Moreover, the reported tail probability has a strong cyclical
pattern—it remains relatively low during bubble episodes such as between 2004
and 2006 and becomes high during financial crisis between 2008 and 2010. Such
a trend is also consistent with other important economic variables such as default
yield, term yield, and VIX. In fact, as will be clear later, perceived tail risks are
3There are a few observations before 1999 for the individual investor subsample.
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highly correlated with many important business cycle indicators. Indeed, Shiller
Survey has proven to contain useful information not only on investor beliefs but
also on asset price dynamics. For example, Barone-Adesi et al. (2013) estimate
behavioral pricing kernels using market option data and find them to be highly
correlated with Shiller tail risks series. 4
[Place Figure C.1 about here]
Investor Expectation Surveys
In the past decades, researchers have made progress in understanding investor be-
lief formation mechanism with information based on investor expectation surveys.
Among others, Greenwood and Shleifer (2014) demonstrate investor expectation
surveys are not meaningless noise but really capture the consensus investor expec-
tations in the market. One of the main purposes of this paper is to demonstrate the
consistency between investor expectation surveys and left-tail risks surveys. How-
ever, to better connect previous results and put my results into a coherent framework,
I also presents some evidence on the consistencywithin investor expectation surveys.
For a more detailed discussion on investor expectation surveys, see Greenwood and
Shleifer (2014).
Different from investors’ perceptions of tail risks, investor expectation surveys mea-
sure another attribute of investor belief information: the perceived expectations of
future returns. In this section, I briefly describe the investor expectation surveys,
especially two types (quantitative and qualative) of investor expectation questions.
Gallup
The Gallup survey measures individual investors’ expectations of the U.S. stock
market over the next twelve months. It is conducted monthly between 1996 and
2011, but there are some gaps in later years, especially between November 2009 and
February 2011 when the survey was discontinued.
To extract investor expectations, in each month, Gallup survey asks participants one
qualitative question: whether they are “very optimistic”, “optimistic”, “neutral”,
“pessimistic” or “very pessimistic” about stock returns over the next twelve months.
4The reported probabilities in Shiller tail risk survey are high partially because they are subjective
probabilities, which reflect both probabilities and risk aversion. To test the robustness of these survey
responses, Goetzmann et al. (2016) run an independent experiments on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk
using similar questions, and find the reported responses remain unchanged.
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With the percentage of each response in the collected survey answers, Gallup reports
a qualitative investor expectation series to measure investor expectations in the
market:
Gallup = %Bullish −%Bearish, (3.1)
where “Bullish” is defined as either “very optimistic” or “optimistic” and “Bearish”
is defined as either “pessimistic” or “very pessimistic”. This qualitative time series
helps us understand the dynamics of investor sentiment in the market.
However, to investigate the connections between investor expectation surveys and
Shiller tail risks survey, a quantitative estimations of expected returns would better
serve my purpose. Fortunately, Gallup survey also asks more precise quantitative
questions on investors’ perceived expected returns, although only for a shorter sam-
ple. Specifically, between September 1998 and May 2003, Gallup asks participants
to give an estimate of the percentage return they expect for the stock market over the
next year.
Therefore, as long as participants in the Gallup survey answer quantitative and
qualitative questions in a consistent way, I can effectively get quantitative estima-
tions investor expectation series by rescaling qualitative Gallup investor series with
projection method. 5 Indeed, the reported quantitative Gallup investor expectation
series turns out to have a high correlation of 84% with the qualitative investor ex-
pectation series within the short sample between September 1998 and May 2003.
I make the further assumption that such high correlation between quantitative and
qualitative investor expectation series still holds true even beyond the short sample
period. Therefore I can get rescaled Gallup quantitative series at any time as long
as the Gallup qualitative series is available. This projection method also helps me
transform qualitative series in other investor expectation surveys to a meaningful
quantitative basis.
American Association of Individual Investors
The American Association of Individual Investors Sentiment Survey is conducted
weekly to members of American Association of Individual Investors starting from
January 1987. Similar with Gallup, it asks qualitative questions and measures the
5Carlson and Parkin (1975) propose a method to generate average expectations from categorical
survey data. As pointed in Greenwood and Shleifer (2014), this method has almost no impact on the
investor expectation time series.
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percentage of individual investors who are bullish, neutral or bearish on the U.S.
stock market over the next six months. They report the AA qualitative investor
expectation series following the equation (3.1).
Investor Intelligence
“Investor Intelligence” is conducted monthly in 1963, then biweekly through June
1969 when it was shifted to weekly later. Instead of asking investors directly,
directors of this survey classify 120 independent financial market newsletters as
having “bullish”, “neutral” or “bearish” forecasts of returns on the U.S. stock market
over the near term. Similarly, they report the II qualitative investor expectation
series following the equation in (3.1).
Shiller Investor Expectation Survey
In Shiller’s survey question set, one question asks investors whether or not they
expect the market to rise over the following year, which essentially is the qualitative
investor expectation question. Shiller constructs the one-year individual confidence
index which measures the percentage of individual investors who expect the market
to rise over the following year. I use the one-year individual confidence index as the
qualitative investor expectation series for my later analysis.
Garham and Harvey
John Graham and Campbell Harvey have been surveying chief financial officers
(CFOs) of major U.S. corporations quarterly. In their question, they ask CFOs their
expectation of stock market returns on the U.S. stock market directly over the next
twelve months. The quantitative expectation series is available from October 2000.
Consistency within Investor Expectation Surveys
In using survey data to investigate investor beliefs, one prerequisite is the validity
of survey information. If there is no common information among investor belief
surveys, then corresponding investigations would be meaningless. For the five
investor expectation surveys mentioned above, they should reflect market-wide in-
vestor expectations of returns. Fortunately, previous studies have confirmed in point.
(Greenwood and Shleifer (2014)): investor expectation surveys are highly correlated
with each other.
93
Specifically, I report the information for the original qualitative investor expectation
series in Panel A of Table C.1. Clearly, qualitative investor expectation series are
highly correlated with each other. For instance, the correlation between Gallup
and AA has a correlation of 0.63. This indicates that investor expectation surveys
are not meaningless noise but really contain consistent information on investors’
expectations for future stock returns.
[Place Table C.1 about here]
Another general concern for the survey data is whether the reported responses truly
reflect investors’ real beliefs in their minds. Although unlikely, it is still possible
that investors misinterpret the questions and report irrelevant answers. To address
this possibility, Greenwood and Shleifer (2014) investigated the reported investor
expectations and the mutual fund flows at the aggregate level.
Rescaling
With the reliability of investor expectation surveys, I proceed to investigate the
connections between investor expectation surveys and Shiller tail risks survey. To
build quantitative connections between investor expectation surveys and left-tail
risks survey, I transform each qualitative investor expectation series to quantitative
series by projecting Gallup quantitative investor expectation series onto qualitative
investor expectation series from five surveys. Panel B of Table C.1 report the
summary statistics for the rescaled series. The average expected return ranges from
0.09 to 0.11 while the standard deviations range from 0.002 to 0.030. I use these
rescaled investor expectation series for my analyses.
3.3 Consistency between Two Types of Surveys
With investor expectation surveys, economists have improved understandings on how
investors form expectations of returns in their mind—there is a strong extrapolative
structure in investors’ expectations. However, demonstrating the consistency within
investor expectation surveys is merely the first step in showing the validity of the
contained information in the survey—after all, investor beliefs have various belief
attributes, including expectations, variance, perceived left-tail risks and others. If
surveys can only reflect one isolated type of investor belief information but fail
to capture variations in other attributes of investor beliefs, then the validity of
survey information is greatly undermined. Moreover, proposing belief formation
mechanism only based on one attribute of belief could lead to severe over-fitting
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problem—the proposed belief mechanism might only explain certain types of belief
attributes but miss in most of other attributes. Such over-fitting problem essentially
lead to the “lack of discipline” critique.
Fortunately, extant surveys also records different attributes of investor beliefs, in-
cluding investor expectations and perceived left-tail probabilities. The variety of
investor belief attributes in the survey provide me an opportunity to answer one “big
picture” question on the validity of survey information: is investor belief survey
information really reliable?
To address this question, throughout this section, I treat the aggregated survey in-
formation as the consensus beliefs among survey participants. For example, an
rescaled investor expectation of 10% in the survey effectively reflects a consensus
market-wide investor expectation level of 10%. Irrespective of underlying return
distribution assumptions, increase in consensus investor expectation should effec-
tively reduces the consensus left-tail probabilities. If investor expectation surveys
and tail risks survey truly contain consistent and effective information, there should
be strong connections between the consensus information contained in each type
of surveys. Therefore, investigating common variations between the consensus in-
formation in different investor belief surveys can help me effectively address the
validity of survey information.
Interpretations of Shiller Tail Risks Survey
In this section, I start with interpretations of Shiller tail risks survey question under
semi-annual frequency. Specifically, I interpret the reported probabilities in Shiller
tail risks survey as the probabilities for a catastrophic event within six months. To
fully extract information from the Shiller tail risks survey question, I also define the
catastrophic tail event as the occurrence of more than 27.81% decline within future
six-month horizon.6
Figure C.2 provides an intuition for the reported tail event probability of the catas-
trophic event in investors’ mind. At each point in time, investors in the surveys form
a perceived distribution for future returns, based on their perceived expected returns,
conditional volatility, and other factors. When asked about the probability of the
catastrophic event in Shiller tail risks survey, they report their tail event probability
based on their perceptions in the minds, which corresponds to the shaded area in
6The number 27.81% is the average of the maximum market decline from two defined market
downturn episodes in Shiller tail risk question: in 1929 market downturn the maximum decline is
-31.95% and in 1987 market downturn, the maximum decline is 23.67%.
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this figure. Therefore, this figure essentially provides a connection between investor
expectation surveys and Shiller left-tail risk surveys. After all, the shaded area
for the perceived tail event probability essentially depends on investors’ perceived
expectations of returns in the surveys.
[Place Figure C.2 about here]
To facilitate my analysis for this connection, I start with a simple normality as-
sumption for the future return distribution, but will also report the robustness of my
results using other types of distributions in the appendix. Specifically, to connect
the perceived quantities in the surveys, I mainly focus on the following perceived
return dynamics:
∆Pt/Pt = µeP,t∆t + σ
e
P,t∆ω
e
t , (3.2)
where µeP,t and σ
e
P,t are the annualized perceived expectations and perceived volatil-
ity of S&P 500 index, and ∆ωet is the perceived Brownian shocks that drives the
return dynamics.
Dynamics in equation (3.2) indicates the return distribution at time t follows a
conditional normal distribution with mean µeP,t and volatility σ
e
P,t . Naturally, the
perceived expectation of returns µeP,t corresponds to the reported probabilities in
investor expectation surveys at time t. For the perceived volatility σeP,t , I use the
VIX index based on S&P 500 index option at time t from Chicago Board Options
Exchange because it reflects market-wide expectations of annualized future 30-day
return volatility. 7 Then I can back out the left-tail probability at time t purely based
on information in investor expectation survey and VIX using the following formula:
Probe(∆Pt/Pt < C¯t ) = Ψ(
C¯t − µeP,t∆t
σeP,t
√
∆t
), (3.3)
where function Ψ represents the standard normal distribution and ∆t = 0.5 under
semi-annual frequency. Despite the conditional normality, the unconditional dis-
tribution of return distribution is highly skewed—with perceived expectations of
returns being time-varying and positive in general, the unconditional return distri-
bution is left-skewed.
7Replacing VIX with realized volatility does not significantly change my results.
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The implied left-tail probability based on equation (3.3) builds the connection be-
tween two types of surveys. I plot the left-tail probability implied from investor
expectation surveys in Figure C.3. All implied left-tail probabilities have strong
countercyclical pattern and fluctuate synchronously with the reported left-tail prob-
ability from Shiller tail risk survey: investors in both types of survey perceive a
rapidly increasing left-tail risks during NBER recessions and perceive a low left-tail
risks during market booms such as Internet bubbles episodes around 1999 and the
episodes between 2003 to 2006.
[Place Figure C.3 about here]
Correlations between Two Types of Surveys
To investigate the connections between two types of surveys, one natural way is to
analyze their correlations: if two surveys reflect consistent information, then when
investors report higher expected returns in expectation surveys, they should also
report a lower tail event probabilities in Shiller tail risks survey.
To formally check this conjecture, I record correlations between the implied left-
tail probability from investor expectation surveys and that from Shiller left-tail risks
survey in column one of Table C.2. Despite different survey sources, the correlations
are all around 0.60, which means the left-tail probabilities implied by investor
expectation survey explain about 60% variations of Shiller tail risk survey. The
corresponding p-values are all close to zero, indicating strong positive correlations
between the implied crash probabilities and the Shiller tail risks surveys.
[Place Table C.2 about here]
Contemporaneous Connections between Two Types of Surveys
I conclude this section by providing another set of evidence on the consistency
between two types of surveys. Based on the proposed belief mechanism in Figure
C.2, changes in the investors’ perceived expectations should negatively associate
with their contemporaneous reported left-tail probabilities. To formally test this
pattern, I run the following regression:
Crash Index = a + b µeP,t︸︷︷︸
perceived expectations
+ut . (3.4)
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The proposed mechanism implies b should be negative and statistically significant.
Table C.3 and C.4 present results for the above regression. Table C.3 reports the
regression results from equation (3.4). To provide a robust test, I report all possible
associations between each investor expectation surveys and Shiller left-tail risks
survey.
[Place Table C.3 and C.4 about here]
The results indicate that, regardless of the investor subsample I choose, responses in
investor expectation surveys are negatively and significantly associatedwith reported
left-tail probabilities within the same period, which is consistent with the proposed
belief mechanism in Figure C.1.
3.4 Connections between Return Extrapolation and Perceived Left-tail Prob-
abilities
What is the underlying belief mechanism for the perceived left-tail risks dynamics?
With what I have shown so far—variations in the perceived left-tail probabilities are
largely connected to changes in the perceived investor expectations—investigating
patterns of investor expectations can help understand the left-tail probability dy-
namics.
In this, several previous empirical studies have stressed the role of extrapolative
beliefs in explaining investor expectation variations in the survey and therefore can
guide our research. Among others, Greenwood and Shleifer (2014) document that
investors expect excessively higher returns going forward after observing a sequence
of good past returns and vice versa, a belief formation pattern formally defined as
return extrapolation in the literature. Additionally, previous works also provide
evidence on how much weight investors put on the past returns when forming
expectations of future stock returns.
Due to the important role of return extrapolation in driving investor expectations,
very likely, it could help explain the perceived left-tail risks dynamics. For instance,
during market booms, investors observe episodes of good returns and return ex-
trapolation leads investors to become overly optimistic. With elevated perceived
expectations, the perceived left-tail probabilities drop significantly and therefore in-
vestors neglect left-tail risks. Conversely, when the market is in its bust, a sequence
of negative returns makes investors overly pessimistic. With a nosedive in investor
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expectations, the perceived left-tail probabilities rise rapidly—which accord with
the countercyclicality of tail risks I document (FigureC.1).
Connections Based on Correlations
To test the connection between return extrapolation and the perceived left-tail risks
dynamics, I first construct an expectation variable, Psentiment, which represents an
expectation level based on return extrapolation. With this new expectation variable,
I investigate to what extent return extrapolation alone can explain the perceived
left-tail risks dynamics.
In constructing the new expectation variable Psentiment, I use the following formula
in previous studies:
Psentimentt = a + b
∑n
j=1
w jRD(t− j∆t)→(t−( j−1)∆t) + εt, (3.5)
where w j = e−λ( j−1)∆t/
∑n
l=1 e
−λ(l−1)∆t represents the decision weight and λ mea-
sures the memory decay speed for investors since it determines how much weight
to assign when forming expectations of future stock returns. All parameters a, b,
λ can be directly estimated from the investor expectation surveys.8 Here I use the
estimators a = 0.004, b = 2.04 and λ = 0.428 based on Gallup survey from Bar-
beris et al. (2015) to construct my Psentiment variable. A magnitude of λ = 0.43
indicates the past returns three years ago is only 25% as important as the most recent
returns.
I then back out the implied left-tail probabilities with Psentiment proxying for µeP,t .
I report the correlation between implied left-tail probabilities based on Psentiment
and the left-tail probability measures directly from Shiller tail-risk surveys in Panel
A of Table C.5.
[Place Table C.5 about here]
It turns out that return extrapolation explains 40% variations of reported probabilities
in Shiller survey. If we use Shiller crash indices which greatly eliminate outliers of
reported probabilities, the correlation rises to 55%. Therefore, return extrapolation
does a decent job in explaining the perceived left-tail risks dynamics.
Rational expectations models, on the contrary, do not fit into the documented left-
tail risks pattern in the survey. Specifically, I use two types of rational expectation
8For detailed estimation procedure, see Barberis et al. (2015)
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measures: logDP expected returns and ex-post twelve-months returns. The logDP
expected returns are the fitted values from themultivariate regression of excess stock
market returns over the next twelve months on the log dividend to price ratio, the
Treasury-bill rate, default spread and the term spread. The ex-post twelve-months
returns are just the accumulative future twelve-months returns in the future. The
correlations between implied left-tail probabilities based on rational expectations
and the left-tail probability measures directly from Shiller tail-risk surveys are
reported in Panel B of Table C.5. Contrary to the results in Panel A, the correlations
are in general very low and with an average magnitude of 0.10. For example, the
implied left-tail risks based on logDP expected return and reported probability from
Shiller tail-risk surveys only have a correlation of 0.09. The maximum correlation
is only around 0.11, which is only less than one-third of that in Panel A of Table
C.5 based on return extrapolation. The striking contrast between Panel A and
B indicates that rational expectation models can hardly explain the dynamics of
perceived left-tail probabilities.
Throughout my exercises so far, I have used both time-varying investor expectations
and time-varying VIX to back out the perceived left-tail probabilities. One natural
question to ask is how much variations return extrapolation alone can explain for
left-tail probabilities. To answer this question, I construct the implied left-tail
probabilities in equation (3.3) by excluding information from VIX and imposing
a constant volatility of 20% for σeP,t . The corresponding correlation results are
reported in Table C.6.
[Place Table C.6 about here]
The reported results reinforce the connections between return extrapolation and the
perceived left-tail probabilities. In Panel A of Table C.6, even without the VIX infor-
mation, the implied left-tail probabilities from expectations based on either survey
or return extrapolation on average explains 45% of the variations in the reported
left-tail probabilities. When using Shiller Crash Index, the average correlations rise
to an average of 55%. The p-values for each correlation relationships are still identi-
cally close to zeros—excluding VIX information does not undermine the underlying
connections between return extrapolation and reported left-tail probabilities.
A striking contrast occurs in Panel B of Table C.6 in which I report the correlations
between the implied left-tail probabilities based on rational expectations and the
reported left-tail probabilities in the surveys. Without the assistance of VIX, now
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the overall correlations become negative. For example, compared to the previous
(maximum)magnitude of 0.62 in PanelAofTableC.6, now the correlations becomes
0.04. Therefore, rational expectations tend to interpret the variations in the reported
left-tail probabilities in the wrong directions—they predict high perceived left-tail
risks during booms and low perceived left-tail risks during recessions—which are
opposite to the patterns in the survey.
Connections Based on Regressions
Guided by previous empirical research (Greenwood and Shleifer (2014)), investor
expectations in the surveys are highly correlated with the current log price to divi-
dend ratios.9 Moreover, correlation analysis in previous sections provides intuitive
connections between return extrapolation and left-tail probabilities. If the perceived
tail risks in the survey are truly driven by the variations in the investors’ perceived
expectations, then the reported tail risks should also depend on the current log price
to dividend ratio. Therefore, I run the following regression:
Crash Index = a + blog(Pt/Dt ) + cV IXt + dXt + ut . (3.6)
Here Pt/Dt denotes the price to dividend ratio which is a measure of the price level,
V IXt stands for the VIX index at time t and Xt denotes other variables. I report the
regression results in Table C.7 in which all reported standard errors are corrected
following the approach in Newey and West (1986).
[Place Table C.7 and C.8 about here]
The reported results are largely consistent with the previous analyses, especially
with the proposed belief formation mechanism in Figure C.2. Overall, the reported
left-tail probabilities are well explained by both the current log(Pt/Dt ) ratios and
VIX index. First, the coefficient of log(Pt/Dt ) is negative: when past price has been
high, investors expect higher returns going forward, therefore they perceive a lower
left-tail probabilities.10 Second, the coefficient for the VIX index is positive. This
9For most surveys, investor expectations are also closely connected with the past twelve-months
returns. However, for Shiller survey, investor expectations are only connected to the current
log(Pt/Dt ) ratio (see Greenwood and Shleifer (2014)). Hence, we only use log(Pt/Dt ) ratio here to
explain the variations in the reported left-tail probabilities in the Shiller left-tail risks surveys.
10A strong pattern documented in Greenwood and Shleifer (2015) which supports the return
extrapolation hypothesis.
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is because, asV IXt increases, investors perceive higher volatilities for future returns
and hence a higher left-tail probabilities. Moreover, consistent with my previous
findings, both time-varying investor expectations and VIX play important roles in
determining the perceived left-tail probabilities11
In addition to the current price to dividend ratio and VIX index, I experiment
with several other proxies related to the left-tail probabilities, including the realized
volatilities, current risk free rate, default spread defined as the difference between
Moody’s Baa and Aaa corporate bond yield, and the term yield which is the differ-
ence between 10-year T-bond and three-month T-bill yields. None of these variables
except for the default yield, it turns out, has robust explanatory power. Although
these variables sometimes have statistically significant explanatory power, they are
not stable and eliminated after controlling for the current price to dividend ratio and
VIX index.
The results in Table C.5, C.6, C.7 and C.8 are not only broadly consistent with the
evidence on return extrapolation, but also expand the role of return extrapolation and
deepen understandings on investors belief formation patterns in different dimensions.
When stock market prices have been increasing, investors not only become overly
optimistic about the expectation of future market returns, they also perceive low
left-tail probabilities and thus neglect left-tail risks. Further, these results also
reinforce the validity of survey evidence: not only that survey measures of investor
expectations are highly correlated across data sources, reported investor left-tail
probabilities and investor expectations in the surveys are mutually coherent.
Moreover, the fact I document in this section—that return extrapolation explains
both the excessive optimism and pessimism in investor expectations and perceived
left-tail risk—raises a higher bar for all other belief formation mechanisms: in
order to convincingly explain the observed patterns in the survey, models should
both explain dynamics in investor expectations and the variations in the left-tail
probabilities.
3.5 Concluding Remarks
Despite the importance of tail risks in explaining central asset pricing facts such
as equity premium, option variance premium and volatility smile, economists have
11Notice that, when using Shiller Crash Index as a proxy for investor beliefs on tail risks, there is
a difference between results from two investor subsamples: institutional investors are less influenced
by the current price level but are still influenced by the VIX index. This indicates that institutional
investors might be more sophisticated and therefore are less subject to psychological heuristics.
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very limited knowledge about investors’ perceptions of tail risks. In this paper, I use
survey data to measure investors’ perceptions on tail event probabilities in the stock
market.
Specifically, I make several contributions to understanding investor’s perceptions of
tail risks using survey data. First, to further relieve concerns on survey information
quality, I reinforce its validity by demonstrating consistency between two different
types of investor belief surveys; indeed, changes in investor expectation surveys
can explain up to 76% variations in Shiller tail risks survey. Therefore, compared
to the findings in Greenwood and Shleifer (2014) that surveys contain consistent
information on investor expectations, my results effectively provide further cross-
validation evidence between different survey types. To argue against one type of
survey, researchers need to explain variations both in investor expectation surveys
and Shiller tail risks survey.
Second, with improved confidence in the quality of survey data, I demonstrate
that investors’ perceptions of tail risks and perceived expectations of returns can be
largely interpretedwithin one unified belief formation framework based on return ex-
trapolation. Therefore, return extrapolation can effectively explain the time-varying
optimism and pessimism on investor expectations as well as the overestimation and
underestimation of tail risks. By explaining investor beliefs in different dimensions
within one framework, return extrapolation effectively avoids the “lack of discipline”
critique.
There are several directions for future research. First, although return extrapolation
seems to be the main driver for the perceived tail risks dynamics, VIX also plays a
significant role. Therefore, understanding investors’ perceptions of volatilities can
help further refine understandings of investors’ perceptions of tail risks. Second, due
to similarities between perceived tail risks in the stock market and the consumption
process, the belief mechanism based on return extrapolation has the potential to
help understand the time-varying probabilities in rare disasters literature. A further
investigation along this direction seems very interesting.
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A p p e n d i x A
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER ONE
A.1 Micro-foundations for Fundamental Investors
To keep the decision problem of fundamental investors simple, I model the funda-
mental investors as an overlapping generation (OLG) of agents. To explain the OLG
timeline in a continuous time setting clearly, I index time as t, t +∆t, t + 2∆t and so
on. Each fundamental investor in generation t inherits wealth from the last gener-
ation and lives between period t, and t + ∆t. For simplicity, fundamental investors
are assumed to have homogeneous wealth levels of W ft at the beginning of period
t and adjust their portfolio to maximize the exponential utility with respect to their
bequest to the next generation,W ft+∆t .
One crucial assumption here, however, is that fundamental investors can liquidate
their risky asset at the fundamental value PF,t ≡ Dtr−gD at t + ∆t.1 There are
multiple ways to justify this assumption. One possible situation is that at the
end of each period, fundamental investors can trade with mutual funds who target
on fundamental values of assets with a price of PF,t .
The excess return from holding the risky asset for fundamental investors is therefore
PF,t−Pt
Pt
+ 1l , where
1
l is the dividend to price ratio. Moreover, their trade counterparts
also suffer from exogenous liquidity shocks, ˜ ∼ N (1 − r + 1l , σ
2

Pt
).2 The liquidity
shock also affects the resale returns of the risky asset price—with a realized shock
of  t , holding risky asset only yields an excess return of
PF,t−Pt
Pt
+ 1l −  t .
The timeline for fundamental investors is as follows. At the beginning of period t,
fundamental investors receive bequest amount of W ft and observe the risky asset
price, Pt , as well as the fundamental value, PF,t . They select their risky asset position
to maximize:
U (W ft+∆t ) = −exp(−γhW ft+∆t ). (A.1)
1The fundamental value of the risky asset follows the Gordon growth formula.
2Such shocks can be motivated by liquidity constraints. Intuitively, the mean value of liquidity
shock is positively correlated with interest rate r: higher interest rate elevate the liquidity shock.
Also, the variance of  is inversely correlated to the price level of the risky asset, with higher risky
asset price associatedwith lower liquidity risk. At the same time, the liquidity shock is also negatively
related to the current price level, measured by the price to dividend ratio l.
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with budget constraint
W ft+∆t = W
f
t r + α
f
t W
f
t (1 +
Pt+∆t − Pt
Pt
+
1
l
−  t − r), (A.2)
where γh represents the risk aversion coefficient of fundamental investors and α ft
is the total risky asset demand of fundamental investors. The first order condition
gives the optimal portfolio choice:
α
f
t =
PF,t − Pt
γhσ
2
W
f
t
. (A.3)
Therefore, the per-capita total dollar demand of fundamental investors is
Qt ≡ α ft W ft =
PF,t − Pt
γhσ
2

≡ PF,t − Pt
k
, (A.4)
where k is a constant.
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A.2 Rational Benchmark Model
Following the standard Merton method, we have the optimal portfolio for the ex-
trapolators with fully correct beliefs:
αt =
g¯P,t + l−1 − r
σ¯2P,t
. (A.5)
Using Ito’s lemma on both sides of xt ≡ WtDt :
dxt = d(Wt/Dt ) =x(dWt/Wt − dDt/Dt + (dD/D)2 − (dW/W )(dD/D)) (A.6)
=x(r − ρ + αt (g¯P,t + l−1 − r) − gD + σ2D − αtσDσ¯P,t )dt
+x(αtσ¯P,t − σD)dωt
≡gxdt + σxdωt .
Combined with the geometric form of the dividend process and the logarithmic form
utility function, I conjecture that the underlying state of the economy is xt ≡ WtDt , the
wealth to dividend ratio. In other words, all equilibrium quantities can be expressed
as a function of xt . For example, the price to dividend can be denoted as l¯ (xt ) = PtDt .
For notational convenience, I denote the dynamics of xt as:
dxt = gx,t (xt )dt + σx,tdωt . (A.7)
Then I apply Ito’s lemma on both sides of l = P/D and get:
dl =lxdx +
1
2
lxxσ2xdt = (lxgx +
1
2
lxxσ2x)dt + lxσxdωt, (A.8)
and
d(Pt/Dt ) =dPt/Pt − dDt/Dt + (dDt/Dt )2 − (dDt/Dt )(dPt/dPt ) (A.9)
=l (g¯P,t − gD + σ2D − σDσ¯P,t )dt + l (σ¯P,t − σD)dωt .
By matching terms:
lxgx +
1
2
lxxσ2x = l (g¯P,t − gD + σ2D − σDσ¯P,t ), (A.10)
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and
lxσx = l (σ¯P,t − σD). (A.11)
Then by combining equation (A.6) and (A.10), I can solve for g¯P,t :
g¯P,t =
lxx(r − ρ − gD + σ2D) + lx (c0l − c1)(l−1 − r − σDσ¯P,t )
l − lx (c0l − c1) (A.12)
+
1
2
lxxσ2x + l (gD − σ2D + σDσ¯P,t )l − lx (c0l − c1).
Then I can get
gx = xt (r − ρ − gD + σ2D) + (c0l − c1)(g¯P,t + l−1 − r − σDσ¯P,t ) (A.13)
and solve for
σ¯P,t = σD +
lx
l
x(αtσ¯P,t − σD). (A.14)
With xtαt = c0l − c1, I have:
σ¯P,t = σD
1 − lxl xt
1 − lxl (c0l − c1)
, (A.15)
σx = (c0l − c1)σ¯P,t − xtσD .
Combined with the market clearing conditions and the Chebyshev polynomials (for
more details, see appendix A.3), I numerically solve this model.
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A.3 Behavioral Model
In the behavioral model, the time-varying investment set is driven by two state
variables: xt and St . Therefore, using the standard argument in Merton (1971), I
define the extrapolators’ value function as
J (Wt, St, xt ) ≡ max{Ct+s }s≥0 E
e
t [
∫ ∞
t
e−ρs lnCsds] (A.16)
For the logarithmic form utility function, I guess the corresponding value function
has the form
J (Wt, St, xt ) = 1/ρ ln(Wt ) + j (St, xt ), (A.17)
Under extrapolators’ subjective beliefs, after omitting the subscripts, the Hamilton-
Jacobian-Bellman (HJB) equation follows
ρJ (W, S, x) =ln(W ) + ρ j (S, x) (A.18)
=max
C,α
[
lnC + JWW [−C/Wdt + rdt + α[gˆP,t + l−1 − r]dt]
+ 1/2JWWα2W2σ2P,tdt + JSµSdt + 1/2JSSσ
2
Sdt
+ Jxgxdt + 1/2Jxxσ2xdt + JSxσSσxdt
]
,
where JWS and JWx all equal to zero and are omitted.
By the FOC w.r.t C, I have
1/Ct − JW = 0,
which implies
Ct = ρWt . (A.19)
Substitute equation (A.19) into the HJB equation (A.18), I have the following
optimization problem with respect to αt :
max
α
[
ln ρ + JWW [−ρdt + rdt + α(gˆP,t + l−1 − r)dt] + 1/2JWWα2W2σ2P,tdt
(A.20)
+ JSµSdt + 1/2JSSσ2Sdt + Jxgxdt + 1/2Jxxσ
2
xdt + JSxσSσxdt
]
.
Again, with the FOC w.r .t α
JWW (gˆP,t + l−1 − r) + JWWα2tW2σ2P,t = 0,
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and substitute JW = ρ/Wt and JWW = −ρ 1W2 , I get
αt =
gˆP,t + l−1 − r
σ2P,t
. (A.21)
The fundamental investors’ linear demand function, and the geometric Brownian
form of the dividend process and the logarithmic form of extrapolators’ utility
function, together indicate a linear relation between the equilibrium price Pt and
the dividend process Dt . For analytical convenience, I denote Wt as the aggregate
wealth and define xt ≡ WtDt and l (St, xt ) ≡
Pt
Dt
, which follows:
dxt =gx,t (St, xt )dt + σx,t (St, xt )dωt (A.22)
=gˆx,t (St, xt )dt + σx,t (St, xt )dωet .
With extrapolators’ optimal strategy, I can solve for the dynamics of xt as follows:
dxt =xt (r − ρ + αt[gˆP,t + l−1 − r] − gˆD,t + σ2D − αtσDσP,t )dt + xt (αtσP,t − σD)dωet ,
(A.23)
which yields
gˆx,t (St, xt ) =xt (r − ρ + αt[gˆP,t + l−1 − r] − gˆD,t + σ2D − αtσDσP,t ), (A.24)
σx,t (St, xt ) =xt (αtσP,t − σD).
To solve for gˆP,t and gˆD,t , I consider l (St, xt ) ≡ PtDt and apply Ito’s lemma on both
sides of it:
RHS = dl =lxdx + lSdS + 1/2lxx (dx)2 + 1/2lSS (dS)2 + lSx (dx)(dS) (A.25)
=(lx gˆx + lSµS + 1/2lxxσ2x + 1/2lSSσ2S + lSxσxσS)dt+
+(lxσx + lSσS)ωet ,
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and
LHS = d(
P
D
) =
P
D
[
dP
P
− dD
D
+ (
dP
P
)2 − (dP
P
)(
dD
D
)] (A.26)
=l
(
(gˆP,t − gˆD,t + σ2D − σDσP.t )dt+
+(σP,t − σD)ωet
)
.
By matching terms, I get
σP,t = σD + l−1(lxσx + lSσS), (A.27)
and
gˆP,t = gˆD,t − σ2D + σDσP.t + l−1(lx gˆx + lSµS + 1/2lxxσ2x + 1/2lSSσ2S + lSxσxσS).
(A.28)
Also, by the market clearing condition (1.20) in the main text, I have
µαtWt + (1 − µ)Q = Pt, (A.29)
µαt xt +
1 − µ
k (r − gD) =
1 − µ + k
k
l,
αt xt =
1 − µ + k
kµ
l − 1 − µ
µk (r − gD) ≡ c0l − c1,
Then I solve for σP,t . substitute (A.24) into (A.27), and use the market clearing
condition, I can get
σx = αt xσP,t − σDx = (c0l − c1)σP,t − xσD . (A.30)
Substitute the above equation and equation (1.10) into equation (A.27), I get a
function for σP:
(lx/l (c0l − c1) − 1)σ2P,t − (lx/l x − 1)σDσP,t + ls/lθ(µH − S)(S − µL) = 0,
(A.31)
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and we get the expression for σP
σP,t =
( lxl x − 1)σD −
√
( lxl x − 1)2σ2D − 4( lxl (c0l − c1) − 1) lSl θ(µH − S)(S − µL)
2( lxl (c0l − c1) − 1)
.
(A.32)
There are two roots to the equation (A.31) and by taking x → 0, I can easily exclude
one of them.
The PDE for function l (S, x) can be obtained by combining the market clearing
condition and extrapolators’ optimal trading strategy:
αt =
c0l − c1
x
=
gˆP,t + l−1 − r
σ2P,t
. (A.33)
Note that σP is a nonlinear function of l, lx and lS. To solve it, I apply Chebyshev
projection method described in the appendix.
Then further we can get expressions for gx . First, by combining the drift terms in
equation (A.26) and (A.25), I have
l (gˆP,t − gˆD,t + σ2D − σDσP,t ) = lx gˆx + lSµS + 1/2lxxσ2x + 1/2lSSσ2S + lSxσxσS,
(A.34)
and with the definition of gˆx in equation (A.24), I get
gˆD,t =
xlx/l (r − ρ + αt (gˆP,t + l−1 − r) + σ2D − σDσP,tαt ) + ls/lµS + 1/2 lxxl σ2x
xlx/l − 1
(A.35)
+
1/2 lssl σ
2
s +
lsx
l σSσx − (1 − θ)gD − θS − σ2D + σDσP,t
xlx/l − 1 ,
I can get the expression for the risky asset growth rate under the true probability
measure:
gP,t = gˆP,t + σP,t/σD (gD − gˆD,t ). (A.36)
Then gˆx becomes
gˆx = x(r − ρ + αt (gˆP,t + l−1 − r) − gˆD,t + σ2D − αtσDσP,t ). (A.37)
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For the boundary conditions, when xt → 0, fundamental investors dominate and
risky asset price is mainly driven by fundamental investors’ demand; by the market
clearing condition (1.20), I have
lim
xt→0
l =
c1
c0
, (A.38)
where c0 = k+1−µkµ and c1 =
1−µ
kµ(r−gD ) are both constant. Furthermore,
lim
x→0 lx = limx→0
l (S, x) − l (S, 0)
x
(A.39)
= lim
x→0
αx/c0 +
c1
c0
− c1c0
x
= lim
x→0
gˆP,t +
c0
c1
− r
σ2D
1
c0
≡ α(S, 0)
c0
.
For the case where xt → ∞, extrapolators dominate and in order to clear the
market, α goes to 0; otherwise the asset prices goes to infinity. This means that the
conditional excess returns perceived by extrapolators are zero, leading to
lim
x→∞ l = (r − gˆP,t )
−1. (A.40)
Chebyshev polynomial requires a domain of [−1, 1]. Therefore, the following trans-
formations maps S and x to new variables that lie between −1 and 1:
y =aS + b, (A.41)
a =
2
µH − µL , b = −
µH + µL
µH − µL ,
z =
x − ζ
x + ζ
,
where ζ is some constant. When S = µL,
y =
2µL
µH − µL −
µH + µL
µH − µL = −1; (A.42)
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when S = µH ,
y =
2µH
µH − µL −
µH + µL
µH − µL = 1; (A.43)
Similarly, when x = 0, z = −1 and when x = +∞, z = 1.
The following equalities prove to be useful:
x =
ζ z + ζ
1 − z , (A.44)
and
∂z
∂x
=
(1 − z)2
2ζ
. (A.45)
Further, I define l (S, x) = l ( y−ba ,
ζ (z+1)
1−z ) ≡ m(y, z). Then the corresponding deriva-
tives of m(y, z) follow
lx =
∂z
∂x
mz =
(1 − z)2
2ζ
mz, (A.46)
lS =
∂y
∂S
my = amy,
lxx =
(1 − z)3
(2ζ )2
[(1 − z)mzz − 2mz]
lSS =a2myy,
lSx =a
(1 − z)2
2ζ
myz .
Substitute all the terms into the PDE and its boundary conditions, I get
lim
z→−1 m(y, z) =
c1
c0
, (A.47)
lim
z→−1 mz (y, z) =
ζ
2
1
c0
α(S, 0) ≡ ζ
2c0
α0, (A.48)
lim
z→1 m(y, z) = (r − gˆP,t )
−1 =
1
r − (1 − θ)gD − θa (y − b)
, (A.49)
where α0 =
(1−θ)gD+ θa (y−b)+
c0
c1
−r
σ2D
and α0,y = θaσ2D
. I use Chebyshev polynomial to
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approximate it.
To be specific, I set m(y, z) as follows:
m(y, z) ≡c1
c0
+
ζ
2c0
(1 + z)α0 + (1 + z)2
∑
i+ j≤N
ai jTi (z)Tj (y) (A.50)
≡c1
c0
+
ζ
2c0
(1 + z)α0 + (1 + z)2v(y, z), (A.51)
where v(y, z) =
∑
i+ j≤N ai jTi (z)Tj (y). Here Ti (z) and Tj (y) are Chebyshev Polyno-
mial functions and ai, j are the coefficients to be determined. Moreover,
mz (y, z) =
ζ
2c0
α0 + 2(1 + z)v(y, z) + (1 + z)2vz (y, z), (A.52)
mzz (y, z) = 4(1 + z)vz (y, z) + 2v(y, z) + (1 + z)2vzz (y, z), (A.53)
my (y, z) =
ζ
2c0
(1 + z)α0,y + (1 + z)2vy (y, z), (A.54)
myy (y, z) = (1 + z)2vyy (y, z)(since wyy = 0), (A.55)
mzy (y, z) =
ζ
2c0
α0,y + 2(1 + z)vy (y, z) + (1 + z)2vzy (y, z), (A.56)
(A.57)
and boundary conditions (A.38) and (A.39) hold automatically. Here Ti (z) and
Tj (y) are Chebyshev polynomials evaluated at z and y respectively. Therefore, I
need to minimize
M∑
i j
β1i j
[c0m(xi, y j ) − c1
xi
− gˆP(xi, y j ) + m(xi, y j )
−1 − r
σ2P(xi, y j )
]2
(A.58)
+K
∑
j
β2j
[
m(y j, 1) − (r − gˆP,t )−1
]2
.
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A.4 Figures and Tables
Figure A.1: Gallup Investor Expectations and S&P 500 Index
In the sample period 1996:10 - 2011:11, I plot both investor expectation index in
Gallup survey and the S&P500 index. The blue solid line plots Gallup Index, defined
as the percentage difference between bullish investors and bearish investors. The red
dashed line plot the S&P500 index. The shaded areas represent NBER recessions.
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Figure A.2: Gallup Investor Expectations and Household Mutual Fund Flows
In the sample period 1996:10 - 2011:11, I plot both investor expectation index in
Gallup survey and the household flows from HNPO sector. The blue solid line plots
Gallup Index and red dashed line plots the household mutual fund flows. The shaded
areas represent NBER recessions.
fund household inflow vs Gallup survey.png
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Figure A.3: Predictive Power of Investor Sentiment: Intuition
This figure provides intuition for the positive predictive pattern of investor sentiment
when the wealth is low. When the wealth level is low, extrapolators have low market
impact and they are very unlikely to push asset prices away from the fundamental
values. In this situation, investor sentiment reflects market correction and therefore
positively predict future returns.
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Figure A.4: Calibrated Model Solutions: Rational Benchmark.
This figure plots the price to dividend ratio l, the optimal portfolio αt , and the return
volatility σP as functions of both the latent state variable St and the transformed
wealth to dividend ratio zt in the rational benchmark model. As zt goes to -1 (1),
the wealth to dividend ratio WtDt goes to zero (infinity). The parameter values are
r = 4%, gD = 1.5%, ρ = 2%, k = 0.5, µ = 0.5, µH = 3%, µL = −9%, χ = 0.15,
λ = 0.15.
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Figure A.5: Calibrated Model Solutions: Behavioral Model.
This figure plots the price to dividend ratio l, the optimal portfolio αt , and the return
volatility σP as functions of both the latent state variable St and the transformed
wealth to dividend ratio zt in the behavioral model. As zt goes to -1 (1), the wealth
to dividend ratio WtDt goes to zero (infinity). The parameter values are r = 4%,
gD = 1.5%, ρ = 2%, k = 0.5, µ = 0.5, µH = 3%, µL = −9%, χ = 0.15, λ = 0.15.
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Figure A.6: Gallup Survey and Simulated Investor Sentiment.
In the sample period 1996:10 - 2011:11, I plot both investor expectation index in
Gallup survey and investor sentiment based on model simulations. The blue solid
line plots Gallup Index and red dashed line plots the investor sentiment based on
model simulations. The shaded areas represent NBER recessions. The parameter
values are r = 4%, gD = 1.5%, µH = 0.03%, µL = −0.06%, χ = λ = 10%,
θ = 0.5%, ρ = 2%, k = 0.5, µ = 0.5, µH = 3%, µL = −3%.
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Figure A.7: Interaction between Wealth and Investor Sentiment vs Degree of Ex-
trapolation.
This figure plots Interaction between wealth and investor sentiment (upper panel)
vs degree of extrapolation (lower panel). The lower panel is based on Cassella
and Gulen (2015). The parameter values are r = 4%, gD = 1.5%, µH = 0.03%,
µL = −0.06%, χ = λ = 10%, θ = 0.5%, ρ = 2%, k = 0.5, µ = 0.5, µH = 3%,
µL = −3%.
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Figure A.8: Perceived Sharpe Ratio and True Sharpe Ratio.
This figure plots the true Sharpe ratio (red dashed line) and perceived Sharpe Ratio
(blue solid line) based on model simulation. The parameter values are r = 4%,
gD = 1.5%, µH = 0.03%, µL = −0.06%, χ = λ = 10%, θ = 0.5%, ρ = 2%,
k = 0.5, µ = 0.5, µH = 3%, µL = −3%.
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Table A.1: Summary Statistics
This table reports the summary statistics and correlation matrix between key vari-
ables. Panel A reports the general information for the Gallup surveymeasurement of
investor sentiment, excess returns over next twelve months, wealth to dividend ratio
for the HNPO sector, and the Psentiment variable. Panel B reports the correlation
matrix for these key variables.
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Gallup Measurement of Investor Sentiment 182 0.107 0.011 0.077 0.124
Excess Return (next 12-months) 912 0.086 0.174 −0.471 0.611
Wealth to dividend ratio 183 0.984 0.599 0.137 2.137
Psentiment 492 0.023 0.011 −0.024 0.047
Panel A: General information
Gallup_rescaled CRSPex12 WD Psentiment
Gallup Measurement of Investor Sentiment 1.00 -0.02 -0.32 0.75
Excess Return (next 12-months) -0.02 1.00 0.03 -0.12
Wealth to dividend ratio -0.32 0.03 1.00 -0.28
Psentiment 0.75 -0.12 -0.28 1.00
Panel B: Correlation matrix for the key variables
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Table A.2: Forecast Revision of Investor Sentiment
This table reports the results from the following predictive regression of N-months
ahead sentiment revision based on current sentiment level:
SRt+1[Sentt+N − Sentt+1] = c + dSentt + ut, (A.59)
where on the left hand side SRt+1[Sentt+N−Sentt+1]measures the changes in investor
sentiment over future N horizons, Sentt represents the investor sentiment at time t
and ut on the right hand side is the corresponding residual at time t. Panel A reports
the regression results based on the Gallup survey. Panel B reports the regression
results based on the Psentiment. All standard errors in parenthesis are based on the
Newey-West correction (Newey and West (1986)).
Panel A: Forecast Revision of Investor Sentiment: Gallup
Dependent variable:
1 Quarter 2 Quarters 4 Quarters 6 Quarters
Constant 0.015∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.011) (0.015) (0.015)
Gallup −0.142∗∗∗ −0.313∗∗∗ −0.624∗∗∗ −0.774∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.099) (0.142) (0.149)
Observations 179 176 170 164
R2 0.062 0.132 0.284 0.359
Adjusted R2 0.057 0.127 0.279 0.355
Panel B: Forecast Revision of Investor Sentiment: Psentiment
Dependent variable:
1 Quarter 2 Quarters 4 Quarters 6 Quarters
Constant 0.001∗∗ 0.004∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Psentiment −0.064∗∗ −0.158∗∗∗ −0.329∗∗∗ −0.477∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.053) (0.084) (0.086)
Observations 489 486 480 474
R2 0.031 0.080 0.162 0.235
Adjusted R2 0.029 0.078 0.160 0.233
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table A.3: Predictive Regressions on Future Returns
This table reports the results from the following predictive regression:
Ret+N = a0 + a1Sentt +  t, (A.60)
where Ret+N represents the excess return of CRSP value-weighted index over the next
N-month, Sentt represents quantitative investor sentiment variable measured by Gallup
survey. Results for future 1 to 6 quarters are reported in the column 1 to 4. Panel A reports
the predictive regression results based on the investor sentiment in Gallup survey. All
standard errors in parentheses are adjusted using Newey-West correction. The sample spans
from 1996:10 to 2011:11.
Dependent variable:
1 Quarter 2 Quarters 4 Quarters 6 Quarters
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant −0.079 −0.054 0.090 0.372
(0.134) (0.255) (0.409) (0.450)
Gallup 0.850 0.730 −0.400 −2.819
(1.201) (2.292) (3.711) (4.230)
Observations 182 182 182 182
R2 0.011 0.004 0.0005 0.015
Adjusted R2 0.005 -0.002 -0.005 0.010
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table A.4: Conditional Predictive Regressions on Future Returns
This table reports the results from the following predictive regression:
Ret+N = a + bSentt + cWt/Dt + dSentt ×Wt/Dt +  t, (A.61)
where Ret+N represents the excess return of CRSP value-weighted index over the next
N-month, Sentt represents investor sentiment variable, Wt represents the total financial
asset value of the HNPO sector. Results based on future returns of 1 to 6 quarters are
reported in the column 1 to 4. Panel A reports the predictive regression results based on
the investor sentiment in Gallup survey. Panel B reports the predictive regression results
based on Psentiment. All standard errors in parentheses are adjusted using Newey-West
correction. The sample spans from 1996:10 to 2011:11.
Panel A: Predictive Regression based on Gallup
Dependent variable:
1 Quarter 2 Quarters 4 Quarters 6 Quarters
Gallup 11.200∗∗∗ 23.683∗∗∗ 29.549∗∗ 50.552∗∗
(3.787) (8.977) (14.805) (20.127)
Wt/Dt 0.741∗∗∗ 1.638∗∗ 2.081∗∗ 3.729∗∗∗
(0.265) (0.716) (0.996) (1.410)
Gallup ×Wt/Dt −7.180∗∗∗ −15.916∗∗ −20.573∗∗ −35.970∗∗∗
(2.474) (6.738) (8.892) (13.543)
Constant −1.150∗∗∗ −2.420∗∗ −2.942∗ −5.183∗∗
(0.430) (0.973) (1.685) (2.125)
Observations 60 60 60 60
R2 0.042 0.087 0.088 0.143
Adjusted R2 -0.009 0.038 0.039 0.097
Panel B: Predictive Regression based on Psentiment
Dependent variable:
1 Quarter 2 Quarters 4 Quarters 6 Quarters
Psentiment 20.384∗∗∗ 37.181∗∗∗ 54.921∗∗∗ 84.599∗∗∗
(3.067) (5.329) (16.467) (21.284)
Wt/Dt 0.023∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.010) (0.021) (0.027)
Psentiment× −1.496∗∗∗ −2.776∗∗∗ −4.161∗∗∗ −6.398∗∗∗
Wt/Dt (0.208) (0.350) (1.159) (1.546)
Constant −0.323∗∗∗ −0.546∗∗∗ −0.753∗∗ −1.291∗∗∗
(0.090) (0.162) (0.340) (0.421)
Observations 60 60 60 60
R2 0.179 0.307 0.367 0.524
Adjusted R2 0.135 0.270 0.333 0.499
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table A.5: Conditional Predictive Regressions on Future Returns (with Controls)
This table reports the results from the following predictive regression:
Ret+N = a + bSentt + cWt/Dt + dSentt ×Wt/Dt + Xt +  t, (A.62)
where Ret+N represents the excess return of CRSP value-weighted index over the next
N-month, Sentt represents Gallup survey measurement of investor sentiment,Wt represents
the total financial asset value of the HNPO sector. Results for future 1 to 6 quarters
are reported in the column 1 to 4. Xt represent the commonly used forecasters for the
aggregate future market returns, cay. All standard errors in parentheses are adjusted using
Newey-West correction. The sample spans from 1996:10 to 2011:11.
Dependent variable:
1 Quarter 2 Quarters 4 Quarters 6 Quarters
Gallup 15.277∗∗ 30.900∗∗∗ 40.223∗∗∗ 66.621∗∗∗
(6.108) (9.780) (14.455) (10.360)
Wt/Dt 0.077∗∗ 0.164∗∗ 0.195∗ 0.363∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.070) (0.113) (0.064)
Gallup ×Wt/Dt −0.799∗∗ −1.673∗∗ −2.008∗ −3.633∗∗∗
(0.319) (0.678) (1.081) (0.623)
CAPE −0.007∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗∗ −0.023∗∗∗ −0.033∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
cay 0.194 1.191 4.062∗ 4.613
(0.604) (1.033) (2.398) (3.102)
Constant −1.312∗∗ −2.694∗∗∗ −3.314∗∗ −5.764∗∗∗
(0.596) (0.987) (1.543) (1.041)
Observations 60 60 60 60
R2 0.162 0.317 0.493 0.625
Adjusted R2 0.085 0.254 0.446 0.590
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table A.6: Parameter Values
Parameter Variable Value
Asset parameter:
Expected dividend growth gD 1.5%
Standard deviation of dividend growth σD 10%
Correlation between dD and dC ρ 0.2
Risk-free rate r 4%
Utility parameter:
Subjective discount factor δ 0.02
Belief parameter:
Degree of extrapolation θ 0.5
Transition intensity from H to L χ 0.10
Transition intensity from L to H λ 0.10
Return in state H µH 0.03
Return in state L µL -0.06
Other parameter:
Demand parameter for fundamental investors k 0.5
Population fraction µ 0.5
135
Table A.7: Simulated Extrapolative Expectations: Behavioral Models
This table reports the results from the following regression focusing on the determinants of
investor sentiment, based on the simulations of the behavioral model:
Ee[Rt+12]t = a0 + a1Xt +  t, (A.63)
where E[Rt+12]t represents the perceived expected returns at time t, Xt represents either
past accumulative 12-month returns (R12) or the current log price to dividend ratio (logPD).
Results in column 1 to 2 are based on the perceived expectations of returns with dividend
yield. Results in column 1 to 2 are based on the perceived expectations of returns without
dividend yield. All standard errors in parentheses are corrected based on the Newey-west
approach.
Dependent variable:
Expectations with dividend yield Expectations without dividend yield
(1) (2) (3) (4)
R12 0.023∗∗ 0.011∗∗
(0.011) (0.006)
logPD 0.100∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.003)
Constant −0.050∗∗∗ −0.328∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗ −0.160∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.014) (0.006) (0.007)
Observations 239 239 239 239
R2 0.235 0.914 0.221 0.907
Adjusted R2 0.232 0.914 0.218 0.907
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table A.8: Memory Structure of Investor Expectations: Behavioral Models
The table reports the memory decay parameter ψ, the intercept a, the regression
coefficient b, and the adjusted R-squared, for running the non-linear least squares
regression
Expectationt = a + b
∑n
j=1
w jRD(t− j∆t)→(t−( j−1)∆t) + εt,
over a sample of 15 years or 50 years, where w j = e−ψ( j−1)∆t/Σnl=1e
−ψ(l−1)∆t . Here
∆t = 1/12 and n = 600.
Eet [RDt+dt]
φ 0.510 0.521
a 0.064 0.064
b 1.15 1.18
R2 0.78 0.78
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Table A.9: Forecast Revision of Investor Sentiment: Simulated Results Based on
Behavioral Model
This table reports the results from the following predictive regression based on the
simulated series from the behavioral model:
SRt+1[Sentt+N − Sentt+1] = c + dSentt + ut, (A.64)
where on the left-hand side SRt+1[Sentt+N−Sentt+1]measures the changes in investor
sentiment over future N horizons, Sentt represents the investor sentiment at time t
and ut on the right hand side is the corresponding residual at time t. Panel A reports
the regression results based on the Gallup survey. Panel B reports the regression
results based on the Psentiment. All standard errors in parentheses are again based
on the Newey-West correction.
Panel A: Forecast Revision of Investor Sentiment: with Dividend Yield
Dependent variable:
1 Quarter 2 Quarters 4 Quarters 6 Quarters
Constant 0.001 0.005∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.003) (0.006) (0.009)
Sent −0.021 −0.090∗ −0.332∗∗∗ −0.666∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.051) (0.108) (0.164)
Observations 236 233 227 221
R2 0.015 0.052 0.173 0.335
Adjusted R2 0.011 0.048 0.170 0.332
Panel B: Forecast Revision of Investor Sentiment: without Dividend Yield
Dependent variable:
1 Quarter 2 Quarters 4 Quarters 6 Quarters
Constant 0.0001 0.0004∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.001)
Sent −0.022 −0.080∗∗ −0.253∗∗∗ −0.468∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.034) (0.061) (0.083)
Observations 896 893 887 881
R2 0.017 0.048 0.137 0.242
Adjusted R2 0.016 0.047 0.136 0.242
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table A.10: Model-simulated Conditional Predictive Regressions on Future Re-
turns: Behavioral Models
This table reports the results from the following predictive regression:
Ret+N = a + bSentt + cWt/Dt + dSentt ×Wt/Dt +  t, (A.65)
where Ret+N represents the excess return of CRSP value-weighted index over the next
N-month, Sentt represents investor sentiment variable, Wt/Dt represents the wealth to
dividend ratio in the model. Results for future 1 to 6 quarters are reported in the column 1
to 4. All standard errors in parentheses are adjusted using Newey-West correction.
Dependent variable:
1 Quarter 2 Quarters 4 Quarters 6 Quarters
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 0.979∗∗∗ 0.955∗∗∗ 0.908∗∗∗ 0.870∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.047) (0.111) (0.177)
Sentt 6.714∗∗∗ 13.330∗∗ 24.550∗∗ 32.641
(2.201) (5.184) (12.465) (20.182)
Wt/Dt 0.019 0.043 0.101 0.165
(0.012) (0.029) (0.067) (0.104)
Sentt ×Wt/Dt −3.068∗∗ −6.638∗∗ −14.146∗∗ −21.679∗∗
(1.194) (2.749) (6.275) (9.789)
Observations 239 239 239 239
R2 0.420 0.496 0.624 0.713
Adjusted R2 0.413 0.489 0.619 0.709
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table A.11: Conditional Predictive Power of Investor Sentiment.
This table reports the conditional predictive power of investor sentiment St , a1 + a3Wt/Dt ,
from the following predictive regression:
Ret+12 = a + bSentt + cWt/Dt + dSentt ×Wt/Dt +  t, (A.66)
where Ret+N represents the excess return of CRSP value-weighted index over the next
N-month, Sentt represents investor sentiment in Gallup survey, Wt represents the total
financial asset value of the HNPO sector. The sample spans from 1996:10 to 2011:11.
Investor
Sentiment
Wealth
Level
Conditional
coefficient t-statistics
p-value
bt =
[b + d ×Wt/Dt ]
Gallup
2 -0.162 -2.660 0.010
0 0.098 1.428 0.159
-2 0.359 2.034 0.047
Psentiment
2 -0.267 -3.915 0.000
0 0.106 2.108 0.039
-2 0.479 3.020 0.004
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Table A.12: Conditional Predictive Power of Investor Sentiment: Simulations based
on the Behavioral Models.
This table reports the conditional predictive power of investor sentiment St , a1 + a3Wt/Dt ,
from the following predictive regression:
Ret+12 = a + bSentt + cWt/Dt + dSentt ×Wt/Dt +  t, (A.67)
where Re
t+12 represents the excess return of CRSP value-weighted index over the next
12-month, Sentt represents investor sentiment, Wt/Dt represents the wealth to dividend
ratio in the model.
Investor
Sentiment
Wealth
Level
Conditional
coefficient t-statistics
p-value
bt =
[b + d ×Wt/Dt ]
Behavioral
Model
2 -0.025 -3.421 0.000
0 -0.000 -0.034 0.973
-2 0.025 2.885 0.004
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Table A.13: Leverage Ratio and Future Consumption Growth: Behavioral Models
This table reports the predictive power of leverage ratio on future consumption growth rate
based on behavioral models.
Consumption Growtht+N = a0 + a1αt +  t, (A.68)
where αt represents the leverage ratio of extrapolators, and all standard errors in parentheses
are adjusted using Newey-West correction.
Dependent variable:
1 Quarter 2 Quarters 4 Quarters 6 Quarters
(1) (2) (3) (4)
αt −0.010∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗ −0.041∗∗∗ −0.045∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.005) (0.010) (0.013)
Constant 0.001∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Observations 896 893 887 881
R2 0.014 0.020 0.021 0.013
Adjusted R2 0.013 0.019 0.020 0.012
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table A.14: Simulated Extrapolative Expectations: Rational Benchmark Models
This table reports the results from the following regression focusing on the determinants of
investor sentiment, based on the simulations of the rational benchmark model:
E[Rt+12]t = a0 + a1Xt +  t, (A.69)
where E[Rt+12]t represents the perceived expected returns at time t, Xt represents either the
past accumulative 12-month returns (R12) or the current log price to dividend ratio (logPD).
Results in column 1 to 2 are based on the perceived expectations of returns without dividend
yield. Results in column 1 to 2 are based on the perceived expectations of returns with div-
idend yield. All standard errors in parentheses are corrected based on Newey-west approach.
Dependent variable:
Expectations without dividend yield Expectations with dividend yield
(1) (2) (3) (4)
R12 −0.00003 −0.001
(0.0002) (0.002)
logPD −0.006∗∗∗ −0.049∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.0005)
Constant 0.018∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Observations 239 239 239 239
R2 0.0003 0.913 0.016 0.999
Adjusted R2 -0.004 0.912 0.012 0.999
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table A.15: Model-simulated Conditional Predictive Regressions on Future Re-
turns: Rational Benchmark Models
This table reports the results from the following predictive regression of N-months ahead
returns based on simulations of the rational benchmark model:
Ret+N = a + bSentt + cWt/Dt + dSentt ×Wt/Dt +  t, (A.70)
where Ret+N represents the excess return over the next N-month, Sentt represents investor
sentiment variable,Wt/Dt represents the wealth to dividend ratio in the model. Results for
future 1 to 6 quarters are reported in the column 1 to 4. All standard errors in parentheses
are adjusted using Newey-West correction.
Dependent variable:
1 Quarter 2 Quarters 4 Quarters 6 Quarters
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 1.245∗∗∗ 1.561∗∗∗ 2.307∗∗ 3.205∗∗
(0.163) (0.392) (0.954) (1.630)
Sentt −8.969 −20.669 −48.522 −82.221
(6.303) (15.138) (36.854) (62.965)
Wt/Dt −0.017∗∗ −0.039∗∗ −0.091∗∗ −0.154∗
(0.008) (0.019) (0.046) (0.079)
Sentt ×Wt/Dt 0.660∗∗ 1.520∗∗ 3.596∗∗ 6.079∗∗
(0.307) (0.726) (1.744) (2.994)
Observations 239 239 239 239
R2 0.047 0.071 0.125 0.176
Adjusted R2 0.035 0.060 0.114 0.165
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
144
Table A.16: Leverage Ratio and Future Consumption Growth: Rational Models
This table reports the predictive power of leverage ratio on future consumption growth rate
based on rational models.
Consumption Growtht+N = a0 + a1αt +  t, (A.71)
where αt represents leverage ratio of extrapolators, and all standard errors in parentheses
are adjusted using Newey-West correction.
Dependent variable:
WD_growth1 WD_growth2 WD_growth3 WD_growth4
1 Quarter 2 Quarters 4 Quarters 6 Quarters
(1) (2) (3) (4)
αt 3.003∗∗∗ 4.500∗∗∗ 6.081∗∗∗ 7.014∗∗∗
(0.139) (0.274) (0.532) (0.773)
Constant 0.003∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.001)
Observations 896 893 887 881
R2 0.341 0.232 0.129 0.086
Adjusted R2 0.341 0.231 0.128 0.085
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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A.5 Alternative Regressions
In this appendix, I replace Wt/Dt with Wt/Pt to measure the relative impact of
extrapolators on the stock market. Results remain robust.
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Table A.17: Conditional Predictive Regressions on Future Returns
This table reports the results from the following predictive regression of N-months ahead
returns from CRSP value-weighted index:
Ret+N = a + bSentt + cWt/Pt + dSentt ×Wt/Pt +  t, (A.72)
where Ret+N represents the excess return over the next N-month, Sentt represents investor
sentiment variable, Wt represents the total financial asset value of the HNPO sector. Pt
measures the price level. Wt/Pt measures the relative share held by the extrapolators.
Results for future 1 to 6 quarters are reported in the column 1 to 4. Panel A reports
the predictive regression results based on the investor sentiment in Gallup survey. Panel
B reports the predictive regression results based on Psentiment. All standard errors in
parentheses are adjusted using Newey-West correction. The sample spans from 1996:10 to
2011:11.
Panel A: Predictive Regression based on Gallup
Dependent variable:
1 Quarter 2 Quarters 4 Quarters 6 Quarters
Gallup 6.910∗∗ 16.227∗∗ 25.851∗∗ 28.236∗∗
(3.363) (7.944) (12.621) (13.194)
Wt/Pt 9.168∗∗∗ 23.852∗∗∗ 39.029∗∗∗ 45.375∗∗∗
(3.267) (8.536) (14.089) (15.823)
Gallup ×Wt/Pt −76.408∗∗∗ −204.113∗∗∗ −332.067∗∗∗ −382.004∗∗
(28.250) (75.413) (128.641) (152.968)
Constant −0.801∗∗ −1.865∗∗ −2.984∗∗ −3.287∗∗
(0.395) (0.909) (1.407) (1.415)
Observations 60 60 60 60
R2 0.062 0.147 0.200 0.201
Adjusted R2 0.012 0.101 0.158 0.159
Panel B: Predictive Regression based on Psentiment
Dependent variable:
1 Quarter 2 Quarters 4 Quarters 6 Quarters
Psentiment 1.753 4.201∗ 5.301 3.497
(1.242) (2.416) (4.313) (5.860)
Wt/Pt 1.010∗∗∗ 2.344∗∗∗ 3.740∗∗∗ 4.121∗∗∗
(0.350) (0.563) (0.949) (1.182)
Psentiment ×Wt/Pt −29.961∗ −74.290∗∗ −92.760 −63.356
(17.928) (35.020) (59.738) (82.405)
Constant −0.044 −0.103∗∗ −0.144 −0.113
(0.029) (0.052) (0.089) (0.109)
Observations 159 159 159 158
R2 0.025 0.061 0.079 0.080
Adjusted R2 0.006 0.043 0.062 0.062
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table A.18: Conditional Predictive Regressions on Future Returns (With Controls)
This table reports the results from the following predictive regression of N-months ahead
returns from CRSP value-weighted index:
Ret+N = a + bSentt + cWt/Pt + dSentt ×Wt/Pt + Xt +  t, (A.73)
where Ret+N represents the excess return over the next N-month, Sentt represents Gallup
survey measurement of investor sentiment, Wt represents the total financial asset value of
the HNPO sector. Pt measures the price level. Wt/Pt measures the relative share held by
the extrapolators. Results for future 1 to 6 quarters are reported in the column 1 to 4. Xt
represents the commonly used forecasters for the aggregate future market returns, cay. All
standard errors in parentheses are adjusted using Newey-West correction. The sample spans
from 1996:10 to 2011:11.
Dependent variable:
1 Quarter 2 Quarters 4 Quarters 6 Quarters
Gallup 8.563∗∗∗ 19.265∗∗∗ 31.521∗∗∗ 37.765∗∗∗
(2.684) (5.227) (5.116) (4.812)
Wt/Pt 8.301∗∗∗ 21.442∗∗∗ 33.901∗∗∗ 39.911∗∗∗
(3.035) (5.749) (4.725) (6.872)
Gallup ×Wt/Pt −77.873∗∗∗ −198.279∗∗∗ −314.599∗∗∗ −385.603∗∗∗
(28.883) (50.089) (33.191) (74.938)
CAPE −0.006∗∗∗ −0.011∗∗∗ −0.021∗∗∗ −0.033∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.008)
cay 1.172∗ 2.919∗∗ 6.039∗∗∗ 7.191∗∗∗
(0.609) (1.161) (1.809) (2.336)
Constant −0.758∗∗ −1.774∗∗∗ −2.803∗∗∗ −3.032∗∗∗
(0.310) (0.648) (0.767) (0.635)
Observations 60 60 60 60
R2 0.141 0.319 0.536 0.605
Adjusted R2 0.062 0.256 0.493 0.569
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table A.19: Model-simulated Conditional Predictive Regressions on Future Re-
turns: Behavioral Models
This table reports the results from the following predictive regression of N-months ahead
returns based on model simulations:
Ret+N = a + bSentt + cWt/Pt + dSentt ×Wt/Pt +  t, (A.74)
where Ret+N represents the excess return over the next N-month, Sentt represents investor
sentiment variable, Wt represents the total financial asset value of the HNPO sector. Pt
measures the price level. Wt/Pt measures the relative share held by the extrapolators.
Results for future 1 to 6 quarters are reported in the column 1 to 4. All standard errors in
parentheses are adjusted using Newey-West correction.
Dependent variable:
1 Quarter 2 Quarters 4 Quarters 6 Quarters
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sentt 6.710∗∗∗ 13.400∗∗∗ 24.754∗∗ 32.892
(2.202) (5.154) (12.390) (20.120)
Wt/Pt 0.371 0.864 2.037 3.352
(0.249) (0.584) (1.352) (2.105)
Sentt ×Wt/Pt −62.920∗∗∗ −136.792∗∗ −291.685∗∗ −445.884∗∗
(24.376) (55.709) (127.197) (198.796)
Constant 0.980∗∗∗ 0.956∗∗∗ 0.909∗∗∗ 0.872∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.046) (0.111) (0.177)
Observations 239 239 239 239
R2 0.065 0.075 0.121 0.203
Adjusted R2 0.053 0.064 0.109 0.193
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table A.20: Conditional Predictive Power of Investor Sentiment.
This table reports the conditional predictive power of investor sentiment St , a1 + a3Wt/Dt ,
from the following predictive regression of N-months ahead returns from CRSP value-
weighted index:
Ret+12 = a + bSentt + cWt/Dt + dSentt ×Wt/Dt +  t, (A.75)
where Re
t+12 represents the excess return over the next twelve months, Sentt represents
investor sentiment in Gallup survey, Wt represents the total financial asset value of the
HNPO sector. Pt measures the price level. Wt/Pt measures the relative share held by the
extrapolators. The sample spans from 1996:10 to 2011:11.
Investor
Sentiment
Wealth
Level
Conditional
coefficient t-statistics
p-value
bt =
[b + d ×Wt/Pt ]
Gallup
2 -0.054 -2.179 0.034
0 0.100 1.461 0.149
-2 0.255 2.018 0.048
Psentiment
2 -0.039 -1.717 0.091
0 0.008 0.421 0.676
-2 0.055 1.201 0.235
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Table A.21: Conditional Predictive Power of Investor Sentiment: Simulations based
on the Behavioral Models.
This table reports the conditional predictive power of investor sentiment St , a1 + a3Wt/Pt ,
from the following predictive regression of N-months ahead returns from CRSP value-
weighted index:
Ret+12 = a + bSentt + cWt/Pt + dSentt ×Wt/Pt +  t, (A.76)
where Re
t+12 represents the excess return over the next twelve months, Sentt represents
investor sentiment, Wt represents the total financial asset value of the HNPO sector. Pt
measures the price level. Wt/Pt measures the relative share held by the extrapolators.
Investor
Sentiment
Wealth
Level
Conditional
coefficient t-statistics
p-value
bt =
[b + d ×Wt/Pt ]
Behavioral
Model
2 -0.065 -2.384 0.021
0 -0.001 -0.067 0.947
-2 0.064 1.797 0.078
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A p p e n d i x B
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER TWO
B.1 Derivation of the Differential Equations
For the subjective Euler equation (2.4), setting R˜ j,t+dt , the return on the tradeable
asset, to the gross return on the stock market, the equation becomes
Eet
e−δ(1−γ)dt/(1−ψ)
(
C˜t+dt
Ct
)−ψ(1−γ)/(1−ψ)*,
P˜Ct+dt + C˜tdt
PCt
+-
(ψ−γ)/(1−ψ) P˜Dt+dt + D˜t+dtdt
PDt
 = 1.
(B.1)
Using Taylor expansion, (B.1) becomes
Eet
[
e−δ(1−γ)dt/(1−ψ)
(
C˜t+dt
)−ψ(1−γ)/(1−ψ)
(P˜Ct+dt )
(ψ−γ)/(1−ψ) P˜Dt+dt
(
1 + ψ−γ1−ψ
C˜t+dt
P˜C
t+dt
dt + D˜t+dt
P˜D
t+dt
dt
)]
= C−ψ(1−γ)/(1−ψ)t (PCt )(ψ−γ)/(1−ψ)PDt .
(B.2)
Rearranging terms gives
0 = Eet

d(ΘC (ψ−γ)/(1−ψ)l (ψ−γ)/(1−ψ)D f ) + ψ−γ1−ψΘC
(ψ−γ)/(1−ψ)l (2ψ−γ−1)/(1−ψ)D f dt
+ΘC (ψ−γ)/(1−ψ)l (ψ−γ)/(1−ψ)Ddt

,
(B.3)
where Θ(C, t) ≡ e−δ(1−γ)t/(1−ψ)C−ψ(1−γ)/(1−ψ). By Ito’s lemma, (B.3) leads to
0 = Eet

− δ(1−γ)1−ψ dt − γ(dC/C) + (dD/D) + (df / f ) + ψ−γ1−ψ (dl/l) + γ(γ+1)2 (dC/C)2
+12
ψ−γ
1−ψ
2ψ−γ−1
1−ψ (dl/l)
2 − γ(ψ−γ)1−ψ (dC/C)(dl/l) − γ(dC/C)(dD/D) − γ(dC/C)(df / f )
+
ψ−γ
1−ψ (dl/l)(dD/D) +
ψ−γ
1−ψ (dl/l)(df / f ) + (df / f )(dD/D) +
ψ−γ
1−ψ l
−1dt + f −1dt

.
(B.4)
Using (2.7), (2.10), and (2.14) to further simplify (B.4) gives (2.16).
Setting R˜ j,t+dt in (2.4) to the gross return on the Lucas tree, the subjective Euler
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equation (2.4) becomes
Eet
e−δ(1−γ)dt/(1−ψ)
(
C˜t+dt
Ct
)−ψ(1−γ)/(1−ψ)*,
P˜Ct+dt + C˜tdt
PCt
+-
(1−γ)/(1−ψ) = 1. (B.5)
Rearranging terms yields
0 = Eet
[
d(ΘC (1−γ)/(1−ψ)l (1−γ)/(1−ψ)) + 1−γ1−ψΘC
(1−γ)/(1−ψ)l (ψ−γ)/(1−ψ)dt
]
. (B.6)
By Ito’s lemma, (B.6) leads to
0 = Eet

− 1−γ1−ψ δdt − (γ − 1)(dC/C) + γ(γ−1)2 (dC/C)2 + 1−γ1−ψ (dl/l)
+12
1−γ
1−ψ
ψ−γ
1−ψ (dl/l)
2 +
(1−γ)2
1−ψ (dC/C)(dl/l) +
1−γ
1−ψ l
−1dt

. (B.7)
Using (2.7) and (2.14) to further simplify (B.7) gives (2.17). 
Steady-State Distribution for Sentiment
Below we provide all the terms necessary for solving the Kolmogorov forward
equation (2.25). From the expression of σS in (2.7)
σ′S =
θσDP (µH + µL − 2S) − θ(µH − S)(S − µL)(σDP )′
(σDP )
2 ,
σ′′S =
θ(µH − S)(S − µL){2[(σDP )′]
2 − σDP (σDP )′′}
(σDP )
3 − 2θ
σDP (σ
D
P )
′(µH + µL − 2S) + (σDP )
2
(σDP )
3 .
(B.8)
For the expression of µeS in (2.7) and the expression of g
e
D in (2.11)
(µeS)
′ = − (λ + χ),
(geD)
′ = θ − σD (σDP )′ − µ′S ( f ′/ f ) − µS[ f ′′/ f − ( f ′)2/ f 2]
− σSσ′S ( f ′′/ f ) − 12σ2S[ f ′′′/ f − f ′ f ′′/ f 2],
(B.9)
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where σDP is from (2.11), and (σ
D
P )
′ and (σDP )
′′ are
(σDP )
′ =
θ(µH + µL − 2S)( f ′/ f ) + θ(µH − S)(S − µL)[ f ′′/ f − ( f ′)2/ f 2]√
σ2D + 4θ(µH − S)(S − µL)( f ′/ f )
,
(σDP )
′′ = − 2{θ(µH + µL − 2S)( f
′/ f ) + θ(µH − S)(S − µL)[ f ′′/ f − ( f ′)2/ f 2]}2
[σ2D + 4θ(µH − S)(S − µL)( f ′/ f )]
3/2
+
−2θ f ′/ f + 2θ(µH + µL − 2S)[ f ′′/ f − ( f ′)2/ f 2]√
σ2D + 4θ(µH − S)(S − µL)( f ′/ f )
+
θ(µH − S)(S − µL)[ f ′′′/ f − 3( f ′ f ′′)/ f 2 + 2( f ′)3/ f 3]√
σ2D + 4θ(µH − S)(S − µL)( f ′/ f )
.
(B.10)

B.2 Numerical Procedure for Solving the Equilibrium
We use a projection method with Chebyshev polynomials to jointly solve the two
differential equations (2.16) and (2.17). The value of the sentiment variable S
ranges from µL to µH , whereas the domain for Chebyshev polynomials is [–1, 1].
Therefore, we transform S to a new state variable z
z ≡ aS + b, where a = 2
µH − µL , b = −
µH + µL
µH − µL , (B.11)
and we define h(z) ≡ f (S(z)) and j (z) ≡ l (S(z)). Equations (2.16) and (2.17) can
be rewritten as
0 =

− (1−γ)1−ψ δ − γgeC + geD + [(h′/h) + ψ−γ1−ψ ( j′/ j)]aµeS + 12 [(h′′/h) + ψ−γ1−ψ ( j′′/ j)]a2σ2S
+
γ(γ+1)
2 σ
2
C +
1
2
ψ−γ
1−ψ
2ψ−γ−1
1−ψ (a j
′/ j)2σ2S − γ(ψ−γ)1−ψ ρσCσS (a j′/ j)
−γρσCσD − γρσCσS (ah′/h)
+
ψ−γ
1−ψσDσS (a j
′/ j) + ψ−γ1−ψσ
2
Sa
2( j′/ j)(h′/h) + σDσS (ah′/h) + ψ−γ1−ψ j
−1 + h−1

(B.12)
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and
0 =

− 1−γ1−ψ δ − (γ − 1)geC + γ(γ−1)2 σ2C + 1−γ1−ψ (a j′/ j)µeS + 1−γ2(1−ψ) (a2 j′′/ j)σ2S
+12
1−γ
1−ψ
ψ−γ
1−ψ (a j
′/ j)2σ2S +
(1−γ)2
1−ψ ρσCσS (a j
′/ j) + 1−γ1−ψ j
−1

.
(B.13)
We approximate h and j by
hˆ(z) =
∑n
r=0
arTr (z), lˆ (z) =
∑m
r=0
brTr (z), (B.14)
where Tr (z) is the r th degree Chebyshev polynomial of the first kind.1 The pro-
jection method chooses the coefficients {ar }nr=0 and {br }mr=0 so that the differential
equations are approximately satisfied. One criterion for a sufficient approximation
is to minimize the weighted sum of squared errors
∑N
i=1
1√
1−z2i

− (1−γ)1−ψ δ − γgeC + geD + [(hˆ′/hˆ) + ψ−γ1−ψ ( jˆ′/ jˆ)]aµeS + 12 [(hˆ′′/hˆ)
+
ψ−γ
1−ψ ( jˆ
′′/ jˆ)]a2σ2S +
γ(γ+1)
2 σ
2
C +
1
2
ψ−γ
1−ψ
2ψ−γ−1
1−ψ (a jˆ
′/ jˆ)2σ2S
−γ(ψ−γ)1−ψ ρσCσS (a jˆ′/ jˆ) − γρσCσD − γρσCσS (ahˆ′/hˆ)
+
ψ−γ
1−ψσDσS (a jˆ
′/ jˆ) + ψ−γ1−ψσ
2
Sa
2( jˆ′/ jˆ)(hˆ′/hˆ) + σDσS (ahˆ′/hˆ)
+
ψ−γ
1−ψ jˆ
−1
+ hˆ
−1

2
z=zi
+
∑N
i=1
1√
1−z2i

− 1−γ1−ψ δ − (γ − 1)geC + γ(γ−1)2 σ2C + 1−γ1−ψ (a jˆ′/ jˆ)µeS
+12
1−γ
1−ψ
ψ−γ
1−ψ (a jˆ
′/ jˆ)2σ2S +
(1−γ)2
1−ψ ρσCσS (a jˆ
′/ jˆ) + 1−γ1−ψ jˆ
−1
+
1−γ
2(1−ψ) (a
2 jˆ′′/ jˆ)σ2S

2
z=zi
,
(B.15)
where {zi}Ni=0 are the N zeros of TN (z). By the Chebyshev interpolation theorem, if
N is sufficiently larger than n and m, and if the sum of weighted square in (B.15) is
sufficiently small, the approximated functions hˆ(z) and lˆ (z) are sufficiently close to
the true solutions.
For the numerical results in the main text, we set m = 40, n = 40, N = 400. We then
apply the Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm and obtain a minimized sum of squared
errors less than 10−11. The small size of the total error indicates convergence of
the numerical solution. The solution is also insensitive to the choice of n, m, or
1See Mason and Handscomb (2003) for a detailed discussion of the properties of Chebyshev
polynomials.
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N . Together, these findings suggest that the numerical solutions are a sufficient
approximation for the true h and j functions.
The same numerical procedure is applied to solving the Kolmogorov forward equa-
tion (2.25). 
B.3 Additional Discussion about Return Expectations and Cash Flow Expec-
tations
The direct implication of return extrapolation is that the agent’s subjective expecta-
tion about the future stock market return
Eet [PDt+dt] = 1 + E
e
t [rDt+dt]dt = E
e
t

PDt+dt
PDt
 + DtdtPDt (B.16)
is a positive function of the stock market’s recent past returns. Rearranging terms
gives
PDt
Dt
=
1
Eet [rDt+dt] − Eet [dPDt /(PDt dt)]
. (B.17)
That is, the current price-dividend ratio is determined by the agent’s subjective
expectation about the future stock market return Eet [rDt+dt] and the agent’s subjective
expectation about future price growth Eet [dPDt /(PDt dt)]. Equation (B.17) does
not suggest an explicit role for the agent’s expectation about dividend growth in
determining the price-dividend ratio.
However, two conditions allow us to link the price-dividend ratio of the stock
market to the agent’s expectation about dividend growth. First, the law of iterated
expectations must hold so that we can iterate forward the Euler equation (2.4) with
the stock market as the tradeable asset. Second, the transversality condition must
hold so that the economy permits no bubbles.2 These two conditions allow us to
obtain
PDt
Dt
= Eet

∫ ∞
t
e−δ(1−γ)(s−t)/(1−ψ)
(
C˜s
Ct
)−ψ(1−γ)/(1−ψ)
M˜ (ψ−γ)/(1−ψ)t→s
(
D˜s
Dt
)
ds
 ,
(B.18)
where M˜t→s denotes the continuously compounded gross return for holding the
Lucas tree from time t to time s (> t). Equation (B.18) says that the current price-
dividend ratio of the stock market equals the agent’s subjective expectation of the
2The transversality condition holds in this economy as the stock market price is bounded by a
finite range.
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sum of discounted future dividend growths.
For an infinitely-lived agent, (B.18) further implies that the agent is aware of the fact
that both her expectation about future price growth and her expectation about future
returns are linked to her expectation about future dividend growth. The specific
relationship between these expectations is discussed in Sections 2.2 and 2.3. 
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B.4 Figures and Tables
The figure plots the price-dividend ratio of the stock market f , the volatility of
stock market returns σDP , the rational expectation about the log excess return E[r
D,e]
(the conditional equity premium), and the interest rate r , each as a function of the
sentiment variable S. The parameter values are gC = 1.91%, gD = 2.45%, σC =
3.8%, σD = 11%, ρ = 0.2, γ = 10, ψ = 0.9, δ = 2%, θ = 0.5, χ = 0.18, λ = 0.18, µH
= 15%, and µL = –15%.
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Figure B.1: Important Equilibrium Quantities Each as a Function of Sentiment.
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Figure B.2: Objectively Measured Steady-State Distribution of Sentiment.
The figure plots the objective steady-state distribution of sentiment ξ as a function
of the sentiment variable S. The parameter values are gC = 1.91%, gD = 2.45%, σC
= 3.8%, σD = 11%, ρ = 0.2, γ = 10, ψ = 0.9, δ = 2%, θ = 0.5, χ = 0.18, λ = 0.18,
µH = 15%, and µL = –15%.
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Figure B.3: Objective and Subjective Expectations about Price Growth.
The dashed line plots the objective (rational) expectation about price growth,
Et[(dPDt )/(PDt dt)], as a function of the sentiment variable St . The solid line
plots the agent’s subjective expectation about price growth, Eet [dPDt /(PDt dt)], as a
function of the sentiment variable St . The parameter values are gC = 1.91%, gD =
2.45%, σC = 3.8%, σD = 11%, ρ = 0.2, γ = 10, ψ = 0.9, δ = 2%, θ = 0.5, χ = 0.18,
λ = 0.18, µH = 15%, and µL = –15%.
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Figure B.4: Agent’s Expectations about Stock Market Returns, Price Growth, and
Dividend Growth.
The dashed line plots the agent’s expectation about stock market returns, Eet [(dPDt +
Dtdt)/(PDt dt)] = (1 − θ)gD + θSt + 1/ f , as a function of the sentiment vari-
able St . The dotted-dashed line plots the agent’s expectation about price growth,
Eet [dPDt /(PDt dt)] = (1− θ)gD + θSt , as a function of the sentiment variable St . The
solid line plots the agent’s expectation about dividend growth, Eet [dDt/(Dtdt)], as
a function of the sentiment variable St . The parameter values are gC = 1.91%, gD =
2.45%, σC = 3.8%, σD = 11%, ρ = 0.2, γ = 10, ψ = 0.9, δ = 2%, θ = 0.5, χ = 0.18,
λ = 0.18, µH = 15%, and µL = –15%.
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Figure B.5: Comparative Statics: Utility Parameters.
The upper panel plots the average equity premium E[rD,e] and the average volatility
of stock market returns σ(rD,e), each as a function of γ, the coefficient of relative
risk aversion. The lower panel plots the average equity premium E[rD,e] and the
average volatility of stock market returns σ(rD,e), each as a function of ψ, the
reciprocal of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. The default values for γ
and ψ are 10 and 0.9, respectively. The other parameter values are gC = 1.91%, gD
= 2.45%, σC = 3.8%, σD = 11%, ρ = 0.2, δ = 2%, θ = 0.5, χ = 0.18, λ = 0.18, µH
= 15%, and µL = –15%.
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Figure B.6a: Comparative Statics: Belief Parameters (I).
The figure plots the average equity premium E[rD,e], the average volatility of stock
market returns σ(rD,e), the average price-dividend ratio exp(E[`n(P/D)]), and the
average interest rate E[r] (in percentage), each as a function of θ, the parameter that
controls the extent to which the agent is behavioral. The other parameter values are
gC = 1.91%, gD = 2.45%, σC = 3.8%, σD = 11%, ρ = 0.2, γ = 10, ψ = 0.9, δ = 2%,
χ = 0.18, λ = 0.18, µH = 15%, and µL = –15%.
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Figure B.6b: Comparative Statics: Belief Parameters (II).
The figure plots the predictability of stock market returns and the persistence of the
price-dividend ratio, each as a function of θ, χ, or λ. The predictability of returns
is measured by the slope coefficient for a regression of the next year’s log excess
return on the current log price-dividend ratio. The persistence of the price-dividend
ratio is measured by the one-year autocorrelation of log price-dividend ratios. The
default values for θ, χ, and λ are 0.5, 0.18, and −0.18, respectively. The other
parameter values are gC = 1.91%, gD = 2.45%, σC = 3.8%, σD = 11%, ρ = 0.2, γ =
10, ψ = 0.9, δ = 2%, µH = 15%, and µL = –15%.
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Table B.1: Investor Expectations.
Eet [(dPDt + Dtdt)/(PDt dt)] Eet [dPDt /(PDt dt)]
RDt−12→t
0.022 0.023 0.040 0.040
(8.2) (11.7) (8.4) (12.1)
`n(P/D) 0.068 0.069 0.120 0.121
(29.5) (39.2) (36.8) (48.9)
Constant 0.07 0.07 –0.13 –0.13 0.02 0.02 –0.33 –0.34
Sample
size
15 yr. 50 yr. 15 yr. 50 yr. 15 yr. 50 yr. 15 yr. 50 yr.
R2 0.57 0.54 0.98 0.98 0.58 0.55 0.99 0.99
Eet [(dPDt + Dtdt)/(PDt dt)] − rt Eet [dPDt /(PDt dt)] − rt
RDt−12→t
0.013 0.013 0.030 0.030
(6.6) (9.0) (7.8) (11.1)
`n(P/D) 0.039 0.039 0.091 0.091
(12.4) (16.6) (22.3) (28.7)
Constant 0.05 0.05 –0.06 –0.06
–
0.002
–
0.002 –0.27 –0.27
Sample
size
15 yr. 50 yr. 15 yr. 50 yr. 15 yr. 50 yr. 15 yr. 50 yr.
R2 0.51 0.47 0.92 0.91 0.56 0.53 0.97 0.97
The table reports the regression coefficient and the t-statistic (in parenthesis), the
intercept, as well as the adjusted R-squared, for regressing the agent’s expectation
about future stock market returns either on the past twelve-month cumulative raw
return RDt−12→t or on the current log price-dividend ratio `n(Pt/Dt ), over a sample
of 15 years or 50 years. In the top panel, the expectations measure for the first four
columns is Eet [(dPDt +Dtdt)/(PDt dt)], and the expectations measure for the last four
columns is Eet [dPDt /(PDt dt)]. In the bottom panel, the expectations measure for the
first four columns is Eet [(dPDt + Dtdt)/(PDt dt)] − rt , and the expectations measure
for the last four columns is Eet [dPDt /(PDt dt)] − rt . Each reported value is averaged
over 100 trials, and each trial represents a regression using monthly data simulated
from the model. The t-statistics are calculated using a Newey-West estimator with
twelve-month lags. The parameter values are gC = 1.91%, gD = 2.45%, σC = 3.8%,
σD = 11%, ρ = 0.2, γ = 10, ψ = 0.9, δ = 2%, θ = 0.5, χ = 0.18, λ = 0.18, µH =
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15%, and µL = –15%.
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Table B.2: Determinants of Investor Expectations.
Eet [(dPDt + Dtdt)/(PDt dt)] Eet [dPDt /(PDt dt)]
φ 0.432 0.417 0.428 0.420
a 0.064 0.064 0.004 0.004
b 1.15 1.18 2.04 2.07
Sample
size
15 yr. 50 yr. 15 yr. 50 yr.
R2 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.98
Eet [(dPDt + Dtdt)/(PDt dt)] − rt Eet [dPDt /(PDt dt)] − rt
φ 0.414 0.408 0.418 0.420
a 0.047 0.047 –0.013 -0.010
b 0.70 0.67 1.58 1.55
Sample
size
15 yr. 50 yr. 15 yr. 50 yr.
R2 0.92 0.90 0.97 0.96
The table reports the parameter φ, the intercept a, the regression coefficient b, and
the adjusted R-squared, for running the non-linear least squares regression
Expectationt = a + b
∑n
j=1
w jRD(t− j∆t)→(t−( j−1)∆t) + εt,
over a sample of 15 years or 50 years, where w j ≡ e−φ( j−1)∆t
/∑n
l=1 e
−φ(l−1)∆t, ∆t
= 1/12, and n = 600. In the top panel, the expectations measure for the first four
columns is Eet [(dPDt +Dtdt)/(PDt dt)], and the expectations measure for the last four
columns is Eet [dPDt /(PDt dt)]. In the bottom panel, the expectations measure for the
first four columns is Eet [(dPDt + Dtdt)/(PDt dt)] − rt , and the expectations measure
for the last four columns is Eet [dPDt /(PDt dt)] − rt . Each reported value is averaged
over 100 trials, and each trial represents a regression using monthly data simulated
from the model. The t-statistics are calculated using a Newey-West estimator with
twelve-month lags. The parameter values are gC = 1.91%, gD = 2.45%, σC = 3.8%,
σD = 11%, ρ = 0.2, γ = 10, ψ = 0.9, δ = 2%, θ = 0.5, χ = 0.18, λ = 0.18, µH =
167
15%, and µL = –15%.
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Table B.3: Parameter Values.
Parameter Variable Value
Asset parameters:
Expected consumption growth gC 1.91%
Expected dividend growth gD 2.45%
Standard deviation of consumption
growth
σC 3.8%
Standard deviation of dividend growth σD 11%
Correlation between dD and dC ρ 0.2
Utility parameters:
Relative risk aversion γ 10
Reciprocal of EIS ψ 0.9
Subjective discount rate δ 0.02
Belief parameters:
Degree of extrapolation θ 0.5
Perceived transition intensity from H
to L
χ 0.18
Perceived transition intensity from L
to H λ 0.18
Upper bound of sentiment µH 0.15
Lower bound of sentiment µL –0.15
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Table B.4: Basic Moments.
Statistic Theoretical value Empiricalvalue
Equity premium (E[rD,e]) 4.88% 3.90%
Return volatility (σ(rD,e)) 27.4% 18.0%
Sharpe ratio (E[rD,e]/σ(rD,e)) 0.20 0.22
Interest rate (E[r]) 2.16% 2.92%
Interest rate volatility (σ(r)) 0.33% 2.89%
Price-dividend ratio
(exp(E[`n(P/D)])) 19.4 21.1
The table reports six important moments about stock market prices and returns:
the long-run average of the equity premium (the rational expectation of log excess
return, E[rD,e]), the average volatility of stock market returns (the volatility of log
excess return, σ(rD,e)), the Sharpe ratio (E[rD,e]/σ(rD,e)), the average interest rate
(E[r]), interest rate volatility (σ(r)), and the average price-dividend ratio of the stock
market (exp(E[`n(P/D)])). The theoretical values for these moments are computed
over the objectively measured steady-state distribution of sentiment S. The model
parameters are gC = 1.91%, gD = 2.45%, σC = 3.8%, σD = 11%, ρ = 0.2, γ = 10,
ψ = 0.9, δ = 2%, θ = 0.5, χ = 0.18, λ = 0.18, µH = 15%, and µL = –15%. For
the empirical values, five out of six are from Campbell and Cochrane (1999); the
empirical value for interest rate volatility is not reported in Campbell and Cochrane
(1999), so we report the value from Beeler and Campbell (2012).
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Table B.5: Return Predictability Regressions.
Theoretical value Empirical value
Horizon
(years)
10×
coefficient
Adjusted
R-squared
10×
coefficient
Adjusted
R-squared
1 –7.2 0.13 –1.3 0.04
2 –9.5 0.16 –2.8 0.08
3 –10.1 0.15 –3.5 0.09
5 –10.6 0.13 –6.0 0.18
7 –11.0 0.12 –7.5 0.23
The table reports the regression coefficient β j and the adjusted R-squared for a
regression of the log excess return of stock market from time t to time t + j on the
current log price-dividend ratio `n(PDt /Dt )
rD,et→t+ j = α j + β j`n(P
D
t /Dt ) + ε j,t,
where j = 1, 2, 3, 5, and 7 (years). The theoretical values are calculated using
10,000 years of monthly data simulated from the model. The parameter values are
gC = 1.91%, gD = 2.45%, σC = 3.8%, σD = 11%, ρ = 0.2, γ = 10, ψ = 0.9, δ = 2%,
θ = 0.5, χ = 0.18, λ = 0.18, µH = 15%, and µL = –15%. The empirical values are
from Campbell and Cochrane (1999).
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Table B.6: Correlation between Consumption Growth and Stock Returns.
Correlation
Theoretical value Empirical value
monthly quarterly annual annual
Corr(rD,et→t+1, `n(Ct−1/Ct−2)) –0.01 –0.02 –0.02 –0.05
Corr(rD,et→t+1, `n(Ct/Ct−1)) –0.01 –0.03 –0.06 –0.08
Corr(rD,et→t+1, `n(Ct+1/Ct )) 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.09
Corr(rD,et→t+1, `n(Ct+2/Ct+1)) 0.00 –0.00 0.01 0.49
Corr(rD,et→t+1, `n(Ct+3/Ct+2)) –0.00 –0.00 0.01 0.05
The table reports correlations between log consumption growth and log excess re-
turns of the stock market. The log consumption growth and log excess returns are
computed at either a monthly, a quarterly, or an annual horizon. Correlations are
either contemporaneous or with a lead-lag structure; for instance, at a monthly fre-
quency, Corr(rD,et→t+1, `n(Ct+2/Ct+1)) is the correlation between the current monthly
log excess return and the log consumption growth in the subsequent month. The
theoretical values are calculated using 10,000 years of monthly data simulated from
the model. The parameter values are gC = 1.91%, gD = 2.45%, σC = 3.8%, σD =
11%, ρ = 0.2, γ = 10, ψ = 0.9, δ = 2%, θ = 0.5, χ = 0.18, λ = 0.18, µH = 15%, and
µL = –15%. The empirical values are from Campbell and Cochrane (1999).
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Table B.7: Campbell-Shiller Decomposition.
Realized dividend growth and returns
Coefficient Value
Adjusted
R-squared
DRobjective 0.98 0.209
CFobjective 0.02 1.2 × 10−4
Subjective expectations about dividend growth and returns
Coefficient Value
Adjusted
R-squared
DRsubjective −0.08 0.982
CFsubjective 1.08 0.984
The table reports the four coefficients, CFobjective, DRobjective, CFsubjective, and
DRobjective, defined in equations (2.29) and (2.30), as well as their corresponding
adjusted R-squared. These coefficients and R-squared are calculated using 10,000
years of monthly data simulated from the model. At each point in time, for a
given level of sentiment, subjective expectations about dividend growth and returns
are calculated as the average values of 100 trials. Each trial is 50 years of monthly
simulated data under the agent’s expectationswith the given initial level of sentiment.
For realized dividend growth and returns, both
∑∞
j=0 ξ
j∆d(t+ j∆t)→(t+( j+1)∆t) and∑∞
j=0 ξ
jrD(t+ j∆t)→(t+( j+1)∆t) are approximated using 50 years of monthly simulated
data. From the simulated data, ξ = 0.9957. The other parameter values are gC =
1.91%, gD = 2.45%, σC = 3.8%, σD = 11%, ρ = 0.2, γ = 10, ψ = 0.9, δ = 2%, θ =
0.5, χ = 0.18, λ = 0.18, µH = 15%, and µL = –15%.
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Table B.8: Autocorrelations of Log Excess Returns and Log Price-dividend Ratios.
Lag
(years)
Theoretical value Empirical value
`n(PD/D)rD,e Σ ji=1ρ(r
D,e
t , r
D,e
t−i ) `n(P
D/D)rD,e Σ
j
i=1ρ(r
D,e
t , r
D,e
t−i )
1 0.33
–
0.28 –0.28 0.78 0.05 0.05
2 0.11
–
0.09 –0.37 0.57
–
0.21 –0.16
3 0.05
–
0.02 –0.39 0.50
–
0.08 –0.09
5 0.00
–
0.01 –0.40 0.32
–
0.14 –0.28
7 –0.02
–
0.01 –0.41 0.29 0.11 –0.15
The table reports, over various lags j, the autocorrelations of log price-dividend
ratios and log excess returns, as well as the partial sum of the autocorrelations of
log excess returns. The operator ρ(x, y) computes the sample correlation between
variable x and variable y. The theoretical values are calculated using 10,000 years
of monthly data simulated from the model; for each month, we compound the next
12 months of log excess returns to obtain an annual log excess return. The parameter
values are gC = 1.91%, gD = 2.45%, σC = 3.8%, σD = 11%, ρ = 0.2, γ = 10, ψ =
0.9, δ = 2%, θ = 0.5, χ = 0.18, λ = 0.18, µH = 15%, and µL = –15%. The empirical
values are from Campbell and Cochrane (1999).
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Table B.9: Return Predictability Regressions in the True Regime-Switching Model.
Theoretical value Empirical value
Horizon
(years)
10×
coefficient
103×Adjusted
R-squared
10×
coefficient
Adjusted
R-squared
1 0.2 0.16 –1.3 0.04
2 0.4 0.31 –2.8 0.08
3 0.5 0.32 –3.5 0.09
5 0.8 0.54 –6.0 0.18
7 0.7 0.34 –7.5 0.23
The table reports the regression coefficient β j and the adjusted R-squared for a
regression of the log excess return of stock market from time t to time t + j on the
current log price-dividend ratio `n(PDt /Dt )
rD,et→t+ j = α j + β j`n(P
D
t /Dt ) + ε j,t,
where j = 1, 2, 3, 5, and 7 (years). The theoretical values are calculated using 10,000
years of monthly data simulated from the true regime-switching model described in
Section 2.5. The parameter values are gC = 1.91%, gD = 2.45%, σC = 3.8%, σD =
11%, ρ = 0.2, γ = 10, ψ = 0.9, δ = 2%, θ = 0.5, χ = 0.18, λ = 0.18, µH = 15%, and
µL = –15%. The empirical values are from Campbell and Cochrane (1999).
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Table B.10: Investor Expectations in Bansal and Yaron (2004).
Expectation of return Expectation of return w/o divd.
RDt−12→t
0.025 0.030 0.025 0.031
(2.4) (3.8) (2.5) (4.0)
`n(P/D) 0.068 0.067 0.069 0.067
(5.6) (7.6) (5.8) (7.6)
Constant 1.06 1.05 0.88 0.88 1.06 1.05 0.88 0.89
Sample
size
15 yr. 50 yr. 15 yr. 50 yr. 15 yr. 50 yr. 15 yr. 50 yr.
R2 0.140 0.142 0.500 0.451 0.136 0.145 0.529 0.451
Expectation of excess return Expectation of excess return w/o divd.
RDt−12→t
–
0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001
(–
0.1) (0.1)
(–
0.1) (0.2)
`n(P/D)
–
0.008
–
0.012
–
0.010
–
0.011
(–
0.8)
(–
1.3)
(–
0.8)
(–
1.2)
Constant 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.09
Sample
size
15 yr. 50 yr. 15 yr. 50 yr. 15 yr. 50 yr. 15 yr. 50 yr.
R2 0.026 0.008 0.087 0.054 0.026 0.008 0.093 0.053
The table reports the regression coefficient and the t-statistic (in parenthesis), the
intercept, as well as the adjusted R-squared, for regressing four measures of rational
expectation of return—raw return or excess return, with or without dividend yield—
either on the past twelve-month cumulative raw return or on the current log price-
dividend ratio, over a sample of 15 years or 50 years. The conditional expectation
of subsequent returns, the dependent variable in each regression, is computed by
averaging realized returns across simulations over a twelve-month horizon for a
given state of the economy. Each reported value is the estimator median over
1,000 trials, and each trial represents a regression using monthly data simulated
from Bansal and Yaron (2004). The t-statistics are calculated using a Newey-West
estimator with twelve-month lags. The parameters take their default values from
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Tables II and IV of Bansal and Yaron (2004).
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Table B.11: Investor Expectations in Bansal et al. (2012).
Expectation of return Expectation of return w/o divd.
RDt−12→t
0.006 0.010 0.006 0.011
(0.7) (1.3) (0.7) (1.3)
`n(P/D)
–
0.006
–
0.041
–
0.006
–
0.038
(–
0.3)
(–
3.1)
(–
0.2)
(–
2.9)
Constant 1.08 1.08 1.11 1.22 1.08 1.08 1.11 1.21
Sample
size
15 yr. 50 yr. 15 yr. 50 yr. 15 yr. 50 yr. 15 yr. 50 yr.
R2 0.031 0.021 0.129 0.147 0.033 0.020 0.139 0.136
Expectation of excess return Expectation of excess return w/o divd.
RDt−12→t
–
0.003 0.000
–
0.004
–
0.001
(–
0.3) (0.1)
(–
0.5)
(–
0.1)
`n(P/D)
–
0.071
–
0.095
–
0.036
–
0.054
(–
5.2)
(–
10.7)
(–
3.4)
(–
5.2)
Constant 0.09 0.08 0.30 0.37 0.08 0.08 0.19 0.24
Sample
size
15 yr. 50 yr. 15 yr. 50 yr. 15 yr. 50 yr. 15 yr. 50 yr.
R2 0.021 0.010 0.432 0.599 0.026 0.008 0.226 0.254
The table reports the regression coefficient and the t-statistic (in parenthesis), the
intercept, as well as the adjusted R-squared, for regressing four measures of rational
expectation of return—raw return or excess return, with or without dividend yield—
either on the past twelve-month cumulative raw return or on the current log price-
dividend ratio, over a sample of 15 years or 50 years. The conditional expectation
of subsequent returns, the dependent variable in each regression, is computed by
averaging realized returns across simulations over a twelve-month horizon for a given
state of the economy. Each reported value is the estimator median over 1,000 trials,
and each trial represents a regression using monthly data simulated from Bansal
et al. (2012). The t-statistics are calculated using a Newey-West estimator with
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twelve-month lags. The parameters take their default values from Table 1 of Bansal
et al. (2012).
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Table B.12: Investor Expectations in the Fundamental Extrapolation Model.
Eet [(dPDt + Dtdt)/(PDt dt)] Eet [dPDt /(PDt dt)]
RDt−12→t
0.004 0.003 0.010 0.010
(0.21) (0.63) (1.15) (2.04)
`n(P/D) 0.017 0.019 0.040 0.042
(0.88) (1.62) (2.08) (3.52)
Constant 0.05 0.05 –0.01 –0.02 0.03 0.03 –0.12 –0.13
Sample size 15 yr. 50 yr. 15 yr. 50 yr. 15 yr. 50 yr. 15 yr. 50 yr.
R2 0.14 0.04 0.24 0.10 0.17 0.08 0.31 0.22
Eet [(dPDt + Dtdt)/(PDt dt)] − rt Eet [dPDt /(PDt dt)] − rt
RDt−12→t
–
0.004
–
0.004 0.003 0.002
(–
0.88)
(–
1.13) (0.07) (0.42)
`n(P/D)
–
0.009
–
0.007 0.014 0.016
(–
0.49)
(–
0.54) (0.71) (1.35)
Constant 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.006 0.006 –0.05 –0.05
Sample size 15 yr. 50 yr. 15 yr. 50 yr. 15 yr. 50 yr. 15 yr. 50 yr.
R2 0.15 0.05 0.22 0.06 0.14 0.04 0.23 0.08
The table reports the regression coefficient and the t-statistic (in parenthesis), the
intercept, as well as the adjusted R-squared, for regressing the agent’s expectation
about future stock market returns either on the past twelve-month cumulative raw
return RDt−12→t or on the current log price-dividend ratio `n(Pt/Dt ), over a sample
of 15 years or 50 years. In the top panel, the expectations measure for the first four
columns is Eet [(dPDt +Dtdt)/(PDt dt)], and the expectations measure for the last four
columns is Eet [dPDt /(PDt dt)]. In the bottom panel, the expectations measure for the
first four columns is Eet [(dPDt +Dtdt)/(PDt dt)]−rt , and the expectations measure for
the last four columns is Eet [dPDt /(PDt dt)]− rt . Each reported value is averaged over
100 trials, and each trial represents a regression using monthly data simulated from
the fundamental extrapolation model described in Section 2.6. The t-statistics are
calculated using a Newey-West estimator with twelve-month lags. The parameter
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values are gC = 1.91%, gD = 2.45%, σC = 3.8%, σD = 11%, ρ = 0.2, γ = 10, ψ =
0.9, δ = 2%, θ = 0.5, χ = 0.18, λ = 0.18, µH = 15%, and µL = –15%.
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Table B.13: Basic Moments in the Fundamental Extrapolation Model.
Statistic Theoretical value Empiricalvalue
Equity premium (E[rD,e]) 1.85% 3.90%
Return volatility (σ(rD,e)) 20.4% 18.0%
Sharpe ratio (E[rD,e]/σ(rD,e)) 0.08 0.22
Interest rate (E[r]) 2.27% 2.92%
Interest rate volatility (σ(r)) 0.23% 2.89%
Price-dividend ratio
(exp(E[`n(P/D)])) 44.4 21.1
The table reports six important moments about stock market prices and returns:
the long-run average of the equity premium (the rational expectation of log excess
return, E[rD,e]), the average volatility of stock market returns (the volatility of log
excess return, σ(rD,e)), the Sharpe ratio (E[rD,e]/σ(rD,e)), the average interest
rate (E[r]), interest rate volatility (σ(r)), and the average price-dividend ratio of
the stock market (exp(E[`n(P/D)])). The theoretical values for these moments
are computed over the objectively measured steady-state distribution of sentiment
S in the fundamental extrapolation model described in Section 2.6. The model
parameters are gC = 1.91%, gD = 2.45%, σC = 3.8%, σD = 11%, ρ = 0.2, γ = 10,
ψ = 0.9, δ = 2%, θ = 0.5, χ = 0.18, λ = 0.18, µH = 15%, and µL = –15%. For
the empirical values, five out of six are from Campbell and Cochrane (1999); the
empirical value for interest rate volatility is not reported in Campbell and Cochrane
(1999), so we report the value from Beeler and Campbell (2012).
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A p p e n d i x C
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER THREE
C.1 Figures and Tables
Figure C.1: Tail Risk Measurements Based on Shiller Tail Risks Survey.
In the sample period 1990:01 - 2016:01, I plot the Shiller Crash Index for the
individual and institutional investor subsample, respectively. The shaded areas
represent NBER recessions.
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Figure C.2: Connecting Investor Expectations with Perceived Left-tail Risks.
The figure provides an intuitive connection between investor expectations and
their perceived left-tail probabilities. (Figure source: Bordalo et al. (2018).)
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Figure C.3: Implied Left-tail Risks based on Investor Expectations.
In the sample period 1990:01 - 2016:01, I plot four the implied left-tail risks
from investor expectation surveys (AA, II, and Gallup) and from return extrap-
olation. In the first three figures, I plot the implied left-tail risks from three
investor expectation surveys. In the lower-left figure, I plot the implied left-tail
risks based on return extrapolation. The shaded areas represent NBER recessions.
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Table C.1: Summary Statistics and Correlations between Investor Expectation Sur-
veys
This table reports the summary statistics and correlation matrix between investor ex-
pectation surveys. Panel A reports the summary statistics for the qualitative investor
expectations. Panel B reports the summary statistics for the rescaled quantitative in-
vestor expectations. Panel C reports the correlations between the qualitative investor
expectations.
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
AA Investor Expectation 331 0.086 0.153 −0.410 0.505
II Investor Expectation 626 13.632 19.794 −49.200 66.640
Gallup Investor Expectation 182 19.362 22.938 −45.000 57.000
Shiller Investor Expectation 183 79.287 7.258 61.940 95.620
Graham & Harvey investor Expectation 35 5.757 1.541 2.180 9.060
Panel A: Summary Statistics for the Qualitative Investor Expectation Series
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
AA Investor Expectation 331 0.099 0.016 0.047 0.143
II Investor Expectation 626 0.099 0.030 0.004 0.179
Gallup Investor Expectation 182 0.107 0.011 0.077 0.124
Shiller Investor Expectation 164 0.111 0.002 0.106 0.116
Graham & Harvey investor Expectation 35 0.109 0.018 0.067 0.148
Panel B: Summary Statistics for the Rescaled Quantitative Investor Expectation Series
AA II Gallup Shiller Graham & Harvey
AA 1.00 0.53 0.63 0.32 0.60
II 0.53 1.00 0.53 0.10 0.74
Gallup 0.63 0.53 1.00 0.53 0.74
Shiller 0.32 0.10 0.53 1.00 0.81
Graham & Harvey 0.60 0.74 0.74 0.81 1.00
Panel C: Correlations between raw investor expectation series
186
Table C.2: Correlations between the Left-tail Probabilities from Investor Expecta-
tion Surveys.
This table shows pairwise correlation coefficients between the implied left-tail prob-
abilities from investor expectation surveys and these directly from Shiller left-tail
risks survey. For example, Left-tail Probability based on AA represents the implied
left-tail probability based on the rescaledAA investor expectation series. The Shiller
crash index is based on the U.S. Crash Index of ICF at Yale, which measures the
percentage of investors who report a less than 10% left-tail probabilities.
Individual Institutional
Individual Crash Index Institutional Crash Index
Left-tail Probability based on AA 0.56*** 0.55***
Left-tail Probability based on II 0.55*** 0.54***
Left-tail Probability based on Gallup 0.67*** 0.69***
Left-tail Probability based on Shiller 0.56*** 0.58***
Left-tail Probability based on Graham & Harvey 0.76*** 0.76***
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table C.3: Contemporaneous Connections between Shiller Left-tail Probability and
Investor Expectations: Individual Investors
I estimate time-series regressions of the form:
Shiller Individual Crash Indext = a + bSurvey Sentimentt + Xt + ut, (C.1)
where Shiller Individual Crash Indext denotes the Individual Crash Index based on Shiller
left-tail questions from the individual investor subsample under the interpretation of annual
frequency, Survey Sentimentt represents survey measurements of investor expectations on
future U.S. equity market returns and Xt represents controls including averaged VIX index
and the realized S&P 500 volatility within month t. All survey measurements of investor
expectations are rescaled, which can be interpreted in units of nominal stock returns. Panel
A shows results for contemporaneous correlations. Panel B shows predictive relations for
one-month ahead perceived crash probabilities. Panel C shows predictive relations for three
month ahead perceived crash probabilities. All t-statistics are corrected using the approach
in Newey and West (1986).
Dependent variable:
Crash Probability from Shiller Survey: Individual Investors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
AA −190.812∗∗∗ −107.270∗∗
(53.248) (48.919)
II −153.325∗∗∗ −36.006
(41.471) (62.678)
Gallup −485.934∗∗∗ −194.966∗
(100.201) (115.515)
Shiller −2, 006.273∗∗∗ −1, 897.276∗∗∗
(604.249) (346.645)
Graham&Harvey −301.859∗∗∗ −153.205∗∗
(26.756) (73.590)
VIX_agg 0.224∗∗ 0.242 0.276∗ 0.263∗∗∗ 0.437∗∗
(0.100) (0.171) (0.148) (0.093) (0.193)
vol_monthly 0.240∗∗ 0.240∗∗ 0.200 0.258∗∗∗ 0.159∗
(0.096) (0.105) (0.124) (0.099) (0.084)
Constant −14.764∗∗ −16.533∗∗∗ 16.125 189.497∗∗∗ −0.574 −31.976∗∗∗ −38.881∗∗∗ −23.972∗ 167.234∗∗∗ −29.005∗∗∗
(5.740) (4.959) (10.397) (67.790) (4.200) (6.667) (10.221) (14.529) (39.337) (10.817)
Observations 170 171 131 164 35 169 170 131 164 35
R2 0.168 0.189 0.366 0.311 0.375 0.396 0.357 0.515 0.634 0.653
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table C.4: Contemporaneous Connections between Shiller Left-tail Probability and
Investor Expectations: Institutional Investors
I estimate time-series regressions of the form:
Shiller Institutional Crash Indext = a + bSurvey Sentimentt + Xt + ut, (C.2)
where Shiller Institutional Crash Indext denotes the Institutional Crash Index based on
Shiller left-tail questions from the institutional investor subsample under the interpreta-
tion of annual frequency, Survey Sentimentt represents survey measurements of investor
expectations on future U.S. equity market returns, and Xt represents controls including
averaged VIX index and the realized S&P 500 volatility within month t. All survey mea-
surements of investor expectations are rescaled which can be interpreted in units of nominal
stock returns.
Dependent variable:
Crash Probability from Shiller Survey: Institutional investors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
AA −126.767∗ −11.219
(65.666) (74.383)
II −157.872∗∗∗ −50.902
(37.404) (64.026)
Gallup −412.324∗∗∗ 129.371
(140.506) (120.671)
Shiller −1, 502.081∗∗ −1, 364.190∗∗
(758.031) (557.957)
Graham&Harvey −297.620∗∗∗ −150.549∗∗∗
(40.810) (47.069)
VIX_agg 0.419∗∗∗ 0.317∗ 0.604∗∗∗ 0.326∗∗ 0.348∗∗∗
(0.157) (0.176) (0.223) (0.150) (0.135)
vol_monthly 0.226 0.263∗∗ 0.315∗∗ 0.353∗∗∗ 0.332∗∗∗
(0.147) (0.128) (0.131) (0.133) (0.094)
Constant −23.091∗∗∗ −18.396∗∗∗ 5.991 130.600 −5.847 −47.045∗∗∗ −41.185∗∗∗ −69.783∗∗∗ 102.092∗ −35.525∗∗∗
(6.409) (3.932) (13.565) (83.372) (4.791) (9.680) (10.186) (15.179) (61.698) (6.938)
Observations 187 188 135 164 35 186 187 135 164 35
R2 0.054 0.162 0.184 0.126 0.330 0.354 0.362 0.572 0.524 0.693
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table C.5: Left-tail Probabilities based on Return Extrapolation and Rational Ex-
pectations (with VIX).
This table compares the left-tail probabilities based on return extrapolation and
rational expectations, with the information form VIX index. The Shiller crash index
is based on the U.S. Crash Index of ICF at Yale, which measures the percentage of
investors who report a less than 10% left-tail probabilities.
Shiller Individual Shiller Institutional
Crash Index Crash Index
Left-tail Probability based on Psentiment 0.55*** 0.55***
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Panel A: Left-tail Probability based on Return Extrapolation.
Shiller Individual Shiller Institutional
Crash Index Crash Index
Left-tail Probability based on logDP 0.09 0.36***
Left-tail Probability based on future realized returns 0.18* 0.20**
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Panel B: Left-tail Probability based on rational expectations.
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Table C.6: Left-tail Probabilities based on return extrapolation and rational expec-
tations (without VIX).
This table compares the left-tail probabilities based on return extrapolation and
rational expectations, without the information form VIX index. The Shiller crash
index is based on theU.S. Crash Index of ICF at Yale, whichmeasures the percentage
of investors who report a less than 10% left-tail probabilities.
Shiller Individual Shiller Institutional
Crash Index Crash Index
Left-tail Probability based on AA 0.41*** 0.24**
Left-tail Probability based on II 0.44*** 0.39***
Left-tail Probability based on Gallup 0.61*** 0.44***
Left-tail Probability based on Psentiment 0.30*** 0.18*
Left-tail Probability based on Shiller 0.56*** 0.36***
Left-tail Probability based on Graham \& Harvey 0.62*** 0.59***
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Panel A. Correlations for implied left-tail probabilities based on surveys (without VIX).
Shiller Individual Shiller Institutional
Crash Index Crash Index
Left-tail Probability based on logDP -0.30*** -0.03
Left-tail Probability based on future realized returns 0.04 0.04
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Panel B. Correlations for left-tail probabilities based on rational expectations(without
VIX).
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Table C.7: Determinant of Perceived Left-tail Probabilities: Individual Investors
I estimate time-series regressions of the form:
Shiller Individual Crash Indext = a + b log(Dt/Pt ) + V IXt + Xt + ut, (C.3)
where log(Dt/Pt ) represents log dividend to price ratio of the U.S. equity market returns,
V IXt represents the average of the VIX index within month t, and Xt represents controls
including the realized S&P 500 volatility, risk free rate, default yield and term yield during
month t. All t-statistics are corrected using the approach in Newey and West (1986).
Dependent variable:
Left-tail Probabilities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Past12 −13.305∗ −6.685∗ 4.256 7.305 4.654 4.533 7.368∗
(7.479) (4.017) (4.481) (5.955) (5.105) (5.320) (3.954)
logPD −22.964∗∗∗ −21.093∗∗∗ −19.025∗∗∗ −17.758∗∗∗ −17.903∗∗∗ −14.726∗∗ −14.970∗∗ −4.079
(7.030) (6.732) (5.235) (5.543) (5.472) (6.209) (6.918) (5.361)
VIX 0.442∗∗∗ 0.342∗∗ 0.273∗∗ 0.231∗∗ 0.284∗∗ 0.288∗∗ 0.377∗∗∗
(0.100) (0.150) (0.124) (0.114) (0.121) (0.131) (0.116)
SP_vol 0.169 0.096 0.108 0.110 0.280∗∗∗
(0.145) (0.108) (0.121) (0.125) (0.082)
Riskfree −843.172 −837.061 −3, 329.633∗∗∗
(823.644) (829.322) (876.495)
def −0.220 −0.085
(2.389) (2.113)
Term −4.059∗∗∗
(0.701)
Constant −18.746∗∗ 58.186∗∗ −41.381∗∗∗ 57.780∗∗ 31.445 21.623 31.964 14.223 15.436 −24.214
(8.143) (27.459) (2.638) (23.454) (22.229) (26.141) (23.055) (28.608) (32.079) (24.210)
Observations 193 190 192 190 189 189 189 189 189 189
Adjusted R2 0.095 0.337 0.276 0.357 0.476 0.488 0.476 0.504 0.501 0.593
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table C.8: Determinant of Perceived Left-tail Probabilities: Institutional Investors
I estimate time-series regressions of the form:
Shiller Institutional Crash Indext = a + b log(Dt/Pt ) + V IXt + Xt + ut, (C.4)
where log(Dt/Pt ) represents log dividend to price ratio of the U.S. equity market returns,
V IXt represents the average of the VIX index within month t, and Xt represents controls
including the realized S&P 500 volatility, risk free rate, default yield and term yield during
month t. All t-statistics are corrected using the approach in Newey and West (1986).
Dependent variable:
Left-tail Probabilities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Past12 −16.314∗∗∗ −13.193∗∗ 1.479 5.909 4.513 −0.135 −0.131
(5.130) (5.317) (5.782) (6.680) (6.648) (6.242) (6.302)
logPD −13.594 −10.968 −7.984 −7.490 −7.239 −7.035 −10.982 −11.016
(8.724) (7.652) (6.785) (7.275) (6.992) (8.052) (7.640) (7.948)
VIX 0.540∗∗∗ 0.518∗∗∗ 0.395∗∗ 0.365∗∗ 0.412∗∗ 0.530∗∗∗ 0.531∗∗∗
(0.123) (0.177) (0.166) (0.162) (0.173) (0.167) (0.167)
SP_vol 0.260 0.202 0.186 0.277 0.279
(0.173) (0.149) (0.159) (0.187) (0.191)
Riskfree −664.955 −877.172 −893.259
(830.918) (717.608) (894.496)
def −6.913∗∗ −6.959∗∗
(3.341) (3.247)
Term −0.040
(1.402)
Constant −17.558∗∗∗ 18.600 −45.377∗∗∗ 22.189 −15.247 −23.884 −17.053 −22.350 1.976 2.207
(5.348) (33.376) (3.309) (26.688) (25.390) (28.608) (28.727) (33.258) (32.345) (33.726)
Observations 210 207 209 207 206 206 206 206 206 206
R2 0.107 0.112 0.286 0.180 0.345 0.370 0.363 0.383 0.416 0.416
Adjusted R2 0.103 0.107 0.283 0.172 0.335 0.358 0.353 0.368 0.398 0.395
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
